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The purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate the
applicability of rational choice theory to a comparative analysis of
petroleum policies in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Norway. It is
assumed that the development of an economically promising resource,
such as petroleum, would be amenable to analysis from an economic
viewpoint, and that government initiatives in this area might reveal
the essential economic interests of the state. If governments are
assumed to have similar economic and political objectives (i.e., to
attain and retain public office, and to acquire the greatest revenues
possible from the exploitation of a depleting natural resource), then
it is to be expected that the petroleum policy outputs in various
states should be similar. Such differences as do exist should be
amenable to explanation by examining the differences in the political
constraints and economic situations of the states in question.
This study proposes to model petroleum policy in four areas:
state participation, pricing, depletion (including exploration and
production policies), and fiscal arrangements, based on the
assumptions central to rational choice theory. A comparison of
policy outputs in the three case states will illustrate the
usefulness of the rational choice approach to comparative policy
analysis.
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CHAPTER ONE
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY AND PETROLEUM POLICY
This dissertation proposes to apply rational choice theory to an
examination of petroleum policies in three cases: Canada, Britain,
and Norway. The purpose of the study is twofold: firstly, to
demonstrate the usefulness of rational choice theory to the
comparison of policy output in general; and secondly, to illustrate
the similarities and dissimilarities in petroleum policies
implemented by various governments within the three case states under
examination. There has been no previous comparative study of the
development of petroleum policy covering these three cases and the
application of rational choice theory within a comparative framework
is exceedingly rare.
The thesis comprises six chapters: the first is devoted to
rational choice theory and its application to the research project;
and the second summarises the historical development of petroleum
policies in each of the three case states. With this theoretical and
historical information, more detailed analysis of petroleum policy
outputs is then undertaken in four chapters dedicated to the main
aspects of petroleum policy: state participation, pricing, depletion,
and the fiscal regime. While this research neither claims to exhaust
all theoretical implications in each of the policy areas nor to
describe the minute detail of each aspect of policy development, the
usefulness of rational choice theory to studies such as these is
demonstrated. The thesis illustrates both the objectives and
mechanisms of petroleum policies in the cases examined and points out
opportunities for further analysis.
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The purpose of this initial chapter is to examine the economic
theory of politics, commonly referred to as rational choice or public
choice theory, and to demonstrate its applicability to an analysis of
petroleum policies. It is assumed that the development of an
economically promising resource, such as petroleum, would be amenable
to analysis from an economic viewpoint, and that government
initiatives in this area might reveal some essential economic
interests of the state. Rational choice studies of political action
to date have principally focused on constitutional rules, voting
theory, bureaucratic behaviour, and the optimality of welfare
economics while largely ignoring the policy output of governments and
their implications for the validity of the approach. This study
treats the development of petroleum resources as the provision of a
public good, and models petroleum policy in four areas: state
participation, pricing, depletion (including both exploration and
production), and fiscal arrangements, based on the assumptions
central to rational choice theory.
The effort will be undertaken in four sections. A brief
introduction to selected theories of the state will provide some
background within which the reader may place the economic theory of
the state, outlined in very general terms. Rational choice theory
more specifically, and the positive literature which is associated
with it, will then be reviewed in some detail in order to demonstrate
the way in which the theory has been applied to date. A discussion
of public goods will follow within which it will be demonstrated that
the development of petroleum resources may appropriately be
considered in this manner. Finally, models of petroleum policy in
the four areas mentioned above, participation, pricing, depletion,
and fiscal arrangements, will be generated using the assumptions
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central to rational choice theory. These model policies will then be
tested in later chapters against the actual policies implemented in
Canada, the United Kingdom, and Norway over the time period 1973 to
the present.
In short, this chapter will provide the theoretical framework
within which petroleum policies in the three cases will be examined.
A deductive approach is adopted with the description of models of
petroleum policies being one of the principal efforts to be
undertaken from the perspective of political economics. The degree
to which petroleum policies differ and the extent to which the
policies fit the models should indicate to some degree the
applicability of this theoretical approach to the analysis of policy
output. In this way, it is believed that the research will
contribute positively to political science.
1. SELECTED THEORIES OF THE STATE
At the most basic level, theories of the state may be broadly
divided into two categories: those based upon organic conceptions of
the collectivity and those based upon individualistic conceptions of
the polity. An organic conception of the state implies a view of the
collectivity as behaving as an individual might, with interests and
motivations uniquely its own, differentiated from those of its
constituent members. The realisation of the collective will in all
of
forms government action and organisation is implicit; individual
members of society are in fact parts of this larger whole and
subordinate their private interests to the collective cause whenever
necessary. Absolute monarchy or fascism might be considered as the
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embodiment of this organic conception of the state and it is
therefore of little relevance to the study of modern democratic
theory.
If the purely organic conception of the state is put to one
side, there remain two main types of state theories: those which hold
that the state is dominated by one group, excluding the interests of
individuals outwith that dominant group; and those in which the state
is assumed to be responsive to pressures from all individuals and
groups within it. The state in both of these conceptions is an
administrative convenience which can be modified as the functions
required of it change over time; a facility within which individuals
attempt to, first and foremost, realise their own objectives. The
collectivist theory of the state assumes that the apparatus of
government will become the mechanism by which the dominant group or
class will secure its position in society, often utilising the
coercive powers of the state as the means by which the other classes
may be kept in their relative positions. The individualistic
perspective, on the other hand, espouses the position that the
collectivity is seen as an organisational form adopted to facilitate
the achievement of individual interests. Individuals associate in
society to exchange goods and services, and to provide for collective
goods when market mechanisms prove unsatisfactory. The most
celebrated modern example of a collectivist conception of the state
lies in Marxist theory, while individualistic assumptions have
spawned another extremely popular conception of collective activity,
the liberal theory of pluralism.
The Marxist theory of the state emphasises historical
materialism and class relations. The state is seen as the dependent
variable manipulated by the dominant economic class in each
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historical epoch, rather than as a collection of institutions
established and operated by individuals with competing interests.
The government becomes a tool for the further oppression of the
working class by the bourgeoisie in capitalist society, the
"executive committee of the bourgeoisie" as Marx terms it.
Furthermore, the government becomes fiscally dependent upon the
profits of capital in its taxation relations which make it impossible
for the capitalist state to pursue policies antagonistic to the
interests of the capitalist class. Parliamentary forms of government
only serve to temporarily perpetuate the myth of democracy in
contemporary society, while the capitalist system will begin to decay
as a result of its own inherent flaws: the market's concentration of
capital in large industrial monopolies, and crises associated with
overproduction and static markets which will only temporarily be
allayed by imperialism. This inherent systemic decadence coupled
with the self-consciousness aroused in the working class as a result
of its impoverished condition will make the timing ripe for the
revolution of the proletariat. Once true communism is established,
classes will no longer exist and the state as this instrument of
bourgeois oppression will wither away as its functions, the
preservation of the dominant class and the perpetuation of false
consciousness, become redundant.
Marx's theory assumes the rational pursuit of self-interest on
the part of individuals within each economic class in capitalist
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society; but as Olson points out in The Logic of Collective Action ,
herein lies its inconsistency. Marx asserts that economic self-
interest on the part of individual workers will encourage the
emergence of the self-consciousness of the proletariat as a
subservient class. This self-consciousness, born of economic self-
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interest, will provoke the working class into revolt as its natural
collective interest surfaces. This revolution along with the decay
of capitalism itself will assure the success of the establishment of
the classless society. Olson's critique centres on his proposition
that the rational individual has no obvious economic incentive to
take individual action to realise the interests of his class, and
that therefore the emergence of a comprehensive class interest will
not prove sufficient provocation for the unified action of all
members within the socio-economic group. Even if class consciousness
emerges, each individual within the class will, assuming economic
self-interest, find it to his advantage if other members in the class
produce the required class action from which he will necessarily
benefit in any case. The flaw which Olson perceives is the inability
of Marxist theory to take seriously the problem of collective action.
The analogy of strike-breaking may provide an appropriate
example of this free-rider problem. It may well be in the individual
interest of each union worker to strike collectively with his fellow
union members against his employer for a higher wage, but it is only
in the solidarity of collective action that the strike becomes
effective. If one or several union members break the strike in order
to secure food for their families or other individual benefits, the
strike has no meaning. The employer does not lose the labour which
is the only threat the union collective can assert. The strike¬
breakers can be said to be "free-riding" on the collective solidarity
of the union, accepting the benefits that the union offered when the
individual costs were not high, but opting out of the collectivity in
the hopes of reaping a larger individual reward. "It is natural then
that the 'Marxian' revolutions that have taken place have been
brought about by small conspiratorial elites that took advantage of
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weak governments during periods of social disorganisation. It was
not Marx, but Lenin and Trotsky, who provided the theory for this
sort of revolution...." Olson simply asserts that the lack of
economic incentives to class action is the lacuna in Marxist theory,
given its basic premiss of economic self-interest in capitalist
society. In the Marxist view, the state may be seen as a mechanism
for the expression of the bourgeois class* self-interest and
domination, and in that sense, it may be viewed collectively.
However, that the self-interest that Marx suggests will provoke the
working class into unified revolution seems questionable to Olson,
and consequently he implies that the collective view of the state
must also come into question if the premiss of economically self-
interested individuals is to be asserted.
Liberal theories of the state are concerned with an
individualist perception of society. For example, pluralism "...is
the political philosophy which argues that private associations of
all kinds and especially labour unions, churches, and cooperatives,
should have a larger constitutional role in society, and that the
state should not have an unlimited control over the plurality of the
private associations."3 Pluralists develop their position from an
assertion of the advantages of voluntary association of self-
interested individuals, and suggest that the "pluralist sphere"
between the individual and the state should be as free from state
interference as possible. It is in voluntary associations of all
kinds that individuals have their greatest opportunity for
influencing government policy and thus furthering their own
interests, and the state itself becomes an agency of coordinating
these various interests, with legislation reflecting a social
consensus of sorts. The corporate state is a development of the
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pluralist society and is allegedly based on a hierarchy of competing
interest and pressure groups and other non-voluntary forms of
representation. Fascist and social catholic corporatists have argued
that legislators would be more representative of society if they were
chosen from these groups rather than often arbitrarily defined
geographical constituencies.
Neo-pluralists are distinguished from classical pluralists by
their argument in favour of an increasing role for government in the
"pluralist sphere", asserting that "...an advanced technological
society cannot be run without an extended role for the state and
without moving towards ever more sophisticated types of policy-making
machinery, many of them far removed from the fairly simple models of
representative government."^ On the other hand, neo-conservative
thinkers criticise the pluralist position from the opposite point of
view: that pluralism fosters the growth of the state, the erosion of
market forces by which individual interests can best be realised, and
the replacement of legitimate government activity by sophisticated
forms of interest bargaining. It is not entirely clear from which
point of view the criticism can appropriately be made, as it is not
entirely clear exactly how pluralists conceive of the state. Their
principal concern appears to be the process of politics rather than
the apparatus within which individual and collective objectives are
realised.
Both these conceptions of society rely fundamentally on the
self-interested action of individuals, yet they result in quite
different views of the actual and legitimate function of the state.
The current economic view of political activity, rational choice
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theory, also commences with the premiss of self-interested
individualism, but arrives at a third conception of proper state
activity.
Economic theory is developed from the axioms that individuals
are self-interested and that a scarcity of resources necessitates
trade and exchange between them. The principle of self-interest in
micro-economic theory asserts that individuals will enter into trade
relationships when, by definition, they see advantage in the
exchange. In other words, people will not freely trade of their
goods and services unless the bargain benefits them in some tangible
way. The private market provides a coercion-free environment in
which various individuals with various resources can enter into such
trade relationships, each transaction representing benefits to both
parties to the exchange. Although the market process itself is
coercively supported in the sense that it is based on legally
enforced property rights, rules of contract, and so on, its principal
functions of allocation of resources, production and exchange are
voluntary. In this sense, the private market is considered to be the
free market.
In his Economic Theory of Democracy^, Downs suggested that
traditional economic theory treated government as a disturbing
influence upon the beneficial exchanges in the private economy.
Government was viewed as a single agent rather than a collection of
agencies, the function of which was to maximise social welfare in the
absence of the private market's ability to do so (its primary
objective being the maximisation of individual welfare through the
process of private exchange). As the private market was seen simply
as an organisational method of coordinating the exchange of the
different resources and interests of individual economic actors, its
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proper sphere of activity was seen as excluding issues of interest to
the collectivity. The role of the state was to establish the rules
of law by which social interaction would be regulated and to provide
the means by which the collectivity could benefit from the
coordinated provision of what would later be termed public goods.
Classical economists therefore viewed the role of the state in an
extremely limited way, because they were more concerned about its
potential to disrupt the market economy.
Later thought on this issue concerned the question of social
welfare itself, and (leaving aside the unresolved debate on the
meaning of social welfare) the extent of the state's responsibility
to secure some measure of this welfare, however defined, for the
benefit of the collectivity. In this debate, the principal concern
became the appropriate extent, in principle, of state activity in the
provision of social welfare and the efficient fulfilment of this
function rather than the realities of government activity. It was
assumed that governments were composed of citizens whose only
interests lay in the security of collective welfare, regardless of
the inherent contradiction of this assumption with the principal
economic axiom of individual self interest. In Downs' opinion, it
was this failure to consider the motivation of government officials
in the terms of self-interested individuals which was the flaw in the
classical normative economic schools. "[The] premiss that
governments act to maximise social welfare means, in essence, that
the men who run it are perfect altruists in so far as their
productive actions are concerned."^1 Clearly the assumption that the
government actually does secure the collective good simply because it
ought to do so spurred Downs' strict analysis of democratic practice
from the economic axioms of self-interest and the value of exchange.
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His Economic Theory of Democracy remains a classic in the field. The
implications of these two economic principles, individual self-
interest and the value of exchange,should be examined as they form
the basis upon which rests rational choice theory and literature.
Individualism may be viewed as a normative or methodological
concept, and sometimes the two are confused. Normative individualism
is concerned with the proper organisation of society in order best to
realise the interests of the individual. "Individualism as an
analytical method suggests simply that all theorising, all analysis,
is resolved finally into considerations faced by the individual
person as decision-maker."' Methodological individualism suggests
that the fundamental unit in the analysis of human behaviour must be
the individual actor. It does not necessarily imply economic
rationality, but economic rationality implies methodological
individualism.
Economic theory assumes that individuals are rational, which is
to say that they can ordinately perceive their interests and actually
make choices based upon the possible realisation of their preferred
objectives. Rationality concerns the individual's ability to act in
his self-interest. In part, these interests will be realised in
voluntary market exchanges initiated by individuals with other self-
interested individuals, but individual objectives also initiate
collective action. The market is the principal means by which
individuals transform their interests into realised goals in the
processes of pricing, supply quantities, and the subsequent
allocation of private resources.
Not all benefits which individuals seek, however, can be
provided by the market; hence the need for government. A group of
individuals may share a common interest and perceive a better chance
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of realising that interest if it acts in unison. This is the basic
assumption of social contract theories: that governments are set up
by self-interested individuals who perceive the advantages of the
social contract and act together to realise its benefits which, in
turn, accrue to each of them individually. It is thus apparent that
rational men pursuing their disparate individual goals can and do
realise the utility of collective action. Social contract theory is
the most striking example of normative individualism. By contrast
the economic analysis of political activity is based on
methodological individualism. The former generates statements about
what ought to be the case whereas the latter produces empirical
generalisations.
The value of exchange is often expressed as economic utility —
individuals will always attempt to maximise their benefits and
minimise the costs necessary to realise those benefits. Costs and
benefits are broadly defined, but the most common means by which
individual utility is measured is in terms of revealed preferences,
in other words, the actual choices which individuals make. The
assumption is that individuals will make choices which maximise the
chances of realising their preferences whenever possible, while at
the same time minimising the possible frustration of their
objectives. In each market transaction, for example, both parties
are attempting to realise the best possible deal for themselves which
ensures that the exchange, provided it is non-coercive, is preferred
and freely chosen by both.
Maximising utility is therefore the individual's objective in
private transactions, but it is also the case that people will
attempt to maximise personal utility in collective associations.
However, the benefits of collective activity must be obvious,
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otherwise individual participation in associations may have to be
coerced. The realisation of collective goods is the reason why
associations are formed in the first place. If the provision of a
collective benefit is not obvious to the self-interested members of
the collectivity, they will attempt to mitigate their costs of
participation, even withdraw from participation altogether, in order
to attempt to realise some of the collective benefit without
incurring any of the individual costs.
This is the free-rider problem of collective action which was
alluded to earlier. "The problem with coordinated or collective
action, however, is that once the good is optimally supplied, the
person then has an incentive to become a free-rider -- to stop
producing his share so as not to incur any costs -- unless he is
O
somehow coerced into fulfilling his obligation." Solutions to the
problem may be found in three types of collective organisation: an
anarchic situation in which no monopoly of coercive power is granted,
a strong leadership (leviathan) in which all coercive power is
vested, or the development of norms for the collectivity and some
form of self-policing to ensure their enforcement.9
2. RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY
Public choice can be defined as the economic study of
non-market decisionmaking, or simply the application of
economics to political science. The subject matter of
public choice is that of political science: the theory of
the state, voting rules, voter behaviour, party politics,
the bureaucracy, and so on. The methodology of public
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choice is that of economics, however. The basic
behavioural postulate of public choice, as for economics,
is that man is an egoistic, rational, utility maximiser.
Public or rational choice theory utilises a deductive method,
often in mathematical form, to develop theories concerning political
processes and structures which may be open to empirical
investigation. It has been applied to the supply of and demand for
collective goods, the influence of party competition for votes on
government policy, and the behaviour of bureaucratic organisations.
There is one notable collection of studies of policy output and
behaviour in organisations, Loehr and Sandler's Public Goods and
Public Policy While much of the positive literature is
implicitly in the contractarian tradition, its wide application to a
variety of political activities illustrates the usefulness, and some
would argue the validity, of the theory.
Rational choice makes several basic assumptions about the
individual. "Individual adults, whether private citizens, elected
officials or appointed officials of some governments, are assumed to
prefer more rather than less of some good or service in order to
1 ?
satisfy their preferences." This proposition of utility
maximisation is qualified by two further assumptions: that
individuals do not have perfect knowledge of alternatives available
to them, and that their preferences can be reordered at different
times. They can and do make choices based on considerations of short
and longer term utility, and on whether choices are made at the
expense of other alternatives. "Individuals are presumed to be
rational decision makers when they select the alternative they most
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prefer.Finally, not all individuals have the same scale of
preferences nor the same trade-off values between available
alternatives.
A very influential embodiment of rational choice principles and
methods is found in game theory. "The game" is a mathematical
simulation of human behaviour, proposing logical relationships of
individual objectives, behaviour, and the game outcome. A strategy
represents the way in which a player will act to maximise his
utility.
Using the word "game" as a generic term for all
abstractions from (conflictual) social interactions, the
theory of games is a theory of abstract social interaction.
John von Neumann and Osker Morgenstern, the main developers
of the theory, describe a game as the totality of the rules
that describe it.... The main activity is, of course, the
adoption of states of society...which are in turn
individual evaluations of concrete outcomes... The main
product of the theory about this activity is, therefore, an
1A
explanation of payoff configurations.
Central to many games is the postulate of a maximin strategy: it
is assumed that players will choose the strategy in which the worst
possible game outcome is the most utile for them as individuals.^5
In other words, individuals will generally attempt to maximise their
personal utility while minimising their personal costs in any game
situation. Rawls relies heavily on this postulate in his Theory of
Justice^, which is the most celebrated contemporary example of
social contractarian theory.
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There are all manner of games representing social interaction.
Zero-sum games are games in which the interests of the individual
players are in direct opposition such that if one player wins, the
other, by definition, loses. Non-zero-sum games are games in which
the players share some common interests, and bargaining processes
become a significant part of each player's strategy.
Couples is a three-person game about choosing sides, the very
essence of political activity. Tallyrand is a five-person game along
the same lines. Time-Out is a game in which n-persons play, and
players have options to stop the game in order to assess their
strategy, and so on.^ There are two well known non zero-sum games
which relate particularly well to later discussions of petroleum
policies: Chicken and the Prisoners' Dilemma.
Chicken takes its name from the game of challenge played between
two automobile drivers when they drive a collision course with each
other, each one hoping the other will swerve away at the last moment.
If both continue their course of destruction, the ultimate
catastrophe of a collision results — the worst possible outcome for
both players. If they both avoid collision, they both lose face but
preserve their lives — the second best outcome for both. If one
player swerves while the other continues his course, the former loses
esteem for being the "chicken", while the latter gains points for his
courage. This game is represented in the matrix below, where higher
numerical values reflect better individual outcomes, and player A's






Chicken-like games are often evident in situations of adversarial
conflict where the competitors are evenly matched.
The most popular and well known game, however, is the Prisoners'
Dilemma, a two-person game in which two prisoners who have committed
a crime together are offered, individually, incentives to confess.
The two prisoners are isolated from each other, and if they both
remain silent, they will both receive a short remand period. If one
confesses and the other stays silent, the one who confesses will be
freed and the silent partner will receive the total prison sentence
of thirty years. If they both confess, they will both receive
sentences of fifteen years. Clearly, it is in the interests of both
prisoners to remain silent, and if a cooperative strategy could be
arranged, this is no doubt what they would do. However, both will
confess in the belief that no matter what the other does (confess or
remain silent), they will not receive the maximum penalty, and may
escape without penalty if the other prisoner remains silent.
The paradox of the Prisoners' Dilemma is that self-interested
reasoning in this situation will result in a non-optimal outcome. A
diagram may usefully illustrate the point, where once again higher
numerical values represent better individual outcomes and A's payoffs






The Prisoners' Dilemma illustrates the free-rider problem in a
concrete way. Both prisoners have the incentive to free ride on the
other's silence by letting the other pay the full cost of the crime
in serving the full thirty year sentence. Neither prisoner has a
private incentive to produce the collective good of silence, even
though if they jointly do so, they will both gain. Sen and Hirsch
suggest that it is possible to escape the Prisoners' Dilemma "...by
1 ft
responsible behaviour based on an altruistic morality" , a normative
attempt at mitigating the stark realities of rational choice
applications. Another escape from the Prisoners' Dilemma is to play
an infinite number of these games, where neither prisoner knows which
game will be the last. In this supergame model, the best strategy
for each player is to follow the other player's moves, rewarding him
for cooperation with cooperation and punishing him for defection with
defection. Variations of Prisoners' Dilemma games have been applied
to such diverse topics as the question of disarmament and analyses of
Hobbes' state of nature. However, the most typical use of the
Prisoners' Dilemma in rational choice literature is its
exemplification (in n-person application) of the free-rider problem
in the provision of public goods.
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Rational choice assumptions about goods and services are based
upon the proposition that individuals have diverse values for
different goods and services. The provision of goods and services to
individual consumers may vary along several dimensions:
excludability, jointness of supply, and indivisibility, all of which
contribute to their respective degrees of "privateness" or
"publicness". Excludability refers to the cost of excluding
potential users from consumption or enjoyment of the good. For
example, a lighthouse is a non-excludable good in that its beacon
cannot be exclusively offered to certain ships which pass by the
shore, and not to others. Jointness of supply (i.e., jointness of
production) concerns the degree to which a given good or service can
be supplied by individual producers or is more efficiently provided
collectively. An example of a jointly supplied good would be clean
air. Finally, the degree to which the good remains available to
potential consumers once others have used or enjoyed it is referred
to as its indivisibility. Public parks are none the less available
to potential consumers no matter how many previous consumers have
enjoyed them. Purely private goods are perfectly excludable, not
jointly supplied, and perfectly divisible while purely public goods
are non-excludable, jointly supplied, and indivisible. In practice,
goods and services span the spectrum from purely private goods right
through various degrees of privateness and publicness to purely
public goods.
These various goods and services are provided through two
principal institutions: the market and the government. Both the
private and the public sectors have advantages and disadvantages in
their respective provision of goods and services. "The market can
work reasonably well in providing the desired amount of those goods
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and services which are easily packageable, readily divisible and
offer the potential consumer some choice in consumption."^9 in these
cases, the role of government is limited to that of a neutral referee
of the private economy, enforcing the rules of free market exchange
while disputes are resolved by the legal and judicial systems. The
market will not readily provide goods and services which are non¬
excludable, jointly supplied, and indivisible — in other words,
collective goods. Because of the tendency of rational individuals to
attempt to avoid the joint provision of such goods and services (the
free-rider problem already referred to), government is necessary to
coerce individuals, by means of taxation or sanctions of some kind,
to contribute toward the provision of such collective goods. In
these cases, the price mechanism does not operate to signal
adjustments of the supply of public goods. Instead, consumer
preferences are reflected by the democratic exercise of the vote and
by other means of political participation.
Government, from the rational choice perspective, is not
therefore seen as an end in itself. Rather, it is a facility which
is judged according to its capacity to provide desired collective
goods and services at minimal costs to individual members of society.
"Various means exist within democratic governments for the
articulation of the preferences of individual citizens. Voting,
petitioning, lobbying, complaining, demonstrating and other forms of
political participation are avenues open in various degrees within
governmental institutional arrangements. Such means of
participation, as well as migration to capture a different mix of
market and collective-consumption goods provided in another
PC)
community, are inherently costly for an individual to pursue."
Thus the value of democratic government is explicitly recognised:
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private exchange is best facilitated by the free market economy, and
public exchange (votes and taxes for public goods) is best served by
the democratic organisation and operation of government.
Much of the rational choice literature concerns the cost/benefit
analysis of political activity in various forms, and a good example
?1
is Hirschman's Exit, Voice and Loyalty . In this study, Hirschman
outlines the private market responses of exit (non-consumption or a
move to another product) and voice (complaint), and applies these
market responses to the political realm. Exit in politics is the
concept of voting with the feet, the option of individual citizens to
move themselves physically into a different polity so as to enjoy a
different range of both private and public goods. Political exit
assumes (often unrealistically) full mobility and full knowledge on
the part of the individual as to both his present and future
communities' provision of desired goods and services. In addition,
exit in political terms tends to be viewed undesirably, and is spoken
of in the language of desertion, defection, and treason. A much more
acceptable and easily employed expression of an undesirable state of
affairs lies in political voice. Voice is the political activity
undertaken by individual citizens with a view to improving the
present polity. It is expressed by voting, political party
participation, demonstrations, and all manner of legal and illegal
political activity directed at articulating principally
dissatisfaction, but also satisfaction, with the system. Hirschman
asserts that exit represents the typical economic mechanism by which
consumers express dissatisfaction, while voice is the principal
method used in the political world. Loyalty, to a product/firm or to
a political party/state, is the moderating factor which, to greater
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and lesser degrees, inhibits both exit and voice. Hirschman's effort
is an interesting and provocative juxtapositioning of market and non-
market mechanisms.
Another well known application of normative rational choice
theory is in welfare economics, especially in Pareto optimality.
"The Pareto criterion states that economic welfare can be said to
have increased when one or more members of the group concerned are
better off and no one is worse off." The economic welfare of the
community is consequently thought to be at an optimal level when it
is no longer possible to improve the welfare of any individual member
of the collectivity without reducing the utility of one or more other
members. The Pareto optimum is not a moral standard of economic
welfare, but a criterion of efficiency and utility in the allocation
of resources. Consequently, any given allocation of resources may be
optimal in the Paretian sense while remaining completely unacceptable
from a moral point of view. For example, a situation in which the
rich become marginally richer while the poor remain at the same level
of economic welfare may satisfy the Pareto criterion, but many
members of society would argue that it is not just or fair that
improvements in economic welfare be limited to the rich. This
difficulty has led rational choice theorists to develop other
criteria of social welfare.
The Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function postulates that
collective welfare is a mathematical function of all the variables
that might affect it — these variables being the preferences and
utility orderings of each individual member in the relevant social
group. In consequence, its optimal achievement is possible only if
the independent variables (the individual members' utilities) are
correctly identified and accounted for. "[The] Bergson-Samuelson SWF
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must be defined over cardinal, interpersonally comparable individual
utility indexes or their equivalent, if a single socially preferred
allocation is to be determined. The next question is how these
cardinal utilities are to be measured and what form is [the welfare
function] to take."^3 Arrow developed the Bergson-Samuelson social
welfare function further by suggesting that the collective choice
rule which specifies utility orderings for society is the social
welfare function. Arrow deduced four seemingly innocuous conditions
which the SWF must satisfy in order to satisfy the criteria of
minimal rationality and legitimacy: unrestricted domain, the weak
Paretian criterion, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-
dictatorship. He then proceeded to prove mathematically that no one
p/l
SWF could simultaneously satisfy those conditions. The extensive
literature on social welfare functions and Paretian optimality
demonstrates a normative application of rational choice principles
and methods to social welfare evaluation.
Positive public choice theory focuses on political processes and
the structures of government. As mentioned previously, the primary
objective of government activity is the provision of public goods and
services which are not optimally produced by the private market.
Democratic methods are assumed to most accurately reflect, in the
public sector, the consumer sovereignty and competitive efficiency
associated with market processes. Democracy is not, therefore, seen
as a normative objective, but rather as the most efficient process of
coordinating the various individual interests relating to the
provision of collective goods and services. In Schumpeter's
definition: "...the democratic method is that institutional
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arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals
acquire power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the
people's vote.
Given the economic premises of rational choice thought, the
necessary outcome of the democratic process is the functioning of
government as the monopoly provider of public goods. However, the
economic axiom of individual self-interest applies equally to public
as to private individuals, and therefore the actions of government
can be assumed to reflect the personal interests of the politicians
and officials elected and appointed to serve in a public capacity.
In Albert Breton's (1977) theory of representative
democracy, the government is the party in control of the
legislature.... The governing party has an objective
function, which includes the probability of being
reelected, but also can include 'variables' such as
personal pecuniary gains, personal power, [the individual
politician's] own image in history, [and so on].... To
achieve these goals the governing party takes advantage of
its position as monopoly supplier of certain highly desired
public goods, e.g., defence, police and fire protection,
Pf}
highways.
Rational choice theorists do not assume that public officials
will necessarily act in the collective interest. Rather, they will
behave in accordance with their personal interests which will
include, first and foremost, the desire to be reelected. Politicians
are viewed as political entrepreneurs, anxious to capture public
office by uniting with other like-minded individuals in coalitions of
political interests known as political parties. The parties then
propose platforms of policies which they hope will appeal to a broad
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spectrum of voters in the election campaign, with the objective of
forming the next government. Votes are exchanged for packages of
public goods and services presented in party platforms, and, through
whatever collective choice rule is constitutionally accepted, the
government is elected. Its action, or inaction as the case may be,
in terms of implementing its campaign promises will reflect its
security in office, and as the next election approaches it will take
measures to improve its public image.
Neither Downs in his Economic Theory of Democracy^ nQr Breton
pQ
in The Economic Theory of Representative Government offered
empirical evidence for their propositions concerning the economic
analysis of politics, but much of the more recent positive rational
choice literature indicates that research is consistent with their
hypotheses^. Frey and Lau employed the variables of popularity and
ideology to illustrate that incumbent parties seek to maximise their
utility. They found that high government popularity allowed for
pursuit of ideological goals, while low popularity led to abandonment
of ideology in favour of short-term policy manipulation. Landes and
Posner showed that, in the U.S.A., legislation is preferentially
supplied by governments to groups that outbid rival seekers of
favours in terms of campaign contributions, votes, implicit promises
of future favours, and even bribes.
For the purposes of this thesis, applications of rational choice
to more specific questions of collective choice and political
behaviour shall be examined. The collective choice rule most often
employed in the selection of government is that of majority rule.
This rule, according to Sen, satisfies the Pareto principle in
addition to Arrow's conditions of social welfare functions^.
However, other collective choice rules have been analysed by public
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choice theorists as well: the plurality rule, the Condorcet
criterion, the Borda count, exhaustive voting, and approval voting31.
Buchanan and Tullock^ examined the question of collective choice
from the process of constitutional design through to
interest/pressure group activity in modern democracies. Wicksell33
has challenged the appropriateness of the majority rule for certain
types of collective decisions, suggesting that public expenditures be
subject to a unanimity rule. Mueller took this idea a step further
by suggesting that "...the collective choice process is confronted
with two fundamentally different types of collective decisions to
resolve, corresponding to the distinction between allocation and
redistribution decisions.... The inherent differences between the
underlying characteristics of these two types of decision suggests
that they be treated separately conceptually, and as a practical
matter that they be resolved by separate and different collective
decision processes."3^ He proposes that a unanimity rule be used for
allocative decisions, and that a majority rule be employed to make
redistributive decisions.
A large body of rational choice literature is concerned with the
optimality of various electoral mechanisms; for example, the effects
on party numbers and voting outcomes as a result of proportional
representation as opposed to plurality rules35. Electoral campaigns
also lend themselves readily to rational choice analysis. Hotelling
developed a spatial model of two-party democracy which fits in well
with the premises of rational choice, in which left and right
political extremes are driven towards the centre in order to maximise
votes. The assumption is that the frequency of voter preferences is
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symmetrical and unimodal, a bell curve, and that consequently the
utility maximising politician and/or party will attempt to capture
modal popularity^.
The free-rider problem of collective action has been applied to
the efforts of individual voters to inform themselves during
campaigns, and it has been suggested that there is little incentive
for the individual voter to incur the costs of gathering political
information, and indeed to vote at all when the benefits are not
immediately apparent to him. The question of why citizens vote at all
is one which troubles public choice theorists. The closeness of the
race between the candidates or parties and the opportunity costs of
voting are obvious contributing factors, but Ashenfelter and Kelly
suggest that a sense of duty or obligation (Hirschman's loyalty?) is
a prime motive for voting, with the variables of the greatest
quantitative impact being education and indecision^^. Finally, on
the issue of elections, Tufte postulated and quantified a definite
electoral/economic cycle in which growth in the GNP, the reduction of
unemployment rates, and increases in real disposable per capita
income are cyclically related to elections in both the United States
and in twenty-one of twenty-seven democracies examined^®. Tufte
suggests that if voters made the connection between the electoral and
economic cycles, their voting decisions would be strongly influenced,
and he recommends the desynchronisation of the economic and electoral
calendars along with public exposure to the political manipulation of
the economy.
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Rational choice theory also offers analyses of fiscal
arrangements in federal states. "Since federalism, prima facie,
disperses at least some authority between national and regional units
of government, we would therefore expect performance in the provision
of goods and services to be higher under federal than under unitary
systems of government, other things being equal."39 Oates^® examined
the relative strengths of highly centralised and decentralised
states, concluding that from an economic point of view, federalism
represents the optimal form of government. The debate on fiscal
federalism is thus focused on the appropriate degree of
decentralisation of a particular public sector. Perfect
correspondence, i.e. the case when the jurisdiction that provides
the public good corresponds exactly to the community of individuals
who consume the good, is the ideal federal arrangement in terms of
the provision of public goods. The more centralised a state, the
less likely is the occurrence of perfect correspondence and the
greater the potential for conflict between governmental levels;
although in federal constitutions, different levels of government
with specific areas of exclusive jurisdiction make possible the
optimal provision of collective goods in various regions of the
state.
Public expenditure has also been analysed by rational choice
theorists. In the theory of public expenditure developed from
economic principles, taxes are seen as the price paid for the
provision of collective goods. "In barest essence the argument is
that since demands of different individuals for a collective good are
complementary rather than competitive, we can add the willingness to
pay of different individuals and if the aggregate sum exceeds the
costs, the good is worth producing. For all quantities for which
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this is true, there exists a tax policy which would collect levels of
taxes sufficient to cover marginal costs, and still leave all
citizens satisfied."**"'- The growth of public spending is consequently
explained by a burgeoning demand on the part of members of societies
for goods and services to be collectively provided by governments.
Increasingly affluent voters are more and more prepared to support
hp
public expenditures , and it may be expected that in times of
economic recession, the demand for public goods will fall and public
expenditures will come under increasing criticism. Taxation policies
will vary according to the state of the economy which, in turn,
influences public support for the government and demand for its
provision of collective goods.
Related to the question of public expenditure is the behaviour
of the government bureaucracy in its roles as allocator and consumer
of government revenues.
Because the personnel of government, as well as the
individual citizen, are assumed to act, within the
limits of imperfect information, on the basis of
their own interests, public choice analysts view
governmental institutions and public offices as
merely sets of often rival collective facilities and
offices for the pursuit of collective as well as
individual interests. It does not assume, as does
much conventional writing, that elected officials ...
are omnipotent and thus have the capacity and
authority to establish the preferred states of
affairs for their citizenry.**3
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The use of rational choice principles in an analysis of
bureaucratic behaviour is an extremely valuable application of this
theory. "Once the government ... decide[s] what government outputs
are to be provided and in what quantities, they must actually be
bought. Although some government outputs are bought directly from
private industry, most government funds are channelled through a
public bureaucracy."^ Downs suggested that the non-market nature of
bureaucratic production meant that it would necessarily be activity-
orientated rather than output-orientated. As bureaucratic budgets are
defined by activities, Niskanen^ developed a theory of bureaucratic
behaviour centred on the principle of budget maximisation through
increased bureaucratic activity as the primary objective of the
utility-maximising bureaucrat.
Bureaucracies have a single sponsor in that the legislature is
the sole provider of funds through the budget and the bureaucracy is
the sole provider of almost all public goods. There is therefore a
bilateral monopoly. "The usual reason for granting a bureau a
monopoly on the provision of a given service is to avoid wasteful
duplication ... [but] the monopoly nature of most bureaus also frees
them from competitive pressure to be efficient, and denies the
funding agency an alternative source of information by which to gauge
the efficiency of monopolist bureaus...." The inability of the
sponsor to monitor the efficiency of bureaucratic output implies that
bureaus can focus upon activity, rather than output, as a primary
means of justifying budgetary expansion. Consequently, bureaucratic
agents will perceive their maximum utility in the continuing
expansion of their budget, which, it is presumed, justifies the
continuing monopoly position of the bureau, enhances the salaries and
personal prestige of the bureaucrats, and even expands their base of
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power and influence. Increases in bureaucratic activity become the
justification for budget increases, and consequently an expansionary
cycle of budget increases and activity increases is established,
without any relation to efficiency of production, which in turn
further consolidates the bilateral monopoly relationship of the
bureau and its sponsor. Niskanen recommends the replacement of the
present bureaucratic system of public goods provision with a more
competitive bureaucracy which may, he acknowledges, appear less
orderly, but which would also be less oppressive, less political, and
more efficient than the present structure. He also suggests economic
incentives be implemented to reward senior bureaucrats for efficiency
by inducing them to maximise the difference between their budgets and
the minimum total costs of the service provided — a kind of modified
profit scheme in which they might have a personal stake.^ He
concludes that "[the] superior performance of market institutions is
not due to their use of better or more analysis.... The primary
differences in the performance of difference organisations are due,
rather, to differences in their structure and the incentives of their
(lO
managers.
This argument illustrates a general point made by Bosanquet. He
notes that rational choice theory has become strongly associated with
the New Right, although its original proponents, Downs and Breton,
could hardly be considered a priori right-wing thinkers. "Nearly all
the main practitioners are of the liberal school, and their findings
have been used to support the crusade against big government....
Lately there has been a major shift in the direction of interest from
the demand side of the political market to the supply side. The main
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interest was once in how voters and parties make choices about public
goods; now it is the economics of bureaucracy, and in the supply-
driven momentum to the growth of government spending."^9
This survey of the literature shows that there are many
applications of both normative and positive rational choice theory.
Several of these applications are directly relevant to the
formulation and implementation of petroleum policies, but the area of
public choice most relevant to policy output studies is that of
public goods theory.
3. PUBLIC GOODS
A. Public Goods Theory
Public goods theory is one aspect of rational choice thought
which, according to Hanson, has not been utilised to its full extent
in political analysis. It has most frequently been used to
illustrate the functions of collective organisations rather than to
analyse policy output. "The abstract nature of public goods makes it
difficult for political analysts to incorporate it into their
research repertoire without investing time and effort in
understanding the economic principles behind the concept."^0 The
result is that most positive rational choice efforts have
concentrated on coalition theory, electoral competition, and the
paradox of voting.
Pure public or collective or social goods are those goods and
services characterised by non-excludability, jointness of supply and
indivisibility. In other words, their provision cannot exclude
certain members of the collectivity from consumption, they are not
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produced by the private market but are produced collectively, and
they are non-packageable, which is to say that their provision is in
its entirety — the good cannot be consumed in part. "The
distinguishing characteristic of these goods is not only that they
can be consumed by everyone, but that there is no escape from
consuming them unless one were to leave the community in which they
are provided.Public goods can in some cases be thought of by
certain members of the society as public evils. The provision of
nuclear defence capabilities, for example, may be thought by certain
individuals within the state to be a public good while others
consider it a public evil. Just as there may be free-riders on
collective goods, there may also be forced-riders, as Loehr and
Sandler term them^. The point is that once provided, no matter
whether viewed positively or negatively by various individuals,
public goods become available to all members of the collective group.
Private goods in contrast are excludable, privately supplied,
and divisible. Consumption by one person necessary excludes the
simultaneous consumption of the particular good by another person,
they are privately supplied and demanded via the market exchange
economy, and they are by definition packageable. As mentioned
earlier, there is a broad spectrum of degrees of "privateness" and
"publicness" in goods and services, but usually goods are thought of
as public if they are jointly supplied and if it is not cost-
effective to exclude some people from their consumption.
While private goods are provided by the market, public goods are
supplied by the collective organisation responsible which, in the
case of public policy, is the government. Because individual members
of society are rationally self-interested, they will attempt to free-
ride on the collective provision of public goods. The state
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therefore assumes a degree of coercive power in the form of taxation
or other sanctions in order to secure the contribution of all members
to the provision of the collective good. The free-rider problem of
collective action manifests itself in all manner of individual
behaviour, a good example being the almost universal attempts to
evade taxes on the part of most citizens in most modern democracies.
The normative debate on public goods provision concerns whether
particular goods and services ought to be provided publicly. "[Public
goods] are not susceptible to market allocation in the traditional
economic sense because they cannot easily be distributed according to
the ways in which people can contribute resources towards their
costs. The solutions to this problem of traditional market failure
are political...."53 The problem of public goods is one aspect of a
wider debate on market failure, and it should be remembered that the
publicness of a good to be provided is not the only reason for
government intervention. There is a much wider debate to be had
about the public provision of goods and services. "Among the
positive issues that underlie the normative debate ... are (1)
whether private market alternatives to public provision are
impossible, impractical, merely costly or simply unwanted; (2) why
the market solution is unsatisfactory to members of the group and to
society as a whole; and (3) the identity of the group of
beneficiaries."5^ Policy studies begin with an analysis of the first
of these issues: the various reasons why the private market cannot,
does not, or should not provide certain types of collective goods and
services.
Market failure is a concept which refers to a number of
situations in which the private market will not allocate resources in
the way in which an ideal mechanism would. Sources of market failure
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include not only the non-excludability of collective goods, but also
decreasing costs, externalities, non-marketability, and
uncertainty^. The situation of decreasing costs refers to the
emergence of a few large-scale (monopoly-like) producers. Often in
these cases, the industry in question is taken into public ownership:
price and production levels are set differently than they would be by
the private monopolist, usually at levels sufficient more. -t)oan
satisfy marginal costs. The problem of externalities becomes manifest
when one individual's consumption or use of a given good directly
affects, whether positively or negatively, other individuals. The
most common example of an obvious externality is pollution. In this
case, governments are often required to regulate the use of the
externality-producing activity in such a way as to mitigate its
negative effects upon those who do not benefit from it. Non-
marketability refers to the market situation where individuals wish
to exchange, but find that appropriate markets simply do not exist.
An example might be the establishment of broadcasting networks in the
far reaches of northern Canada. In cases such as these, governments
usually establish public corporations to service these markets which
would not yield a return sufficient to encourage private investment.
Uncertainty results from a lack of information regarding future
circumstances, and consequently inhibits private market investment in
certain activities. Governments often become involved in insuring
against risks in areas such as the provision of public health care
insurance and so on. In all of these cases of market failure, the
state may be required to provide for a public good or service which
is desired by the collectivity, but is not adequately, if at all,
provided by the market exchange economy.
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However, market failure by itself is not necessarily the only
reason for government intervention. Socialist governments intervene
to override private markets because of ideological hostility to
private market provision as such, rather than to ameliorate a
situation of market failure. In cases of collectively-owned
resources, the assumption made by socialists is that the private
market cannot be trusted to develop optimally and produce the good
for the benefit of the collectivity as a whole. Private industry, it
is argued, acts on the basis of self-interest, and the establishment
of state corporations in strategic sectors of the economy indicates
the belief that only through public participation will collective
interests be realised. In these circumstances, rational choice
theorists suggest that "[gjovernment is also a major producer of
externalities."56
The policy instruments which governments employ to mitigate the
effects of market failures are the provision of public goods
(financed by taxes levied on members of the collectivity), the fiscal
system (the imposition of taxes and subsidies), and the legal system
(the regulation of social and economic activities).57 Robinson
cautions that if government is to improve upon market performance, it
must: (1) be able to forecast the difference in outcomes between
intervention and the maintenance of the status quo, and that this
difference must be positive; (2) formulate the national interest
objectives to reflect society's preferences; (3) develop workable
policies in the national interest thus defined; and (4) be willing to
subordinate its own interests to the national interest in order to
implement effectively the desired policies.5^
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To summarise, the theory of public goods is based on the
economic assumptions of rational, self-interested individuals and the
value of exchange. It will be in the interests of individuals to
unite to provide collectively for goods which have individual utility
but which are not provided by the private market, goods which have
higher degrees of non-excludability and indivisibility and which lend
themselves to collective supply. Because of the free rider tendency,
collective organisations are granted by their members certain powers
of coercion to assure the contribution of all members towards the
provision of the collective benefit. This is the case with
government. The state is viewed in rational choice theory as a
collective organisation, the primary function of which is to provide
desired social goods and services to its members. Politicians are
political entrepreneurs who compete for the opportunity to provide
public goods at a profit by forming coalitions which we term
political parties. Parties offer packages of policies which they
hope will appeal to a broad spectrum of voters in the effort to trade
votes for public goods; but once in office, they will be faced with a
whole range of opportunities and demands for the provision of public
goods both consistent with and outwith their electoral platforms.
The actual public goods and services the government chooses to supply
are reflected in the public policies it initiates. In this way,
public goods theory may be applied directly to the analysis of
government petroleum policy.
B. Petroleum and Public Goods
Buchanan asserts that the highly restrictive classical definition
of pure public goods, that is total non-excludability, does not apply
to most public goods because they tend to share a degree of non-
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excludability59. Partial non-excludability is acknowledged when it
is assumed that there is a specified and identifiable group within
society which will be the beneficiaries of a specific policy measure.
The origin of the collective good thus becomes the focus of defining
its publicness.
The Marshallian theory of the joint supply of public goods makes
clear the case for examining petroleum policy in this way.
For the Marshallian theory the jointness of
supply arises because of the technological conditions
of producing, not because of the technological
conditions of consuming, as in the [classical] public
goods case. However, as we shall demonstrate, the
results that emerge from analysis are identical in
the two models.
His classical example involved the joint supply
of meat and leather, to which he added wool and
mutton, wheat and straw.... The producer or supplier
of bullocks simultaneously meets two separate
demands, that for meat and that for leather or hides.
These final products, desired by different demanders,
are jointly supplied in the process of breeding ...
steers....
Concentration on the Marshallian theory of joint
supply allows several features of the public goods
problem to be clarified.... fA]ny good or service can
be treated as a purely public good, provided that it
is organised through an institutional structure
embodying the extreme publicness features.^
Marshall made two points about the production of goods which are
relevant to the discussion of petroleum resources and public goods.
Firstly, he postulated that the concept of jointness of supply is
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produced by the technology of production, rather than conditions of
consumption. In this way, Buchanan argued, any good or service which
is produced collectively may be considered as a pure public good as
long as it is organised through a public institutional structure.
Marshall's second point focused on the technology of production in a
different sense: more than one good may be produced simultaneously in
a single productive endeavor.
The development of petroleum resources may be considered in this
way. As a natural resource, petroleum (crude oil and natural gas) is
generally owned by the collectivity and the state administers its
exploration, production, and sale. Its exploitation is organised and
regulated by public institutions with the presumption that collective
benefits will accrue to the owners of the resource, the public.
However, petroleum exploitation yields necessarily two types of
product: the private good of petroleum, which may or may not be sold
on the private market at a regulated or non-regulated price; and the
collective good of the opportunity of increased state revenues which
would accrue to the government by virtue of its ownership of the
resource and the taxation or levy imposed on resultant revenues.
This revenue is produced by private and public companies operating
under the policies determined by the state. Once produced it is, in
a rather complicated sense, necessarily available for the benefit of
the collectivity; i.e., it is non-excludable. These additional
revenues directly benefit every taxpayer in the state by reducing
their respective tax burdens in real terms.
Collective ownership of petroleum resources is generally
justified in terms of its strategic and economic importance to the
state as a whole. The socialist assumption is that the people should
exercise collective control over its exploitation in order to
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maximise the benefits, while at the same time minimising negative
externalities which might seriously damage the performance of the
economy in other sectors. Because of its strategic importance,
petroleum exploitation must not be left to the self-interested
determination of private companies in pursuit of maximum profit.
However, even if socialist antipathy toward private market
exploitation of important resources is rejected, aspects of market
failure may justify state intervention on other grounds.
In the case of the private production of petroleum, state
intervention in the form of public participation via the
establishment of a national petroleum company has frequently been
justified in the terms of decreasing costs. A few large
multinational corporations dominated the international petroleum
market prior to the OPEC pricing revolution of 1973/74; since then,
there has been a different form of oligopoly through OPEC which
continued until very recently. Many governments with petroleum
resources have set up public petroleum corporations in order to
influence the development and trade of those resources in addition to
securing information useful to the optimal development of petroleum
policy in other areas. This has been the case in all three of the
countries under study: Canada, the United Kingdom, and Norway.
Government ownership and control of natural resource exploitation
through direct industrial participation has been a common and widely
acceptable mechanism employed by states in the attempt to mitigate
problems arising from the domination of the international petroleum
market by an oligopoly.
Another area of government policy which concerns petroleum as a
private good is the establishment of prices for the product. As a
natural resource, petroleum pricing may be, but is not necessarily,
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subject to government controls. Governments may choose to allow the
price of petroleum produced within their territories to fluctuate
along with the international price level, or they may find greater
utility in determining a price below international levels in order to
secure certain benefits for the consumers of the product.
Conversely, a price set above the international level may be useful
in the encouragement of conservation of the resource. Pricing policy
of the private product is sometimes justified in the socialist terms
of the necessity of collective ownership, but there are obvious
external effects on the economy resultant from various petroleum
price levels which may also be of concern to governments. For
example: large influxes of revenues into the producing economy as a
result of high prices may have serious inflationary effects; as the
major source of energy, petroleum prices affect the performance of
virtually all other sectors of the economy; petroleum prices
influence the value of the currency, the balance of payments, the
prices and economic competitiveness of other fuel sources, to mention
but a few external effects. In short, concerns over economic and
fiscal destabilisation which might result from different price levels
are of major importance to the governments of petroleum-producing
states.
On the question of the collective benefits which derive from
petroleum exploitation are several issues of crucial interest to the
analysis of government policy in this field. Firstly, exploration
and production policies, commonly referred to as depletion policies,
can have major impact upon both the public goods aspect of petroleum
exploitation and the market failures of external economic and fiscal
effects. The public good of increased or decreased opportunities to
derive state revenues from exploitation, both in the short and longer
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terms, is directly related to the rate of extraction of the resource
simply because tax revenue depends, in part, on the rate of
extraction. Positive and negative externalities arising from
petroleum exploitation can also be modified to a certain degree by
enhancing or restricting rates of exploration and production.
Consequently, depletion policy is an extremely important mechanism by
which governments control the impact of petroleum development and
revenues derived from it.
Secondly, the fiscal arrangements concerning petroleum
exploitation yield tremendous financial resources to governments, and
the manipulation of the fiscal regime in addition to the disposal of
these revenues must necessarily indicate government assumptions of
economic utility. The fiscal arrangements include taxes levied by
governments both as owners of the resource (royalties), and for
shares of the profit accruing from the production of the private
good. Economic incentives and disincentives to invest in the
industry and all manner of acquisition and disposal of government
petroleum revenues are of interest in this policy area. Economic
development programs based on petroleum revenues are also of
considerable importance and depend on the successful capture of
economic rent by the fiscal regime. Government efforts in these
financial areas must be directed toward leaving the private industry
sufficient economic incentive (profit) to continue investing in
petroleum development while simultaneously obtaining for collective
benefit the maximum possible revenues from the exploitation of its
natural resource.
Looking at the exploitation of petroleum as the provision of a
public good and as the management of market failures is therefore
justified on several counts. Firstly, public policy in general may
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usefully be analysed using the concept of "public good" defined in
its broadest sense. Secondly, petroleum exploitation yields two
types of goods in the Marshallian sense of joint production: the
private product of petroleum and the collective good of increased
governmentf\There are also the positive and negative externalities of
petroleum exploitation which have economic and fiscal implications
for the state. These result in policies such as government ownership
and control of the industry itself, regulation or non-regulation of
petroleum pricing, depletion policy, and the fiscal policies. This
study therefore proposes to examine petroleum policy outputs in each
of these areas. The next task is to outline what types of policies
in these four areas might be expected if it is assumed that
governments are indeed economic utility maximisers, constrained in
their activity by public opinion and regular elections.
4. MODELS OF PETROLEUM POLICY
Theorists use models to identify general principles of
interaction, empirically observable in the real world. Models should
test the validity of these principles and suggest modifications to
them in the light of evidence gathered by empirical research. The
evidence may also challenge the validity of the models themselves and
the assumptions on which they are based. Consequently, modelling may
be seen to comprise three distinct aspects: the generation of general
principles, analysis in the light of empirical evidence, and
conclusions. "Assumptions may or may not be 'descriptive' or
'realistic', as these words are ordinarily used. In many cases the
'unrealism' of assumptions causes the models to be rejected before
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the conclusions are examined and tested. Fundamentally, the only
test for 'realism' of assumptions lies in the applicability of the
conclusions [to the real world].
In attempting to model petroleum policies in rational choice
terms, the basic assumptions employed will be those of economic
rationality, self-interested individuals, and the perceived value of
exchange, which have led to the view of government as a collective
organisation for the provision of public goods. Rational choice
assumptions concerning the fundamental interests of political actors
and bureaucrats will be presumed to dominate government action.
Petroleum exploitation is assumed to provide both private and public
goods, and incidentally to produce externalities. In the light of
these assumptions, government policies will be examined in four main
areas of interest: government participation in the industry, pricing
policy, depletion policy, and fiscal arrangements.
It is further assumed that both the private industry and the
public have interests in the exploitation of petroleum which do not
always correspond with those of the government. The oil companies,
it is assumed, are intrinsically interested in reaping the maximum
economic benefit, both in the short and medium term, from the
production of petroleum. Consequently, the strategic interests of
the private firms in the petroleum industry must be minimal
government interference. Broadly speaking, they will seek to
minimise government participation in the industry, favour pricing
regulations which maximise company profits, oppose depletion policy,
and propose fiscal arrangements of minimal taxation and maximum
exploration and production incentives. However, there may be
conflicts of interest between the major multinational corporations
and those of the independent and/or domestic firms.
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One further assumption should be noted concerning the concept of
the public interest. The public interest may have two meanings —
that which is in the interest of, i.e., to the benefit of, the
collectivity, or the degree of interest expressed in public opinion
or manifestations of public concern. The former conception of public
interest may appear to be paramount in the government's setting of
priorities in petroleum policies but, according to rational choice
theory, the latter may be more significant, especially as an election
approaches. The public may, of course, be largely indifferent to
specific policy measures although the measures undoubtedly affect
various interests including petroleum producers, consumers, and the
electorate, to name but a few. Public opinion may favour state
participation in the industry to prevent major oil companies alone
reaping the rewards of production and charging high prices for the
product. Indeed, the public is likely to have a keen interest in the
lowest possible prices and neither depletion policy nor the specifics
of the fiscal regime is likely to be of great concern to the majority
of voters. A significant degree of public interest is probable in
such matters as the government's management of external effects on
the balance of trade, the value of the currency, and its use of
revenues which accrue from petroleum production. Government policy
in each of the four specialised areas is therefore influenced to
greater and lesser degrees, depending upon proximity to the next
election and realistic policy alternatives, by the interests of both
the private industry and by the public.
These assumptions suggest both likely state objectives and the
mechanisms employed to realise those objectives with regard to a
rapidly-depletable and financially valuable natural resource. The
rational choice perspective on government and political behaviour
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will be used to assess the similarities and dissimilarities in policy
measures taken by the three case states, Canada, the United Kingdom,
and Norway. If public choice assumptions about economic rationality
are correct, petroleum policies in the three case countries will be
broadly similar because all actors involved will be pursuing the
maximisation of self-interest in each state and each situation; the
independent variable remains the resource itself. Such differences
as do occur should be the result of varying political situations and
should be able to be act-Q/wrtpdated within the theory.
A. State Participation in the Industry
"Because of the shortages that have occurred in petroleum
products and the sharply rising energy price levels since 1972,
consumers are unhappy with various segments of the energy industry.
Given this general dissatisfaction, political appeals for increased
regulation and even public ownership are more frequently voiced and
welcomed by an irate public." Prior to the OPEC price crisis of
1973. the public perception of the oil industry was that of dominance
by the major multinational petroleum companies, the seven sisters.
Since OPEC asserted its power as the cartel-like organisation of the
non-communist world's largest petroleum export:governments, its
control of the international market has, until recently, been the
focus of public concern. In both periods, there seemed to be a large
body of public support for state intervention in the petroleum
industry in order to control externalities associated with
oligopolistic control of a major energy industry.
The public demand for greater government participation in the
development of state petroleum resources, however, does not
distinguish too precisely between the concepts of ownership and
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control. Governments can participate in the petroleum industry by
buying equity in existing petroleum companies, as did the British
government with British Petroleum (then Anglo-Persian) in the First
World War when the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill,
wished to secure petroleum supplies for naval use.^3 By assuming a
51# ownership of BP, the government gained access to petroleum
supplies in the case of a shortage, yet did not attempt to control
the firm's activities when they were unrelated to military security.
Obviously, government ownership can be extended by outright
nationalisation of all petroleum companies operating within the
state's territories. Alternatively a national petroleum company may
be established with participation rights in all petroleum activity
undertaken within the state's boundaries. Neither of these exercises
in government ownership, however, guarantees government control over
the industry. Control is exercised and maintained principally
through the regulations which govern all aspects of petroleum
activity within the state. The implementation of petroleum policies
at all stages of exploration, development, production, and marketing
IS a more precise indicator of government control over petroleum
resources.
In short, there appear to be three major policy options which
could be pursued by producer governments in the field of
participation in the petroleum industry, all of which could secure a
degree of stability and control in an oligopolistic petroleum market.
In the first case, state ownership may be limited to the resource
itself and control will thus be exercised only through the regulation
of production and the imposition of taxes. In other words, the
private industry can be left to produce the resource according to
government regulations formulated with stability of price and
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security of supply as the principal objectives. If the private
market option is rejected as insufficiently secure, nationalisation
measures may be introduced and these may vary from military state
holding through to outright government ownership. Finally,
governments could choose to establish national petroleum companies.
It should, however, be emphasised that "[ejconomic nationalism
is not a costless indulgence."^ There are compelling reasons for
governments to participate directly in the petroleum industry, some
of which have already been outlined in the discussion of market
failure. Other advantages offered by direct government participation
in the industry are related to the information gained which is useful
to the formulation of energy policy. Equity ownership is a less
noticeable form of participation and it may afford less effective
control than the creation of a state petroleum company. On the other
hand, outright nationalisation of an entire industry is a politically
charged action which provokes a high degree of uncertainty in the
given market. Public petroleum corporations offer the advantages of
high public profile and direct industrial participation which can be
highly effective in terms of policy implementation. In addition,
depending on the scope of their mandate, public petroleum
corporations can also directly influence production and pricing
levels in ways less obvious to the public than government direction
provided that they are granted either participation or buying-in
rights in the state's oil fields.
Rational choice theory would predict that state participation in
the petroleum industry will be increased in response to strategic
concerns (as was the case with the British government in the First
World War), public pressures for increased state presence in the
industry, or when the government wishes to secure more information
48
regarding the actual state of the industry in order to shape its
policies and capture the greatest benefits possible from the
exploitation of the resource. If public opinion is not favourably
disposed toward explicit government efforts in the direction of
nationalisation, state ownership and control will be exerted through
increased regulation in other areas of petroleum policy or in equity
ownership. However, if the issue of collective ownership and control
of the petroleum industry has become a public concern, it is likely
that participation will be more direct and will take the form of the
establishment of a state petroleum company.
Bearing this in mind, it is possible that the interests of
political actors can best be served with any of the three policy
options, depending on the public climate at a given time and the
proximity to the next election. However, a budget-maximising
bureaucracy is far more likely to be disposed toward the
establishment of a public petroleum corporation with a wide range of
responsibilities in terms of the maximisation of bureaucratic
activity which that option affords. On the other hand, the private
petroleum industry would not support the establishment of a public
corporation, wishing to retain its monopoly on industrial information
and thus secure for itself the most important consultative role in
policy formulation. Within the industry, the major multinational oil
companies could be expected consistently to resist the establishment
of national petroleum companies, while smaller independent companies
might favour their creation if their mandate included the
encouragement of independent activity as, for example, in
participation agreements. The public's concerns would likely focus
on the insecurities associated with oligopolistic petroleum price and
supply, and in times of uncertainty in the international petroleum
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market, public opinion will favour the immediate establishment of
state petroleum corporations with broad control over the industry.
In periods of relative stability, the interest of the public is less
likely to focus on state corporations.
State participation in the petroleum industry is less important
in terms of government control than public policy concerning
petroleum resource development. Rational choice theory suggests that
government control in any given jurisdiction will be augmented when
that policy area exhibits a lacuna of state control or potential for
further state utility as a result of increased control. State
participation in the petroleum industry is generally associated with
public ownership, but effective control is expressed by the breadth




The supply and demand for goods and services exchanged in the
private market are determined by price. In the case of public goods,
no such price mechanism operates in the allocation of resources;
rather, programs of public goods are selected through elections and
the selection of a government.
However, in the case of petroleum, two types of goods are
produced in the exploitation of the resource — both the private good
of the petroleum product and the collective good of increased
government revenues. In addition there are the externalities
associated with each. Since the OPEC-induced price shocks of the
1970s, pricing policies for the private product have come to be of
great concern to governments of producing countries. There appear to
be two main pricing policy options: determination by the
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international market, or determination by government through various
mechanisms such as the establishment of price schedules or via
public corporation activity.
The decision of states to allow the price of petroleum produced
by private and public firms within their territories to fluctuate
■ i
along with the international market indicated until recently a
willingness to allow OPEC initiatives to determine the price of
petroleum. Government regulation of prices, on the other hand,
demands evaluation and decision regarding the relative utility of a
price set below the international market value (a benefit to
consumers) or above the international market value (a benefit to
producers). Lower prices automatically lower reserve standings, as
the economic cost of developing any geological prospect determines
the viability of petroleum production, and vice versa for higher
prices. Various price levels also affect the world petroleum market
itself, the value of the producing country's currency, and production
costs elsewhere in the economy. Price levels can be established by
government determination of schedules or more implicitly by the
activities of a public petroleum corporation, if it is given the
responsibility for purchasing and distributing a large proportion of
petroleum production within state territories.
Price regulation, or non-regulation as the case may be,
therefore indicates how the government wishes to control the price of
the petroleum and which group it wishes to benefit. It must also be
remembered that price levels may be more subtly controlled through
production levels -- increased production (supply) will depress the
market price of the product, while production cutbacks will lead to
price appreciation if products cannot be purchased elsewhere.
The utility-maximising government would be concerned with the
pricing of its petroleum resources on four fronts: firstly, with the
economic and fiscal effects of various price levels on the economy as
a whole, the domestic currency, and the international petroleum
marketplace which in turn affects acceptable price levels within the
state; secondly, with regard to the implications various price levels
will have for the development of its resources; thirdly, with the
revenues it can realise at differing price levels; and fourthly, with
the effect of government-determined price levels and their external
effects on its electoral popularity. It would be expected that
secure governments would be more likely to set prices at high levels
in order to realise maximum development and financial potential
within the period of their office, while insecure governments would
be more favourably disposed to lower price levels in order to boost
electoral support. It could well be that pricing policies may be
related to the electoral cycle. Governments which do not directly
set the price of petroleum products may implicitly and consciously be
doing so in their depletion policies, while governments truly
uninvolved in price setting are illustrating their faith in the
optimal allocation of resources by the international petroleum
market.
Politicians may favour any of the policy options depending upon
the conditions in which the decision has to be made. If an election
is approaching, concerns which focus on satisfying consumer demands
for the lowest possible price are likely to be foremost in the minds
of political actors, and this may conflict with bureaucratic
interests in maximising budgets and policy control which indicate
disposition towards price schedules or public corporation
determination. The private petroleum industry could be expected to
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favour price levels which would increase its profit and provide
incentives to explore for and extract petroleum. Here again the
major companies and the independents may differ in their interests.
It might be expected that the industry as a whole would favour the
international market determination of price, but in fact it may
desire government control over prices in periods of international
price decline to mitigate investment uncertainty. It is unlikely
that in any situation the private industry would be supportive of a
pricing scheme in which domestic prices are held below international
levels, as the opportunity costs both in terms of immediate profit
and incentive to invest would appear unreasonable. The public would
likely favour any policy which minimises the consumer price of fuels,
regardless of longer term effects on output or security of supply.
C. Depletion Policy
Depletion policies are an extremely important indicator of the
way in which a government views the value of petroleum and the length
of time it expects to have the resource at its disposal. Slower rates
of depletion indicate a concern for conservation, while policies
which encourage rapid exploration and maximum production imply urgent
need on the part of the government for immediate benefits, or perhaps
indicate an optimism with regard to geological and technological
prospects.
Government control of depletion of the resource is related both
to price, as illustrated in the discussion of pricing policy, and to
the assumption that the private industry's discount rate may be
higher than the social discount rate.That is to say that
petroleum companies may not have the same appreciation
£©r the. value of the resource as do governments, and that
53
consequently they will produce the resource at maximum levels without
due regard to social interests in conservation, the socio-economic
impact of rapid development, and increasing scarcity. Governments
are better able to view the development of petroleum resources within
an overall energy strategy and, having the regulatory control over
the production of the resource, can use that control to moderate the
depletion rate. If governments are indeed the omniscient and
altruistic organisations assumed by old-fashioned welfare economists,
operating to maximise social welfare, depletion rates more
conservative than those desired by the industry would be typical of
all governments.
A modified price appreciation model demonstrates the assumptions
underlying depletion policy. "[The] net present value maximising oil
producer is interested in two things: prospective net price
appreciation [P] which is the return on oil kept in the ground, and
the return he can expect to earn on other investments [I]. If P is
greater than I, ... oil will tend to be held in the ground so that
planned output programmes will tend to be reduced. If P is less than
I, output will tend to be increased.
If we accept the premises of rational choice theory, it seems
obvious that this model of oil producer behaviour could apply equally
well to both private oil companies in individual fields as to
governments evaluating the entire petroleum resource situation within
their jurisdiction. In this way, the implementation or avoidance
of depletion control indicates the ways in which the government views
the prospects for price appreciation of the resource in relation to
other investments it can make more immediately. Governments which
allow rapid rates of depletion may be assuming the greater utility of
having cash resources immediately at their disposal, which would not
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be surprising given the short time horizons of each term of office.
In these cases, governments may be expected to have higher discount
rates than those of the private industry, which, it is assumed,
wishes to be operating profitably for much longer than a four or five
year period. Governments with more conservative depletion rates may
be assuming greater utility to result from the slower development of
the resource. This could arise as a result of a variety of
considerations — perhaps such governments do not suffer from
immediate financial constraints, or perhaps the social and economic
impact of rapid petroleum development and the ensuing flood of
capital into the economy would pose severe management problems for
them.
Depletion policy can indicate these various orderings of utility
for any given government, but it must be remembered that depletion
policy can be implemented in two principal ways: through regulation
of production levels and also through the regulation of exploration
activity. The means by which various governments choose to regulate
depletion may also indicate something of their interests in terms of
their desire to be seen as controlling the pace of either exploration
or production, and/or the difficulty they associate with each task.
In terms of major policy options, governments could choose to
disregard depletion policy altogether, leaving production levels to
the private industry and assuming efficient investment in future
energy sources as a result. On the other hand, depletion policies,
as mentioned, can be implemented effectively either through licensing
mechanisms which allow for exploration, or through production
controls on petroleum development. Furthermore, licensing for
exploration leases can be undertaken in two principal ways: either
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through the discretionary allocation of licences by the bureaucracy,
or by competitive auction for leases in which private companies make
bids for exploration territories.
While politicians may be indifferent to the actual means by
which exploration licences are allocated, bureaucrats and petroleum
companies would have keen interests in which type of scheme is
employed. Bureaucrats could be expected to favour the discretionary
allocation of licences. Many petroleum companies could take the same
view because leases are more expensive if auctioned. On the other
hand, the competitive auction of exploratory leases does yield higher
levels of government revenues in most cases and might therefore be
preferred by politicians and members of the public.
From the government point of view, production control may or may
not be an attractive policy option, depending upon public opinion and
the efficacy with which exploration control may be employed to
control resource depletion. Once again, particular methods of
production control may be of little interest to political actors,
while the bureaucracy could be expected to favour whichever method
would provide it with maximum discretionary influence in policy
implementation. However, production control in general would not be
in the industry's interest in that various investments require
certain paces of development to maintain their economic viability,
and individual companies tend to balance the entirety of their
various fields' production against losses in individual exploratory
or productive efforts. The less government involvement in these
decisions, the better from the company point of view. The public may
be interested in production levels in terms of longer term security
of supply and revenue income from petroleum production. It might
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favour production control over exploration control simply because the
former more explicitly attempts to control the pace of resource
depletion.
D. The Fiscal Regime
Fiscal arrangements concerning the exploitation of petroleum and
the ways in which governments employ the revenues which accrue to
them indicate the economic interests of the state. If governments are
assumed to be economically rational, then royalty levels and taxation
policies will be designed so as to capture the maximum economic rent
from the exploitation of the resource while leaving the private
industry sufficient incentive in the terms of profit to continue
developing the resource. The fiscal regime will also be designed to
encourage the production of marginal developments, while reaping a
larger proportion of economic rent from more profitable fields.
Modifications to the royalty and taxation system will be expected to
follow every major increase and/or decrease in the price of
petroleum, whether the price is regulated by the government itself or
follows the international market. It would also be expected that the
private industry has its greatest influence in the design of
government policy in this area, being the sole authority on its own
measure of sufficient return on investment and the monopolist of the
technology of petroleum development. Industry associations will
likely focus the bulk of their activities on this area of petroleum
policy, and with some degree of success.
The fiscal regime can be designed along three broad lines:
taxation on corporate profits only (the free market option), resource
rent taxation, and taxation combined with incentives. Taxation on
corporate profits alone would imply that the development of petroleum
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resources is similar to any other industrial activity and has no
strategic importance, minimal external economic effects, and neutral
fiscal impact. This system was employed only in the very earliest
days of petroleum exploration and production in Canada, and never in
the United Kingdom or Norway. Resource rent taxation would comprise
taxation on corporate profits in addition to a single resource rent
tax (a royalty) designed to capture maximum economic rent for the
owners of the resource from those who are developing it while still
leaving to the latter sufficient incentive for investment. The
advantages of this scheme are associated with its simplicity and
efficacy in capturing economic rent, while the disadvantages might be
thought to be in its inflexibility in terms of encouraging marginal
developments. Taxation combined with incentives overcomes the
difficulty with resource rent taxation in that it allows for the
development of an often complicated scheme of various taxes and
incentives, the objectives of which are to capture maximum economic
rent, leave sufficient incentive to investors, and encourage the
development of marginal prospects.
None of the actors interested in petroleum activity today
seriously advocate taxation on corporate profits only, as all
recognise its strategic and economic importance. However, between
the latter two policy options there remains considerable disagreement
as to the relative advantages of resource rent taxation and taxation
combined with incentives. Right-wing political actors tend to favour
the resource rent option as being less interventionist, while left-
wing politicians advocate the taxation/incentives scheme.
Bureaucrats would likely be interested in more administratively
complicated taxation and incentive schemes, and the industry as a
whole might prefer less complicated resource rent taxation, although
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smaller independent companies may be favourably disposed towards
taxation combined with incentives. The public can be assumed to be
relatively indifferent to the fiscal arrangements if satisfied that
the latter capture a fair proportion of economic rent for the
development of the resource and are not inhibiting further
investment.
This theoretical discussion is completely by-passed by the fact
that in the three countries to be examined, taxation and incentive
schemes are employed. Interests consequently tend to be articulated
in terms of less taxation and/or more incentives (or vice-versa) with
regard to specific aspects of the fiscal regime. Again, the
interests of the political actors in these specific debates will
reflect concerns about the impact on public opinion and proximity to
the next election. Bureaucrats will be concerned with enhancing
administrative programs while the industry may varyingly support or
criticise specific programs in relation to its interests of maximum
corporate profit and incentive to invest. In terms of specific
fiscal arrangements, the public is unlikely to be interested.
The investment of government revenues from petroleum production
is likely to take two forms: the amelioration of current financial
problems such as burgeoning deficits; or, and only if the first is
not an immediate issue, the investment of these resources in economic
development schemes to benefit the society in the longer-term.
Governments with severe financial concerns will not engage in policy
plans concerning economic development schemes, although they may
engage in the rhetoric of public discussion of the idea. It would be
expected that in these cases, rapid rates of depletion, high prices,
and taxes would all contribute to the government's management of the
immediate problem, while issues of the long term are dismissed.
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Governments less constrained by immediate financial concerns are more
likely to develop strategies for investment of petroleum revenues and
will probably control the flow of petrodollars into their economies
much more carefully through conservative depletion rates possibly
combined with lower taxation and price levels.
CONCLUSION
These four areas of petroleum policy concern both the private
product of petroleum resource exploitation and the collective
benefits (and costs) resulting from that production. If the rational
choice premises concerning rationality, utility-maximisation, and
government behaviour in the provision of public goods all hold true,
the empirical evidence should suggest a strong similarity in the
basic petroleum policies of the three case countries to be examined.
Whatever dissimilarities appear between the cases and the models
should be explicable within the theoretical terms of the principles
of rational choice. It is also to be expected that the interests of
the private petroleum industry, the voting public, and indeed the
various bureaucratic structures of government involved with the
design and implementation of petroleum policies may be conflicting.
These various interests will influence the policy outcomes to greater
and lesser degrees, depending on the relative bargaining strength of
the various interests, the area of policy concerned, the timing of
the next election, and international market conditions.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Rational choice theory, the application of economic principles
and methodology to the study of politics, has a broad application in
all areas of both political philosophy and political science. To
date, the literature generated in this field has concentrated on the
social contract and social welfare from the normative point of view,
and electoral systems, political campaigns/parties, voting
techniques/behaviour, and the bureaucracy in positive studies.
This research proposes to apply rational choice principles to an
analysis of petroleum policy outputs in three quite different states:
Canada, the United Kingdom, and Norway. In terms of resource
situation and historical development of petroleum policy, Norway and
Britain are constitutionally similar states with Canada providing a
contrast. Although Canada and the U.K. share the British
parliamentary tradition, Canada is the sole federal state among the
three. The choice of these three countries therefore permits an
examination of petroleum policy in democracies with different
constitutional rules.
By employing the theory of public goods, models of petroleum
policies in four areas have been suggested which will be tested
against the policies implemented in the case countries. The relative
influences of the international petroleum market, proximity of
elections, industrial and public concerns about petroleum policies
all should be illuminated by an examination of policy outputs with a
view to explaining similarities and variations between the behaviour
of the governments and the policy options predicted by rational
choice theory. It is argued that the empirical evidence gathered
will illuminate to some degree the usefulness of the rational choice
approach to comparative studies of policy output.
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A SURVEY OF PETROLEUM POLICIES;
OPEC, CANADA, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND NORWAY
This chapter describes the OPEC oil price crises of 1973/7^ and
1979/80 in some detail and outlines the chronological development of
petroleum policies in the three countries under examination: Canada,
the United Kingdom, and Norway. Under the pressures of world
petroleum market conditions, all three states modified the principal
aspects of their petroleum policies. It is therefore necessary to
include an overview of OPEC initiatives in addition to the historical
development of petroleum policies in the three states. The objective
is to highlight major petroleum policy developments in these
countries from i960 to the present in order to provide a perspective
from which the petroleum policies in each of the three case states
may be examined.
1. OPEC AND THE INTERNATIONAL PRICE OF OIL
OPEC's sudden domination of the world petroleum market in the
1970s and 1980s had major impact on the economies of the western
industrialised nations. The shocks of the oil crises of 1973/7^ and
1979/80 brought to light the western world's reliance on OPEC oil and
therefore its strategic vulnerability. Although OPEC has had
difficulty in defending its price level since 1983. it is still the
major supplier of crude to the western world, and as such continues
to wield considerable power. The development of non-OPEC resources,
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such as North Sea oil, has been timely both from an economic and a
strategic point of view; but it is unlikely that such development
would have proceeded as rapidly had it not been for the actions of
OPEC producers in the 70s.
Prior to I960, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
did not exist. The oil industry had been developed and maintained in
the major producing countries of the Middle East by a relatively
small number of U.S. and European-based multinational oil companies
with long histories of exploration and production. Concessions were
granted to these companies in which the country with the petroleum
resources gave the oil companies the right to search for and develop
oil reserves in their territories. The concession agreements were
advantageous to both parties: the host country had its resources
developed at no expense, gaining revenues in the process, and the oil
company acquired reserves of petroleum which it could exploit at
will.
The concession system made the holder the sole
arbiter of the volume and nature of the investment in
the host country, the choice of areas for
exploration, the determination of exploration plans,
the development of oilfields, the production levels,
the size of the necessary production facilities,
exploration and transportation capacities, etc. In
practical terms, this deprived the state of the right
to interfere in any of these vital matters and
limited its role merely to that of collecting taxes,
so that the relationship between the concessionary
company and the state was purely fiscal.^
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In other words, the concession system gave the oil companies free
rein to explore for and develop petroleum resources in the host
countries of the Middle East and Northern Africa, their only
responsibility being the payment of royalties and/or taxes to the
owners of the resource as production ensued. The interests of the
oil companies themselves were entrepreneurial: rapid development of
resources to satisfy a burgeoning world demand with relatively little
concern for the environmental or social costs associated with such
development. The host countries, on the other hand, were the
passive collectors of revenue resultant from such production. In
short, the companies could freely develop and sell Middle East and
North African oil.
The creation of OPEC was a reaction against this control which
the oil companies exercised without great regard for the interests of
p
the host countries . By the late 1950s, two factors were
contributing to the major oil companies' decline of power in the
world oil market: the rise of independent producers and the marketing
of Soviet crude. In order to become more competitive, the majors
unilaterally cut the price of Middle East crude in 1959•
r£Aj£V\»£„
Consequently, the /y shares of the host countries were
proportionately reduced, and they were powerless to influence the
decision. In response, representatives of the leading Middle Eastern
oil producing countries — Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait —
and Venezuela, met in Baghdad in September i960. OPEC was formed at
this meeting; its objective was to put an end to further price
reductions by the oil companies. Later membership came to include
Qatar (1961), Indonesia (1962), Libya (1962), Abu Dhabi (1967),
Algeria (1969), Nigeria (1971). Ecuador (1975). and Gabon (1975)^-
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OPEC's actions in the 1960s focused primarily on asserting the
host countries' sovereignty over their natural resources by insisting
that oil price cuts or amendments be made in consultation with the
producing countries' governments. It failed to restore prices to
pre-1960 levels, but achieved a price freeze in its early years and
managed to establish the producer governments as consultative
partners in the determination of oil prices. OPEC emphasised the
exhaustible nature of petroleum resources and introduced the economic
and social development requirements of the host countries as valid
considerations in long-term petroleum development and pricing
policies. Taxes and royalties were paid on a "posted price" of oil,
a tax reference price determined by the companies in consultation
with OPEC, which added an element of stability to the world market.
Any market price reductions were undertaken at the company's expense
and thus were relatively limited in scope and duration, with the net
producing government share of approximately 56# of the posted price
remaining constant despite spot market fluctuations. Thus, the oil
market throughout the 1960s was relatively stable and the real price
of Persian Gulf crude actually fell over the decade^. The oil
companies continued to control the level of output but the host
countries appeared satisfied with a consistent share of revenues.
However, as early as 1968 OPEC was asserting the principle of
government participation as fundamental in the case of states which
chose neither nationalisation nor direct investment in the
exploitation of their natural resources^. Although OPEC's direct
actions during this period were confined to participation in the
pricing scheme through the proportional taxation of posted prices,
its sphere of interest and activity was much broader than that, as
was later demonstrated.
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In 1970, Libya demonstrated what would occur when the host
country asserted its sovereignty over its petroleum resources. The
concessionary companies were underpricing easily transported Libyan
crude, despite the protests of Ghadaffi who came to power in 1969.
after the closure of the trans-arabian pipeline restricted supplies.
After unsuccessful negotiations, the Libyan government issued
instructions to many of the independent operators within its
territories to cut back production rates by up to 30%•^ The result
was that the companies, not acting in concert, accepted a price
increase of 30 cents per barrel, and the Libyan government achieved
an upward tax correction of 5%, from 50% to 55% of the posted price.
As well, the Libyans had introduced the concept of annual price
increases of 2 cents per barrel for a five year period.^ It was the
first time that a host country had exercised direct control over
production and pricing.
At the OPEC conference in Caracas in December 1970, the
Organisation passed the following resolutions: to undertake
negotiations with the oil companies to secure an upward amendment of
tax ratios in line with the Libyan settlement, to effect a
substantial increase in posted prices to reflect market increases, to
delete all discounts and price rebates enjoyed by the companies, and
to revise the price differentials between varieties of their crudes.
These resolutions led to the negotiation and conclusion of the
Teheran and Tripoli Agreements of February and April 1971* In
Teheran, the Gulf producers negotiated with the companies and
succeeded in outlining a five-year pricing scheme in which the price
of oil was to increase 2.5% per annum with the tax component of the
O
posted price increasing from 56% to 61% . The Tripoli Agreement was
similarly concluded between the North African producing countries and
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the companies operating there. The result of these agreements was
the direct participation of the OPEC governments in the pricing of
oil in their territories and an increase in their revenue shares from
the exploitation of those resources.
The Teheran and Tripoli Agreements were out of date by 1973 when
market prices were well above the posted price of approximately $3-00
per barrel. The governments' shares were a constant percentage of
the posted price, protecting them in the case of a price drop but
excluding them from gains in the case of a price increase. Thus the
companies were reaping all the benefits of an increased market price
resulting from the increased world demand, especially in the
industrialised countries of the U.S., Japan, and Western Europe whose
economies were expanding rapidly in 1973- In the autumn of 1973.
negotiations between the companies and OPEC resumed, but broke down
when the companies refused an adjustment of a higher government
percentage share per barrel designed to siphon off their windfall
profits.
Faced with the companies' refusal, OPEC Gulf members met in
Kuwait on October 16, 1973 where they announced unilateral price
setting of their oil. The posted price for Saudi Arabian light oil,
the marker crude, was increased to $5-12 per barrel^, which
represented a 70% mark-up. On the following day, the Organisation of
Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) resolved to impose an
embargo, aimed principally at the U.S., on the countries supporting
Israel in the ongoing October War. The shortage, both perceived and
actual, meant that realised prices were running at as much as three
times the recently increased posted price. In December, OPEC
increased the posted price of Arabian light to $11.65 per barrel
effective January 1, The price increase boosted the
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producing governments' share to approximately $7.00 per barrel.
Ms
Since the end of 1973. OPEC,remained the sole price administrator of
petroleum produced in member countries (when it succeeded in
maintaining cartel discipline) without challenge or retaliation on
the part of the oil industry or the consuming countries.
However, pricing was not the only area in which OPEC was testing
its strength. In the early 1970s the principle of government
participation, endorsed by OPEC in 1968, stimulated nationalisation
activities in member countries. By March 1972, the principle of
equity ownership was accepted by the companies. By December of the
same year, agreements were concluded in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Abu
Dhabi which gave the host countries 25% ownership of production
operations and included a gradual escalation to 51% ownership by
1 1
1983 • In June 1973 Libya nationalised Bunker Hunt, an independent
petroleum company, and acquired 51% of the Occidental Oasis group in
August. In September, Libya nationalised 51% of the remaining
foreign petroleum assets in the country. The major petroleum
companies attempted to retaliate by boycotting Libyan crude, but
demand was too great and supply was too short. The growing force of
nationalism "...eventually led to complete government control, either
by legislated nationalisation, as in Iraq, Algeria, Venezuela, and
Libya, or, as in other producing countries, by government
participation in the concession ... which led later to complete
government takeover of the oil operations in return for guaranteeing
the companies certain quantities of crude oil at a small price
1 ?
advantage..." By the mid-1970s, OPEC had asserted its dominance in
both the pricing and the production activities of the oil industry
operating within its states. In other words, the petroleum resources
and revenues were now j controlled by the producer
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governments, and this control would be used to further their own
interests as opposed to the interests of the multinational oil
companies or those of the consuming countries. This development made
OPEC the dominant force in the international petroleum market,
controlling the bulk of the free world's reserves and productive
capacity.
After the price revolution of 1973/74, OPEC became more
conservative in its pricing policies. In the September 1975 meeting
in Vienna, the posted price was increased to $11.46 per barrel. In
December of the following year, the Doha meeting produced a two-tier
pricing system in which Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates
increased their crude prices 5% while the other members increased
their prices 10% to be followed by another 5# in six months.
However, the two-tiered system was so difficult to manage that prices
were re-unified at the Stockholm meeting in July 1977- Saudi Arabia
and the UAE agreed to a further 5# increase while the others lowered
their prices The price for the Arabian light marker crude then
stood at $12.70 per barrel"^.
In Abu Dhabi in 1979. OPEC agreed to undertake quarterly
increases to achieve an average increase of 10# over the year.
However, by February the impact of the Iranian Revolution was felt on
the world market when spot prices reached $23 per barrel against a
marker crude level of $13-34 for that quarter. A consultative
meeting of OPEC in late March increased the price to the fourth
quarter level, $14.54 for Arabian light, which resulted in an annual
average increase of 12.5#. The principal outcome of the meeting was
the concept of a floor price under which no OPEC member would sell;
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but surcharges and other sales taxes could allow for any individual
member to attain any price which the market would bear above the
floor price^.
By June 1979. as a result of fears of oil shortages, spot sale
prices were running at $40.00 per barrel against the $14.54 OPEC
price. An OPEC meeting of that month in Geneva moved the marker
crude price up to $18.00 per barrel and the newly admitted surcharge
principle was limited to $2.00 per barrel^. Thus, a ceiling price
for OPEC crude accompanied the floor price in an effort to stabilise
the volatile market. These initiatives illustrate OPEC's attempts to
harness a very insecure market without imposing production quotas on
its members. Just prior to the OPEC conference in Caracas in
December 1979. Saudi Arabia retroactively increased the price of its
marker crude by $6.00 per barrel to $24.00 from November 1. In
January 1980, the market price was increased to $26.00 per barrel,
and again in mid-May to $28.00 effective retroactively to April 1.
It remained at that level until it was increased to $32.00 in January
1981. The following January it rose again to $34.00 where it
remained until the pricing problems of early 1983"^.
The 1979/80 price shock had numerous effects on the world
petroleum market which resulted in a major decline in OPEC's control
over it in the early 1980s. Firstly, the dramatic price increases of
the second oil crisis, as it came to be known, resulted in strong
efforts on the part of consuming countries to increase domestic
supplies and conserve energy. The encouragement of domestic
production and substitute products were undertaken in order to reduce
dependence upon OPEC oil. These efforts in the areas of substitution
and conservation have led to structural changes in the world oil
market and set in motion trends which are not easily halted, much
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less reversed. Of a more transient nature are the effects of the
world-wide economic recession of the early 1980s which has also
contributed to a decline in the demand for oil. Many economists
argue that this recession is a result of the latest increase in
energy costs which the western economies were unprepared to sustain,
and that OPEC's price hawkishness may have done the Organisation very
serious long term damage. OPEC production was 30.7 million barrels
per day in 1979 which accounted for approximately 60% of free world
production; by 1982 it had fallen to less than 19 million barrels per
day, representing less than 50% of free world production^7. By 1987.
production levels had dropped to between 15-9 and 17-1 million
barrels per day. In addition, free world production in non-OPEC
countries increased throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s. Some
observers suggested that a price decline was just as likely as a
18
price increase over the next few years , and this in fact proved to
be the case.
OPEC called a special consultative meeting in March 1982 at
which a production ceiling of 17-5 million barrels per day was set;
it was the first time the Organisation had called upon its members to
limit supply in order to defend the posted priced. After two days
of talks, the July meeting was suspended indefinitely as a result of
angry exchanges between Iran and Saudi Arabia over production quotas,
the Saudis having assumed the position of "swing producer". By
virtue of their vast productive capacity (11 million barrels per
day), the Saudis would increase and decrease their production as
necessary in order to maintain OPEC price levels and were therefore
not constrained by production quotas like the other OPEC members.
The December meeting was once again geared towards the preservation
of the $34.00 marker price which was to become effective in January,
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but disciplinary measures were not forthcoming and members continued
to discount their crudes and sell above their quota levels. Finally,
on March 14 1983. the marker price was reduced by $5.00 per barrel to
$29.00 and production quotas totalling 17-5 million barrels per day
20
were again imposed .
Throughout 1984, prices remained soft and OPEC cut its
production ceiling at the October meeting to 16 million barrels per
day, although it remained committed to maintaining the $29 price.
Norway reduced the official price of its petroleum by $1.35 per
01
barrel in order to reconcile the official rate with what was
actually being realised in the market, and it rapidly became apparent
that a price war between the North Sea and OPEC producers was in the
offing. In January 1985, Norway eliminated its official pricing
structure altogether, acknowledging the supremacy of the spot market
in the situation of over-supply and further increasing pressure on
ppOPEC prices . Saudi Arabia announced its intention to increase its
production and negotiate prices related to the spot market. By
December, Sheik Yamani was predicting petroleum prices below $20 per
barrel if both OPEC and non-OPEC producers did not cooperate to limit
supplies and support the price. North Sea crude prices fell to $18
per barrel in late January 1986. The price continued to slide
throughout the spring, finally bottoming out in April when prices
fell below $10 per barrel after OPEC's failure to reach an agreement
in March. It rallied to $14 in May, and fell again below $10 per
barrel at the end of July before recovering over the rest of the
year. By mid-1987 there was talk of permanent recovery as the price
hovered near $20 per barrel, but discord between OPEC members at the
December meeting shook confidence and the price fell to the $17~l8
per barrel range.
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To conclude, OPEC's formation and its rise to dominance over the
world petroleum market were the direct result of the producer
governments' attempts to assert control over the pricing and
production of petroleum resources within their territories. Through
its efforts in the 1970s, OPEC succeeded in assuming C.t>H-ixo\
over petroleum production in member countries and establishing a
"political" price for its petroleum which was largely unrelated to
the cost of production. In response to this success, consuming
countries endeavored to boost domestic and alternate supplies and to
encourage conservation as oil became an increasingly valuable
commodity. Prior to 1973, energy policy in general, and petroleum
policy more specifically, was largely ignored by the consuming
countries, but it has become a major concern for both consuming and
producing countries since then. States with petroleum resources
concentrated on control over domestic production and on maintaining
an increasing government share in the increasing revenues. This is
the environment in which the major initiatives in the petroleum
policies of Canada, the United Kingdom, and Norway were implemented.
2. CANADIAN PETROLEUM POLICY
The exploitation of natural resources in Canada is greatly
complicated by the federal nature of the Canadian state with its
constitutionally defined division of powers. Section 91 of the
Canada Act 1867 describes the federal government's jurisdiction which
includes the administration of interprovincial and international
trade and commerce, taxation and the like; while sections 92 and 109
give the provinces ownership and control of all natural resources
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located within their respective territories, including those
subsurface. Despite this explicit division of powers, the federal
government reserved to itself control of the Prairie provinces'
natural resources until 1930, although the provinces were established
in I87O (Manitoba) and 1905 (Alberta and Saskatchewan). This
reservation was made under the peace, order, and good government
clause of section 91 and marks the beginning of a continuing struggle
between the federal and various provincial governments (principally
Alberta, Saskatchewan, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia) over the actual
ownership and control of petroleum resources, their pricing, and
marketing.
The first petroleum discovery made in what is now Alberta
occurred when a Canadian Pacific Railway crew was drilling for water
near Alderson in 1883; its disappointing find proved to be natural
gas^3. Alberta's oil era began in earnest with the major Turner
Valley condensate strike in 1914. Petroleum development, production,
pricing, and marketing was entirely in the hands of private companies
until the federal government relinquished its control over natural
resources in the Natural Resources Act, 1930- In the following year,
the province introduced royalties on petroleum production for the
first time . The Alberta government was to receive 5% of petroleum
production in like or kind, but it did not involve itself in the
legislation of prices or production controls. Major oil discoveries
followed, with the late 1940s and early 1950s proving an especially
fruitful era of exploration. An interprovincial pipeline was
constructed in the early 1950s to transport domestic crude as far
east as Sarnia, Ontario, although the bulk of crude supplies in
eastern Canada were supplied by imports.
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In the latter part of the 1950s, controversy developed around
the question of Canadian petroleum exports to the United States.
Transportation costs added such a substantial amount to the cost of
oil and natural gas delivered to eastern Canada that many western
Canadian producers were able to sell greater quantities of their
product south of the border at considerably lower prices. The newly
elected Conservative government under John Diefenbaker struck a Royal
Commission on Energy*^ known as the Borden Commission after its
chairman, Henry Borden, the objective of which was to examine
petroleum supply and demand within the country with a view to
discerning the national interest in this area. It recommended that a
National Energy Board to monitor Canadian petroleum imports and
exports should be established, that Canada export all surplus natural
gas, and that Montreal and points eastward should be designated as an
import market for crude. Domestic production would be consumed in
the west and excess supplies could be exported to the U.S.
As a consequence of the Borden Commission's findings, the
p/T
Diefenbaker government set up the National Oil Policy (NOP) , which
was announced on February 1, 1961. It was the first comprehensive
petroleum policy put in place in Canada, and its principal effect was
to divide the Canadian petroleum market into two halves along the
Ottawa Valley line. The western market would be served by the more
expensive domestic oil, while eastern Canada (the region of greater
population and consumption) would be reserved as an import market.
The interprovincial pipeline would not be extended beyond Sarnia,
Ontario, and all surplus petroleum production would be exported to
the U.S. under the control of the newly established National Energy
Board, set up in 1959- In fact, the NOP provided some protection for
the domestic oil industry in that it reserved a market for domestic
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production regardless of its ability to compete with less expensive
imports. This remained the principal development in petroleum policy
until the first OPEC oil price crisis of 1973 forced the government
to modify its policy.
The Middle East oil crisis had less impact in Canada because the
country was self-sufficient in oil at the time -- imports and exports
were approximately equal. However, it focused public attention on
the finite nature of petroleum resources as it coincided with a
reappraisal of Canadian reserves which indicated they were not as
extensive as previously assumed^. Moreover, a disruption in foreign
supply greatly affected the large import-consuming eastern Canadian
market, making domestic production more attractive in terms of price.
There had been some adjustment of the federal government's
export policy in February 1973 when limits were set on crude oil
exports as supplies tightened up in the face of increasing demand. A
pO
policy statement, An Energy Policy for Canada , was published on
Dominion Day (July 1). Its original draft recommended the
establishment of a state corporation to negotiate directly with the
oil producing nations regarding the price of Canadian imports, but
this suggestion was eliminated in cabinet^. The resultant sixty-
page statement committed the government to the pursuit of adequate
supplies at reasonable prices, national security, the export of
surplus energy supplies, and the encouragement of energy resource
development. The statement also discussed the concept of economic
rent from resource development as opposed to profit on investment.
However, it did not suggest any immediate policy changes and failed
to anticipate the crisis precipitated by the burgeoning price and
supply problem.
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The July policy statement was completely out of date within two
months. In September, Prime Minister Trudeau announced the
introduction of an oil export tax at a rate of 40 cents per barrel,
and the government's intention to consult the provinces on the
extension of the interprovincial pipeline to Montreal^'-'. A voluntary
price freeze at $3.^0 per barrel up to the end of January was
requested of the industry. By this action, the Prime Minister
foreshadowed a major policy change which occurred later in the year.
The NOP was to be abandoned.
In December, Prime Minister Trudeau announced further steps to
be taken in the development of the Liberal government's energy
policy^-*-. The price freeze was extended until the spring of 197^,
the pipeline would be extended to Montreal, the NOP was formally
eliminated, and a national oil company was planned. The export tax
was increased in December to $1.91 per barrel, and to $2.22 in
January 197^, and to $6.60 for February and March^; the revenues
accruing from the export tax were shared with the provinces as had
been agreed in December.
However, the prospect of increased taxation on the natural
resources of the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan by a federal
export tax drew a strong response from those provincial governments.
In October 1973. Premier Lougheed of the Conservative government of
Alberta announced that royalties within the province would rise along
with the international price. "The province's primary objective was
evidently to force Ottawa to withdraw its export levy by squeezing
the industry."33
The federal-provincial First Ministers' Conference on Energy3^
was held January 22-23, 197^. at which federal Energy Minister
Macdonald introduced a scheme for establishing a single Canadian
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price for oil below the international level. The wellhead price in
Alberta would be increased from $4.04 per barrel to $6.05, and the
$2.01 increase would be used by the federal government to subsidise
the more expensive imports coming into the eastern market. The
provincial premiers were hesitant about this plan, but the conclusion
of the Conference saw the federal government planning to subsidise
eastern import consumption with revenues from the increased export
tax from February through April, 197^. during which time a permanent
single-price formula was to be sought.
The tension continued between the federal and producing
provinces' governments and the "general assertiveness of the
producing provinces ... provoked centralising moves by Ottawa,
including the enactment of the sweeping Petroleum Administration Act
of 1974, a bill granting federal officials broad power over the
pricing of oil in Canada."35 jn addition, in the May 197^ budget,
provincial royalties became non-deductible for the purposes of
federal corporate income tax. The petroleum industry, caught in the
middle of the federal/provincial dispute, responded by slowing down
its exploration activities within Canada. "There resulted a sharp
decline in drilling activity and a much-publicised movement of
drilling rigs from Canada to the United States. Shortly thereafter,
important tax and royalty concessions by both levels of government
led to record levels of drilling activity.These developments
were to be repeated in detail in the 1980/81 federal/provincial
resource dispute.
The period from 197^-79 marked a rapid increase in activity on
the part of the federal government in the area of petroleum policy.
Petro-Canada, the national petroleum corporation, was established by
an act of Parliament passed on July 30, 1975^, and commenced
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operations in January of 1976. Its corporate objectives were to
explore for, produce, import, transport, distribute and refine all
kinds of hydrocarbons, in addition to investing in related ventures
and research and development projects. Through these activities, the
Canadian government would be participating directly in the petroleum
sector, acquiring revenues additional to taxes, and exerting some
influence on the direction of exploration and industry investment.
Finally, the national petroleum company was to provide the federal
government with a "window on the industry" which would assist the
government in planning further policy developments. Petro-Canada
immediately assumed control of the federal government's interests in
Panarctic Oils and Syncrude Limited, and would undertake further
acquisitions to increase Canadian ownership in the industry later on.
The next major policy statement was An Energy Strategy for
Canadians--Policies for Self-Reliance^, published in 1976,
introducing the federal government's new petroleum objective of self-
reliance. The document distinguished between energy self-reliance
(security of domestic production and supply) and self-sufficiency
(the satisfaction of domestic demand entirely from domestic
production), noting that the latter would not be realised within the
next ten to fifteen years, but that self-reliance was an achievable
goal within the decade. In order to secure this objective, the
government proposed nine major policies including appropriate energy
pricing, energy conservation, increased exploration and development,
emergency preparedness, greater Canadian participation and control,
and the like. Its targets were to move domestic oil prices towards
world levels, to reduce the average rate of growth of energy use in
Canada to less than 3-5% per annum over the next ten years, to reduce
Canadian net dependence on imports in 1985 to less than one-third of
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total demand, to maintain self-reliance in natural gas, and to double
exploration in the frontier areas of Canada over the next three
years. The government reaffirmed its commitment to the single-
pricing policy for crude oil in Canada. It also acknowledged that
the 1974 fiscal arrangements had left the petroleum industry with
inadequate cash flow. The federal tax system would be restructured
towards investment, and a producer netback (profit or return) at the
then current price of $7-95 per barrel might range from $1.79 to
$3.98.
Two years later the federal government published Energy Futures
for Canadians^. The 1978 report concluded that a National Energy
Program was required which would alter patterns of energy supply and
use, re-organise institutions and regulations, adjust policies
concerning prices, fiscal arrangements, finance, investment,
ownership and control, and public participation. Targets included
further reductions in the growth rate of energy demand, increased
Canadian oil and natural gas production, and increased energy shares
of primary demand for electricity and renewables.
In May 1979. the Liberal Party, led by Pierre Trudeau, was
defeated after eleven years in office and a minority Conservative
government under Prime Minister Joe Clark assumed power. The call
for a new comprehensive energy policy was repeated in a policy
statement made by the new government in late 1979: Background to a
New Energy Strategy^. It was produced after the initial effects of
the Iranian shortage and subsequent price increases were evident, and
reiterated many of the policy proposals outlined in the Energy
Futures report. However, the Clark government was defeated on its
first budget vote held on December 13, which included an energy
package in which the price of domestic oil would be increased (but
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not to world levels), a new revenue tax would be introduced on
petroleum production to capture roughly 50% of the incremental
revenues, and an excise tax of 15 cents per gallon on gasoline would
become effective immediately. The Liberals resumed office under Prime
Minister Pierre Trudeau on February 18, 1980, and introduced the
National Energy Program, 1980^ (NEP) on October 28.
The NEP espoused three objectives: security of supply,
opportunity for Canadians, and fairness in pricing and revenue
sharing. Security of supply was to be advanced by the introduction
of incentives to consumers to conserve energy along with
encouragement to the industry to explore for petroleum on federal
territories. Opportunity for Canadians would be augmented by a
Canadianisation programme to discourage high levels of foreign
ownership in the petroleum industry active within Canada. Fairness
in pricing and revenue sharing would be introduced by the
implementation of federally-determined price schedules and petroleum
taxes.
The main provisions of the new energy policy were pricing
schedules of gradual increases in both oil and natural gas prices
through 1990. a new array of taxes designed to capture a large
proportion of the economic rent resultant from the recent price
increases in the world market, and programs to increase Canadian
ownership and provide incentives for exploration and development on
Canada Lands, those territories and waters under exclusive federal
jurisdiction. The new taxes included the Petroleum and Gas Revenue
Tax (PGRT), the Natural Gas and Gas Liquids Tax (NGGLT), both
designed to capture the maximum possible economic rent from petroleum
production, the Petroleum Compensation Charge (PCC) which would
provide the funds for subsidy of eastern oil imports, and the
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Canadian Ownership Special Charge (COSC) which would provide a fund
from which Petro-Canada could draw to make acquisitions of foreign
firms in order to increase Canadian ownership and control of the
industry. Petro-Canada was also granted an automatic and retroactive
25% participation ("back-in") right on Canada Lands exploration
projects, which embraced the Yukon and Northwest Territories and
offshore areas, all areas of increasing exploration interest.
Increased Canadian ownership and control would be further assured by
the establishment of a Canadian Ownership Rate (COR) to assess
acceptable levels of Canadian control in petroleum firms (and
susbsequent eligibility for the Petroleum Incentives Program [PIP]),
and the activities of the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA),
both of which created considerable tension in Canadian — American
relations at the time.
The response of the Alberta government was immediate and it had
the support of the petroleum industry. Premier Lougheed suggested
production cutbacks in three stages between March and September 1981
1A
to total a shortfall of 180,000 barrels of oil per day order to
ho
increase eastern Canadian dependence on imports . Imported oil then
cost approximately $30.00 per barrel as opposed to a domestic price
of $13.81. The average royalty rate was increased to 43% of
production value. Once again the federal and provincial governments
found it necessary to engage in extremely difficult negotiations as
drilling rigs moved to the U.S., which had responded to the Iranian
crisis by deregulating oil prices altogether. By September 1981, an
accord was reached in the Energy Pricing and Taxation Agreement^3
which revised the pricing schedules for petroleum through 1986,
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introduced an Incremental Oil Revenue Tax (a windfall profits tax to
accrue to the federal government), and established the Alberta
Petroleum Incentives Program. The National Energy Program was
updated in May 1982^, with a reduction of the PGRT and a suspension
of the IORT in the face of falling demand and spot prices. In June
1983 the EPTA's pricing schedules were also revised downward in
response to the falling world price, although the domestic price was
still held below the international level.
In September 1984, the Conservative Party under Brian Mulroney
attained a huge majority in the federal election after campaigning on
improved relations with the provinces and, of particular interest in
the west, on a platform committed to the abolition of the NEP and the
revocation of subsequent agreements. The Atlantic Accord*^, a
petroleum revenue-sharing arrangement between the federal government
and the province of Newfoundland, was signed on February 11, 1985 in
anticipation of eventual production offshore. On March 28, 1985. The
Western Accord^ was announced: an agreement on energy policy had
been reached between the governments of Canada, Alberta, British
Columbia, and Saskatchewan. The central points of the new policy
included the abolition of the NEP by the elimination of its taxes and
ef-
incentive programs and by the deregulation Canadian petroleum prices.
Royalties would remain a feature of the fiscal regime, as would
corporate income tax at both the federal and provincial levels, but
all other petroleum taxes were to be phased out over short periods of
time. Oil price deregulation was rapidly followed by the
deregulation of natural gas prices, although it must be mentioned
that these initiatives took place in the period of rapid decline in
petroleum prices, creating some concern on the part of small
producers. The principal o'b'cchvcbof the Western Accord were a
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simplification of the petroleum taxation system and an attempt to
return pricing policies and investment decisions to market
determination.
The Canadian government introduced its major petroleum policy
initiatives immediately after the two oil pricing crises of 1973/7^
and 1979/80, and again after the international market conditions
altered substantially in the early 1980s. Both levels of government
have been principally concerned with control over natural resources
and the acquisition of large economic rents from petroleum pricing
and production. Consequently, bitter disputes between provincial and
federal governments ensued both in 197^ and 1980. Major petroleum
policy statements followed major changes in market conditions
occurring after the two OPEC price increases in the 70s and the price
fall in the early 1980s. Modifications to policy initiatives,
however, seem to have been made in response to domestic political and
economic forces. For example, the implementation of the NEP was more
directly related to changes in the international petroleum market
while the activities of both the provincial governments and the
petroleum industry were instrumental in the various agreements and
amendments which modified the original policy.
3. BRITISH PETROLEUM POLICY
Petroleum policy in the United Kingdom is less complicated than
in Canada principally because the U.K. is a unitary state. Ownership
of mineral oil resources was vested in the Crown in 193^7 , and
Parliament has sole responsibility for the development and
administration of petroleum policy.
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The origins of the industry were modest. Petroleum and
bituminous seepages were recorded in the Lancashire area as early as
I667 and a shale oil industry was active in the Lothian region of
Scotland into the twentieth century. The original products of these
enterprises were paraffin and lamp oil, and legislation was enacted
h O
as early as 1862 to regulate petroleum matters. However, the first
serious involvement of the British government in the petroleum
industry occurred in 1914 when Winston Churchill, then First Lord of
the Admiralty, acquired a 51# state holding in Anglo-Persian Oil (now
British Petroleum) in order to secure supplies for the Royal Navy in
the First World War. Onshore discoveries of small gas and oil fields
began in the 1930s, but these finds were relatively insignificant.
Energy policy in Britain after the Second World War focused primarily
on the protection of the coal industry from competition with other
fuels, including oil.
In the early post-war years the objective was to
expand coal output; subsequently, the more limited
aim of avoiding a rapid decline in the industry took
over. Such policies were evidently not very
successful since, despite a costly protective barrier
which was constructed around coal, there was a very
sharp fall in consumption, output, and employment
from the mid-1950s onwards — mainly because of
competition from lower-priced oil.^
However, on August 14, 1959. the Slochteren gas field was
discovered in a geological formation which extended from the
Netherlands out into the North Sea. Interest in North Sea petroleum
potential spurred the British government to ratify the Geneva
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Convention Continental Shelf Agreement in 1964, and the way was
cleared for exploration licences to be awarded within the U.K.area of
the North Sea.
The first period of U.K. petroleum policy, from the passage of
the Continental Shelf Act in 196450 to the tabling of the July 1974
White Paper on petroleum policy^, was marked by government efforts
to stimulate exploration activity, to achieve rapid natural gas
output and to bring into production such oilfields as might prove
commercial as quickly as possible. "The rapid exploitation policy
was instituted in the mid-1960s when interest lay mainly in the
potentially gas-bearing areas of the southern North Sea, but ... it
was decided in 1968 that essentially the same policy should be
applied as exploration efforts concentrated on the search for oil in
the northern North Sea."52
Initial policy efforts on the part of the British government
concerned the means by which licences to explore for petroleum in
U.K. waters should be awarded. A discretionary system of granting
exploration licences was thought to be the most advantageous, as
opposed to one in which companies bid in an auction for areas they
presumed to be of greater potential. An auction for licences is
generally assumed to be the best means of securing the largest
economic rent from production rights, but the discretionary system
was more compatible, it was believed, with the government's desire
for speed in exploration and extraction and for substantial British
participation. In addition, "...both the Treasury and the then
Ministry of Power relied on the cooperation of Shell and BP, which
favoured discretionary allocation over auction."53 The costs to
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private petroleum companies of obtaining licences would be
substantially less expensive if administratively awarded than if
competitively obtained in private bids or public auction.
In 136k, Frederick Erroll, Conservative Minister of Power,
outlined loose guidelines to be used in the award of licences. The
considerations included:
First, the need to encourage the most rapid and
thorough exploration and economical exploitation of
petroleum resources on the Continental Shelf.
Second, the requirement that the applicant for a
licence shall be incorporated in the United Kingdom
and the profits of the operation shall be taxable
here. Thirdly, in cases where the applicant is a
foreign-owned concern, how far British oil companies
receive equitable treatment in that country.
Fourthly, we shall look at the programme of work of
the applicant and also at the ability and resources
to implement it. Fifthly, we shall look at the
contribution the applicant has already made and is
making towards the development of resources of our
Continental Shelf and the development of our fuel
economy generally.5^
Exploration licences were issued for three years, while
production licences were awarded for an initial period of six years
on payment of $15,000 per block, and subsequent annual payments of
differing amounts up to a total of $175,000.55 After the first six
years of a production licence, a certain portion of it (generally
half) was returned to the state with the rest of the lease being
extended for up to forty years at the licensee's discretion5^.
Licensees were forbidden to assign their awards to others without
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Ministerial approval; this provision was designed to prevent the
emergence of a market in licences^?. The principal fiscal
arrangements originally included a 12.5# ad valorem royalty on
production which was part of the licence agreement, and normal
British corporation tax at 52# of company profits^.
"The first allocation of offshore leases in 1964 was hurried
through by the Conservative government so that it could be completed
between the passage of the Continental Shelf Act and the impending
general election."59 Sixty-one companies applied for 400 of the 960
blocks on offer, and fifty-one were awarded leases. Thirty-two
thousand square miles of exploration territory was leased,
principally in the southern half of the North Sea, and offshore
drilling commenced almost immediately. Discoveries from this
licensing round included BP's West Sole gas field in 1965. which came
into production in 1967, as well as other natural gas finds in 1966.
The general election held in October 1964 produced a new Labour
administration which instituted an immediate policy review. The
focus of the review was both the method of licence allocation and the
extent to which government participation was desirable. Both the
Norwegians and the Dutch were awarding licences by administrative
discretion, and this may have influenced the conclusion of the policy
review. No change to the method was proposed, although additional
award considerations were suggested concerning the ability of the
applicant to contribute positively to the British economy especially
in terms of employment, industry, and the balance-of-payments
benefits. In addition, proposals for facilitating public sector
participation would be favourably regarded. The second round of
licence awards followed in 1965, and was subject to these new
considerations.
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With regard to government participation, the Labour government
passed the Gas Act 1965^, employing a very strict interpretation of
the Continental Shelf Act in order to establish the Gas Council
(which became the British Gas Corporation in 1972) in a position of
monopsonist for gas produced in British territories. "[The] companies
were effectively denied the opportunity to sell their production to
anyone other than the Gas Council.... Thus, a state monopsonist
became the instrument of [economic] rent collection [after the
government realised it had not captured maximum revenues through the
allocation of licences]."^"'"
The third round of licensing awards in 1970 was subject to more
firmly entrenched considerations of public enterprise participation.
Blocks in the Irish Sea would be allocated only under the stringent
criterion that the Gas Council or the National Coal Board should
participate directly in projects. Once again, the Minister of Power
expressed preference for North Sea applications involving the BGC,
the NCB or other British institutions. The licences covered 8,000
square miles principally in the northern North Sea, a new area of
interest after 1969 as a result of the major Norwegian oil discovery
in the Ekofisk field and the Montrose find in U.K. waters. Oil
prospects off the Scottish coast of the North Sea looked very
promising, and many of the companies which had been active in the
southern North Sea gas finds had been disappointed by the limited
return they had received on their investment . The Gas Council, as
monopsonist, had set artificially low prices for natural gas in an
effort to pass on some benefit to domestic consumers, thus limiting
the profit companies could make. The government gave no indication
that fiscal arrangements would change dramatically; consequently,
large northern North Sea discoveries would be marginally profitable
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at early 1970s world oil prices. Third round exploration ventures
yielded the BP Forties discovery (November, 1970), which was not
announced as commercially viable until December, 1971. and was the
first British North Sea oil produced, coming onstream in 1975*
The fourth licensing round in 1971 included a limited experiment
with the auction method of allocation: tenders were submitted for 15
of the 286 blocks on offer. The considerations governing
discretionary awards remained similar, but conditions were also laid
out for the submission of tenders, including a 20% deposit to be
submitted with the bid itself6^. The Secretary of State had
virtually unlimited power to reject any tender submitted, and, unless
specifically requested to do so, did not have to inform the applicant
of the reason for rejection, although in principle the highest offer
would win the award. The 15 blocks auctioned yielded $90 million,
with the highest bid being made by Shell and Esso -- $50 million for
Block 211/21 (the two wells drilled on the block failed). The total
area licensed in the fourth round was 24,000 square miles, and
drilling in these areas produced a strike ratio of one well in every
four drilled.
By the mid-1970s the advent of the so-called
energy 'crisis' and a realisation that Britain had
access to large quantities of offshore [petroleum]
had placed the North Sea in the forefront of policy
.... The 'crisis' encouraged the belief that there
are massive problems in the energy market which
require detailed government intervention and the
discovery of substantial British [petroleum] reserves
... [and] opened up a new freedom to 'plan' the
country's energy future and, indeed, its economic
future.64
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The First Report of the House of Commons Public Accounts
Committee, North Sea Oil and Gas^, was tabled in 1973. and it
generated an extensive public debate on the issue of North Sea oil
taxation. Prior to 1973. taxes on North Sea production had been
limited to royalties imposed by conditions in licence agreements and
a corporation tax of 52#. As international petroleum prices
increased rapidly in the latter part of 1973. the realisation grew
that substantial economic rent would remain with the producing
companies unless the North Sea fiscal regime was modified
immediately.
The Conservative government was defeated by the Labour Party in
March 197^, and by July, the new administration produced a White
Paper entitled United Kingdom Offshore Oil and Gas Policy
(Cmnd.5696). In this policy statement, the British government
proposed the establishment of a state oil corporation, a special tax
regime for petroleum (including a new Petroleum Revenue Tax), and
commitment to the principle of production control in the national
interest. This statement marked the first time that explicit
depletion control was suggested in British petroleum policy.
Although it remained committed to building up production as
rapidly as possible, the government wanted to take the necessary
powers to regulate North Sea petroleum depletion if and when
necessary. Several factors contributed to the change in philosophy
regarding depletion policy. Price expectations in the early 1970s
had changed dramatically, and indefinite oil prices rises appeared a
possibility. This contributed to the idea that oil not produced
would appreciate in value more rapidly than investments made from
proceeds of production. In addition, U.K. reserves looked much
larger than originally estimated and the government believed it was
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not necessary to provide incentives to companies to produce oil, as
had been the case with natural gas. It has been suggested that the
government decided to allow high volumes of gas to be produced in
order to compensate the companies for having to sell to the BGC at
less than the market price.^
On December 6, 197^, as a result of growing concerns on the part
of the industry, the Secretary of State for Energy, Mr. Eric Varley,
introduced a series of principles to the House of Commons which would
guide the Department's administration of depletion controls if these
proved necessary (later known as the Varley guidelines) .
Legislation was to be introduced shortly (the Petroleum and Submarine
Pipelines Act 1975) which would further define the government's
powers in this area, but for the moment Varley wished to calm the
concerns of the industry that investment undertaken to date would not
be suddenly subject to onerous production controls. The Varley
guidelines assured the petroleum industry that discoveries made under
existing licenses would not be subject to production controls before
1982, or four years after the onset of production, whichever was
later; and that whatever controls proved necessary would not be
imposed without consultation and with notice having been given to the
companies involved. Shortly thereafter, two significant pieces of
petroleum legislation were enacted: the Petroleum and Submarine
Pipelines Act 1975^ and the Oil Taxation Act 1975^ •
The Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act (PSPA) gave the U.K.
Secretary of State for Energy the broad legislative powers necessary
for the regulation of depletion rates if it was thought to be in the
national interest or during a national emergency. Under the PSPA,
oil companies would have to submit to the Secretary programmes
specifying their capital investment plans and maximum/minimum
96
production rates for proposed projects. The Secretary could reject
these programmes on the grounds that they were contrary to 'good
oilfield practice' or not in the national interest; producers then
would have to modify their programmes and resubmit them. The
Secretary was obliged to give notice to companies whose production
exceeded or was below the accepted limits, but the details of
limitation notices (maximum and minimum production rates, notice
periods, etc.) remained at the Minister's discretion. "Subsequently
[to the original programme] he can modify the plans originally
approved upwards ('national emergency') or downwards ('national
interest') with limits and on notice which he determines, but must
reveal to producers in advance.In effect, this gives the
Secretary of State for Energy complete discretion over production and
capital investment programs in the North Sea. Oil companies were
assured that the Varley guidelines were operative, and in fact the
sole actions by the Secretary of State under this legislation into
the 1980s were to limit the flaring of natural gas in the North Sea
and to announce potential restrictions on the pace of development of
some fields^.
In addition, the PSPA set up the British National Oil
Corporation (BNOC) and the National Oil Account (NOA), a new fund
controlled by the Secretary of State for Energy, which would provide
BNOC's capital. Several policy suggestions on this front preceded
the actual creation of BNOC. The original idea was to create a state
oil company using the government's share in BP, and Conservative
attempts to amend the Act focused on establishing a U.K. Oil
Conservation Authority with broad regulatory powers over depletion.
Both these suggestions were rejected in favour of the establishment
of a public oil corporation which would be responsible for providing
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the government with policy advice and increasing the state's presence
in North Sea operations^. BNOC was given an automatic right to
purchase, at market value, 51# of oil produced from discoveries made
in fields licensed in the first four rounds; and from the fifth round
in 1976, BNOC became a 51# participant in all awards, carrying 51# of
the exploration risks as well. The state oil corporation could also
exercise depletion control either by reserving its petroleum
resources to develop in the national interest or by controlling the
disposal of its own oil. Royalties on petroleum production were to
be funnelled into the National Oil Account from which BNOC could draw
for its operating capital. The NOA was examined annually by the
Auditor General, and in 1977~78 a controversy arose over the fact
that the control of the NOA by the Secretary of State for Energy made
BNOC ultimately dependent upon the Secretary, not Parliament, for its
funding"^. The Public Accounts Committee 1978 Report recommended
restoring full Parliamentary control over BNOC financing.
The Oil Taxation Act 1975 (OTA) set up the fiscal regime under
which petroleum production was to be taxed. Natural gas had been
produced since 1967 and was subject to the 12.5# royalty and the 52#
corporation tax, as mentioned previously, but initial North Sea oil
production was coming onstream in 1975 and a taxation regime geared
to the capture of the maximum economic rent possible had to be put in
place. In fact, by the end of 1976, seven North Sea fields were
producing 20 million tons of oil per annum, amounting to one-quarter
of total British demand^. The OTA established the Petroleum Revenue
Tax (PRT) at a rate of 45# on specially determined taxable profits
from each producing field. It was calculated after deducting
allowable losses and, where applicable, the revenue equivalent of a
production allowance. The PRT would be levied each six months, and
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was due four months after the completion of each taxable period. It
would be deductible for the purposes of calculating corporation tax,
but its principal aim was to capture the bulk of the economic rent
due to the rapid increase in oil prices in 1973/7^. A safeguard was
set up to protect more marginal fields against PRT making the
projects uneconomic — fields with an annual profit of less than 30%
of the capital expenditure to develop would be exempt from the tax.
It should be noted that the rate of the PRT was increased to 60% in
1979. 70% in 1980, and 75% at the end of 1982; while the capital and
recurrent exploration deductions fell in 1979 to 135% from the
original 175%"^ • Under the Oil Taxation Act and prior to the upward
revisions of the PRT and the world price of oil, the Exchequer was
expecting receipts of $11 billion to 1980, and $7-7 billion per annum
thereafter, with the government receiving approximately 70% of net
company revenues from production from fields up to the fourth round,
and approximately 85% for fifth and subsequent round fields^. After
the passage of the Oil Taxation Act, the government revenue share
would include licence fees, state participation benefits through BGC
and BNOC, royalties, PRT, and corporation tax. Natural gas
production after 1975 was subject to this new fiscal regime as well.
Another significant piece of petroleum legislation was
introduced the following year. In 1976, the Energy Act^® was passed
by the British government and it further contributed to the
government's ability to control North Sea depletion. The Act gave
the Secretary of State for Energy emergency powers to demand that
companies such as BP, Esso (U.K.), and Shell (U.K.) land their North
Sea production in Britain alone, further securing British supplies
from British reserves when necessary.
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The fifth licensing round occurred in late 1976 with 51% of all
awards secured for BNOC or BGC. Amoco had resisted negotiation of
BNOC's 51% stake in production from rounds 1-4, and was excluded from
a fifth round award.79 The sixth licensing round was held in 1978.
and companies had to compete to give BNOC equity interest of greater
than 51%. carry BNOC's interest, and give it options to purchase or
Oq
sell oil in order to be competitive in the awards .
In 1978 the government produced another White Paper on
Q-i
petroleum: The Challenge of North Sea Oil , which addressed the
growing controversy over the disposal of North Sea revenues. Debate
on this issue was carried on amid the waning strength of Scottish
nationalism preceding the devolution referendum, but the success of
the Scottish Nationalist Party with the "It's Scotland's Oil"
Op
campaign was a recent memory0 . The policy statement rejected the
concept of a discrete petroleum fund, but the Scottish Development
Agency was introduced in this statement. The following March marked
the failure of the devolution referendum in Scotland.
In May 1979. the Conservative government under Margaret
Thatcher entered office. It announced a "policy of increasing
private sector participation in [BNOC's] offshore assets together
with several changes designed to reduce the privileged position and
quasi-governmental role of [the corporation]...."^3 By late 1982,
the government was planning to denationalise Britoil, the
exploration/production arm of BNOC, effectively limiting BNOC's
function to the establishment of a price for North Sea oil through
the purchase of 51% of the crude produced in the North Sea and its
re-sale on the world market. After a public controversy over BNOC
losses on these operations, early in 1985 the government announced
the abolishment of BNOC, although a newly established Oil and
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Pipelines Agency would assume oil and pipeline regulatory
on
responsibilities . The government wished to retain control over
North Sea oil in emergency situations and thus did not dispose of its
shares in North Sea production, which interests are now the
responsibility of OPA as well. Shortly thereafter, the government
announced its intention to privatise the British Gas Corporation,
which occurred in 198685. The government also sold its remaining
shareholding in British Petroleum in 1987. although the issue
coincided with the market collapse of October and was deemed a
Of.
financial and political failure .
Regarding licensing, the new administration announced that
during the seventh round of awards to be held in 1981, about twenty
of the ninety blocks on offer would be sold on application for
approximately $10 million each (about a tenth in real terms of what
Shell and Esso paid in the highest bid in 1971). The eighth round
awards were made in mid-1983, with fifteen blocks auctioned and the
rest were allocated by administrative discretion. The auction part
of the licence awards yielded $55 million in bids>/^ unfavourable
comparison with the other part auction of the fourth round in 1971,
which netted $90 million for fifteen blocks. In the ninth round in
January 1985, 13 of the 15 blocks on offer were auctioned raising a
total of $135 million. The tenth round was awarded in May 1987
without an auction component. It would appear that the award of
licences by auction has been shelved in the current environment of
depressed international oil prices.
The Conservative government also altered the petroleum fiscal
regime. In July 1979, the new administration passed its first
Finance Act, in which PRT rates were increased to 60%, and again in
the 1980 Budget PRT was boosted to 70%. In November 1980, the
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Chancellor announced major forthcoming changes to the North Sea
fiscal regime in the 1981 Budget, and invited suggestions for
alternative taxation schemes which would maintain the current
government share of revenues while still encouraging investment®^.
Both the United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA) and
the British Independent Operators' Association (BRINDEX) submitted
proposals, as did the Institute for Fiscal . Their
respective suggestions were taken into account (from the
associations, suggestions to modify PRT; from the IFA, a suggestions
for a simplified resource rent tax), but the government retained its
original proposals.
In 1981 the Conservative administration introduced another tax
on North Sea production, the Supplementary Petroleum Duty (SPD)®9.
SPD was to apply for taxation assessment periods over 1981 and the
first half of 1982, but was later extended to the end of 1982. The
tax was levied at 20% of gross profits (which approximates gross
Us&ceefe
revenuej) with a deductible allowance very like the PRT oil allowance.
It was to be collected before PRT and corporation tax and was to be
deductible for the purposes of both of them. As with the
introduction of the PRT, the SPD was designed to capture the new
windfall profits which potentially would have accrued to companies
after the 1979/80 world oil price increases. The PRT was also made
more severe in this Act, with deductible allowances modified
negatively.
The responses to these initiatives were critical from both
academic specialists and industrial interests, with various
publications reasserting alternative methods of taxing petroleum
production as more useful. Members of UKOOA threatened to boycott
the next leasing round. "The ending of SPD, and its replacement by a
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higher rate of PRT in the March 1982 budget, was probably a
recognition of the criticisms, encouraged by falling oil prices."9^
In the 1983 budget, further incremental changes were introduced into
the fiscal regime, the key features of which were royalty exemption
on certain new fields, a doubling of the oil allowance on those
fields, and all exploration expenditure was to become immediately
deductible for the purposes of calculating PRT. The 1984 Budget
introduced a phased-in reduction of corporation tax from the original
52# to 35% with reduced allowances over the next two years. Other
incremental forms of fiscal relief were introduced in the
government's annual budgets including the relaxation of PRT ring
fence rules (1987). However, the fundamental aspects of the taxation
scheme have remained intact despite these modifications made
necessary by the changing world market situation.
In conclusion, unlike Canadian policy, British petroleum policy
has not focused on either the establishment of an appropriate price
for production or the distribution of resultant revenue. The
principal debates have been about the most efficient method of
issuing licences and about the establishment of a fiscal regime which
would capture maximum economic rent while allowing for sufficient
return on high cost investment to keep North Sea development
attractive. However, there are broad similarities in both the timing
and the aspects of policy initiatives. Both states responded to the
OPEC prices crises with major policy initiatives which were
subsequently modified as international and domestic influences
necessitated. The taxation regimes after 1980/81 correspond quite
well: both include royalties and a corporation tax in addition to
taxes designed to capture economic rent (windfall profits taxes --
the PGRT/PRT and the IORT/SPD). Also, both governments established a
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national oil corporation with roughly similar objectives in the mid-
1970s, and both national corporations came under increasing criticism
in the early 1980s.
4. NORWEGIAN PETROLEUM POLICY
It might be expected that Norwegian petroleum policy^ would be
quite similar to British policy, given the identical geographical
situations of the resource and the financial constraints associated
with its development. However, Norway has approximately one-half of
the North Sea petroleum resources and only one-tenth the population
of the United Kingdom. The Norwegian state has quite different
requirements and concerns frow\ those of the British government with
regard to the development of its petroleum reserves. Consequently,
it has assumed a much more conservative depletion policy than has
Britain, although other aspects of the two petroleum policies are
indeed similar.
The initial legislation passed in Norway regarding North Sea
resources was the Royal Decree of May 31. 1963*^, in which the seabed
and subsoil in Norwegian territories was declared to be subject to
Norwegian sovereignty. The Crown assumed the right to issue
regulations regarding the exploration for and exploitation of
submarine natural resources in June of 1965. opening the way for
North Sea activity to commence.
While Britain's objective was rapid exploitation,
Norwegian governments from the beginning adopted a
so-called 'go-slow' policy. This does not appear to
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mean that there were government-imposed restrictions
on the depletion rates of fields already discovered:
the go-slow took the form of limiting the issue of
licences. In other words it was a policy of not
allowing too many discoveries to be made.93
Because seventy percent of Norway's primary energy consumption was
satisfied by its abundant sources of hydro-electricity, and partially
due to the popular mistrust of large foreign investment, the
Norwegian government could afford to take its time in formulating
policies which would achieve maximum economic benefit with the
minimum of social disruption. Given the size of the Norwegian
economy, significant problems of revenue absorption could be avoided,
it was hoped, if the exploitation process was held back.
On April 9. 1965. a Royal Decree was issued regarding the issue
of exploration licences.9^ The Norwegian Ministry of Industry was to
vet carefully all applicants for licences and to grant awards on
technical and commercial grounds; the commercial grounds concerned
willingness on the part of the applicants to form consortia with
Norwegian companies. In the first round of licensing in 1965. only
78 blocks were licensed in the Norwegian sector compared with 3^8 in
the first round of British awards, although the Norwegian blocks are
roughly twice the size of the British95. The second round of
licensing occurred in 1969 and introduced the option of state
participation. Only 14 blocks were then issued, twelve of which
involved a level of state participation varying from 5 to 40#96_ The
Ministry of Industry proposed in 1971 that these participation rights
be vested in a 100# state controlled joint stock company, and the
proposal was unanimously accepted by the Storting, the Norwegian
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Parliament, in June 1972. Statoil was thus established and was to
operate under normal Norwegian corporate law, but its functions were
those of a state corporation: to manage the government's
participation agreements, to expand state activities into the
downstream sector, to take a major operating role in licences north
of 62°N, to conserve petroleum resources, and to cooperate with
Norwegian industry to build up an integrated petroleum sector.
"Statoil was deliberately created as a mechanism to ensure optimal
control of the accumulation process in the oil and gas-regulated
sector because it gave the state a significant degree of fiscal
autonomy, because it was the most effective way to draw revenues from
oil directly into the state treasury, and mostly because the state
could get away with it."97
The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) was set up on April 1,
1973 in order to assume the normal regulatory functions of the state
in this policy area and to enforce legislation applying to all
companies in the sector, including Statoil^®. However, the NPD had a
weak position relative to Statoil; its lack of resources and
inability to control not only the multinationals operating in the
Norwegian North Sea, but Statoil itself, led to a certain amount of
criticism of both the NPD and Statoil in the later 1970s.
Production began in the Ekofisk field in 1971. and was initially
subject to a sliding scale royalty (as per the licensing agreements)
and Norwegian corporation tax. A sliding scale of royalties is one
in which the percentage of production value payable to the owner of
the resource (the royalty) increases as the volume produced
increases. For some older Norwegian fields, a flat 10% royalty
applied, but the sliding scale royalties were calculated on
percentages ranging from 8°/. to 16% for the fields with the lowest to
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the highest average daily production99. Norwegian corporate tax
comprised three main taxes: a federal tax of 26.5% on corporate
profits, a municipality tax of 24.3% on corporate profits, and a
witholding tax of 24.3% on distributed dividends"''^.
In the spring of 1973« the Norwegian Ministries of Industry and
Finance both produced policy statements concerning Norwegian
petroleum activity, which eventually resulted in the production of a
government White Paper on the role of petroleum activity in the
Norwegian society (No.25).In this policy statement, the
government suggested that annual production levels of 70 to 90
million tonnes of oil equivalent would represent the rate of
depletion assumed beneficial in the Norwegian setting, and suggested
that prices should follow the international market. Taxation was to
be reviewed with a view to capturing a larger share of the rapidly
increasing economic rent from petroleum production, as the
1 DP
international price had increased so rapidly .
The Norwegian Special Tax (ST) was introduced in the Odelsting
Proposition No. 26^3, passed in February 1975* The ST approximates
an excess profits tax in that it is levied at a rate of 25% on the
same profits as are the Norwegian corporate taxes. It is assessed on
company profits rather than on a field production basis, like the
British PRT, but "extraneous losses ... cannot be offset against the
profits of Continental Shelf operations and since capital allowances
may not be claimed until the asset is brought into 'ordinary use' ST
assessment is effectively on a field by field basis."10^ Using
various model fields and computer analyses, Robinson and Morgan
estimated that at 1977 prices and taxes, the Norwegian and British
fiscal regimes would yield roughly similar percentage government
revenue shares.
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The go-slow depletion policy remained intact throughout the
1970s. Per Kleppe, Minister of Finance stated in an interview that
As long as some of Norway's petroleum reserves remain
below the North Sea, our assets are probably fairly
well placed. A gradual rise in the relative price of
petroleum would represent interest earned on these
untouched assets. Reasoning along these lines, this
kind of investment compares favourably with financial
investment abroad.-*^
As it was, in 1977 Norway's Prime Minister in a Newsweek interview
said that 40-50# of the state's oil revenue was being invested
outside the country as the economy simply could not absorb the
capital generated from petroleum production-*-®®.
The third licensing round awards were made in November of 1974,
and only 8 blocks were offered. Statoil won 50# or more
participation in all of the five licences awarded, and full
operator's rights for one field-*-®^. The fourth round was to have
been held in late 1977. but a major blow-out in the Ekofisk field
provoked an extended public discussion on the dangers of offshore
production in terms of safety and environmental hazards. However,
the licensing award was delayed only until 1978 and marked an
increasing role for Statoil. Provisions were made for the gradual
take-over of all Norwegian oil production by increasing the
percentage of Statoil's participation in the awards and by setting
five-year limits on the licences awarded to other companies-*-®®.
By the late 1970s, however, tension was growing between Statoil
and Norwegian private interests in the petroleum sector, and between
Statoil and the NPD. Norwegian companies felt that Statoil was
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edging them out of opportunities in which the public corporation was
supposed to be assisting them, and the NPD had become completely
overshadowed by Statoil. Two means of inhibiting Statoil's growing
dominance of the petroleum sector were discussed: removing its
functions as state revenue collector, and awarding more concessions
to private companies109.
In 1980, the government produced a White Paper on the activity
on the Norwegian continental shelf in which its depletion policy was
reaffirmed and a taxation review was suggested"'""'"®. In February,
petroleum companies and other interested parties were invited to
submit proposals for a change in tax arrangements. The modified
proposals boosted the average tax rate on Norwegian production from
69.2# to 8l.8% primarily through an increase in the Special Tax to
35X111.
The Labour government fell in I98I and was replaced by a
Conservative coalition which acted immediately upon the concerns
regarding Statoil. Only one month after the election, the new Prime
Minister, Kaare Willoch, "...announced that his government intended
to promote greater participation in oil by private Norwegian oil
11^
companies." In January 1982, the Storting reversed the previous
government's decision to give Statoil 50% interest in all licence
awards, although this decision was later reversed as well.
The fiscal regime remained intact until July 1986, when the
Norwegian government announced substantial relief for new discoveries
and some relaxation for fields already under production"*""^. Royalty
rates were reduced to zero on future developments, and the ST rate
was reduced to 30%. In addition, the newly elected Labour government
announced a reduction of Norwegian oil exports late in 1986 in an
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attempt to support the international price of oil^^. The Norwegian
government encouraged Britain to adopt a similar posture, but such
overtures were immediately rejected by the Conservative government.
The principal difference between British and Norwegian petroleum
policies is in the area of depletion. Due to completely different
economic and energy requirements, the Norwegian government has been
able to put in place a very conservative depletion policy which does
not limit production in any way, but limits discoveries by awarding
exploration licences in small numbers and infrequently. Fiscally,
the arrangements in both countries appeared to yield equivalent
government revenue shares at least until the late 1970s, and both
governments follow the international market in determining prices.
CONCLUSION
This brief survey of petroleum policies in Canada, the United
Kingdom, and Norway has shown that in many respects, petroleum fiscal
policies appear to be surprisingly similar despite differences in
states, governments, and resource situations. All three states
introduced major petroleum policies after the first OPEC price
crisis, all of which concerned the encouragement of resource
development and the capture of maximum economic rent for the state.
All three states established national petroleum companies in the
1970s, the principal functions of which were to increase state
presence and augment government information on petroleum activities.
However, there are certain obvious differences in the priorities and
emphases of petroleum policy as well, especially in the areas of
pricing and depletion policies. The Canadian policy of government-
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determined petroleum prices varies markedly with the policies
implemented in Britain and Norway and illustrates certain political
constraints on the federal government which do not exist in the other
cases. Norway is the only state in which a conservative depletion
policy was espoused, pointing out a significantly different economic
situation from the other two states.
The similarities in fiscal regimes as well as the differences in
pricing and depletion policies may possibly be accounted for by an
economic view of state behaviour which describes political and
social, as well as economic, objectives of states in relation to
economic principles. Furthermore, there is great scope for
additional research on more detailed questions of petroleum policies
within the framework of rational choice theory.
For example, taking the three countries examined, a comparison
between the investment policies of Alberta (although not examined in
any detail in this dissertation) and Norway may be made with those of
the Canadian and British governments. Alberta and Norway might have
assumed strikingly similar positions regarding the long-term
investment of their petroleum revenues. However, the Albertan
government invested its petroleum revenues in the Alberta Heritage
Trust Fund while the Norwegian attitude favoured a slower depletion
rate combined with investment abroad. Both positions can be
contrasted with the financial and political necessities faced by the
two larger states, Canada and the United Kingdom. Both of these
governments are constrained in the development of their
depletion/investment policies by significantly larger populations,
and thus significantly greater social welfare obligations, in
relation to the resource potential. Both have larger economies as
well, which are capable of absorbing (and indeed in need of) the
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enormous revenues generated by petroleum production. A comparison of
the Scottish Nationalist movement and western Canadian separatism in
the 1970s might also be fruitfully pursued within rational choice
terms. In both countries, separatist movements increased their
activities coincidentally with the increasing value of petroleum
resources they believed to be their own. Detailed examination of
these and similar topics is outwith the scope of this dissertation,
but could be taken up by students of rational choice theory in
further efforts to clarify the politics surrounding petroleum
resource development.
Many such other comparisons are made possible if the various
aspects of petroleum policy — government participation, pricing,
depletion, and fiscal arrangements — are examined in the light of
some guiding hypotheses regarding the economic behaviour of states.
A more detailed analysis of policy developments in each of the three
case countries will be undertaken by comparing policies in each of
the major fields with the models of petroleum policies generated from
rational choice theory in Chapter 1.
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Since the first OPEC crisis in 1973. state participation in
petroleum producing countries has become the norm, not the exception.
The consumer countries were made acutely aware of the value of secure
petroleum supplies and the short-term inelasticity of demand for the
product. Both producer and consumer states rapidly developed an
interest in petroleum affairs if only to secure immediate objectives.
Producer governments also turned their attention to the appropriate
means of direct state participation in petroleum activities
undertaken within their territories. As petroleum is, in most
instances, a national natural resource, increased state participation
was to be expected once oil became a political issue in the early
1970s. Prior to that time, there had been general satisfaction on
the part of consumer states with the supply and price of the product
as provided by the international petroleum industry. The assertion
of sovereign control of petroleum in the OPEC states initiated
similar responses on the parts of producer governments around the
world. Direct state participation by OPEC countries had a dominoe
effect — a series of producer governments more or less followed
suit.
State control over petroleum activities takes many forms.
Governments introduce regulations over industrial activity to secure
fiscal and other objectives. However, numerous producer governments
have taken the step of acquiring an equity stake or nationalising the
petroleum industry on the assumption that the privately-owned
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petroleum industry does not operate in the best interests of the
government or the citizens, and that private ownership must be
replaced by active state participation.
The readily identifiable imperfections of the petroleum market
— decreasing costs, public goods, and uncertainty — encourage
government action on several fronts. Oligopolistic domination first
by the multinationals and then by OPEC highlighted the problem of
decreasing costs. The nature of petroleum exploitation — the costs
and expertise involved — have encouraged the emergence of several
integrated multinational companies whose dominance has been replaced
by the assertion of OPEC sovereignty over petroleum in those states.
Government action in both producer and consumer states might be
deemed necessary to protect consumers from the unchallenged dominance
of these groups. Additionally, in producing countries, petroleum
resources are now generally owned by the public and their
exploitation is controlled by the government. Production of
petroleum therefore necessarily yields two types of good: the private
good of petroleum and the public good of the opportunity of increased
revenues accruing to the government. Thus government policies should
be directed towards maximising the public good viz. revenues, which
could have the effect of market distortion. Producer governments
wishing to exploit petroleum resources in a conservative manner may
have to mitigate the effects of investment uncertainties caused by
this policy. Many of the problems for producers and consumers
associated with imperfections in the petroleum market can be dealt
with effectively through the implementation of production, pricing,
and taxation policies on the part of producer and consumer states.
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However, there are other reasons why governments may wish to
participate directly in the exploitation and production of natural
resources. In socialist states, ideological hostility toward a free
market system, even if regulated, may be a motive. Nationalisation
of strategic industries may be seen as the only effective means of
ensuring the development of a natural resource in the public interest
simply because it is assumed that private industry will pursue short-
term profit maximisation regardless of other social and political
considerations. In capitalist states, the public might favour a
tangible government presence in the petroleum industry, not merely to
deal with the specific problems mentioned above, but also as an
assertion of public sovereignty over resource development. In these
cases, the public may not distinguish too clearly between control
exercised through, on the one hand, various production, pricing, and
taxation policies and, on the other hand, direct state participation,
whether or not the means of participation actually yields any greater
control over the industry than other regulations.
Governments have basically four options, assuming that a total
lack of regulation is unacceptable. The regulated market option
would introduce effective policies concerning production, pricing,
and taxation in order to secure adequate government revenue, supply
of the product, and appropriate financial return to the owners of the
resource. If effective regulation of the petroleum industry was the
only issue, it is doubtful that many non-socialist states would go
beyond the regulated market option. However, if broader political
factors are being considered by producer governments, there is a
whole spectrum of options for state participation ranging from simple
equity ownership in private petroleum companies through the
establishment of public petroleum corporations to outright
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nationalisation of the entire industry. The majority of western
producer states have chosen to establish public petroleum companies
to secure "the public interest" in petroleum development.
The advantages and disadvantages of each of the three options
concerning state participation are obvious. Outright nationalisation
embodies the greatest amount of state involvement over resource
development. It is, however, difficult for the state to acquire
sufficient information and expertise to make the most of its control.
Furthermore, complete nationalisation of an industry is not popular
in most western democracies where there is an evident and strong
attachment to the market system. Modern democracies have experienced
continuous tension in public opinion between state intervention and
individual freedom and responsibility. The establishment of public
corporations in the petroleum sector is a tangible demonstration of
state ownership over the resource. The mandate of the corporation
can be flexible, allowing for an augmentation or diminution of the
corporation's involvement in production, pricing, refining,
marketing, and rent collection as the international petroleum market
and domestic political factors change. However, the more effective
the public corporation is, the more government relations with the
existing petroleum companies will be strained. Additionally, the
flexibility of the public firm's mandate may create additional
uncertainties in the petroleum market. Finally, equity ownership
could allow the government to exercise a degree of control over
company activities consistent with its share of ownership without
necessarily alienating the industry. In other words, equity
ownership could bring almost the same advantages without some of the
attendant disadvantages of outright nationalisation.
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Given the basic assumptions of rational choice theory -- that
governments will be primarily concerned with maintaining office and
acquiring sufficient revenues to assist them in that endeavor --
several expectations regarding state participation follow. It would
be expected that direct state participation in the petroleum sector
would be augmented in response to strategic concerns regarding
supply, public demand for an increased state role in the development
of a national resource, and when information for the appropriate
design of policy in other petroleum areas, for example regarding the
taxation regime, is lacking. The converse of this hypothesis would
also be expected, i.e., that when such pressures diminish in relative
importance on the public agenda, state participation would similarly
assume less importance as well.
However, rational choice theory likewise indicates that the
interests of the bureaucracy may not correspond exactly with the
interests of the fo\\-HckuaS or of the public; therefore, policy
options which maximise bureaucratic control are expected to be those
favoured by the administration. Bureaucrats might be expected to
exercise influence in favour of the maintenance of such participation
policy as exists in the face of decreased interest in the issue on
the part of the public or government. Public opinion may move
against direct state involvement in the petroleum sector when supply
is secure and prices satisfactory, and likewise, once information
sufficient for the formulation of petroleum policies is gained,
politicians may lose interest in direct state participation. In this
case, bureaucratic interests in preserving their spheres of activity
and influence may stem the tide against direct state participation in
the short term.
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Governments of the right would normally be expected to stand
against direct state participation in favour of developing policies
in other areas to regulate market activities. Governments of the
left would be expected to favour nationalisation measures depending
on their degree of socialist commitment, although leaders on both
sides of the ideological spectrum may have interests which vary
dramatically from those in the rank and file of the party. However,
an extrapolation of rational choice principles would indicate that
governments of any political persuasion would be more influenced by
vote-capturing possibilities than ideology. An application of
rational choice theory to the issue of state participation would lead
to the expectation that the popularity of the policy would be the
prime determinant of its introduction, followed by the potential
revenue lost or gained in its implementation, and finally the
ideological considerations.
Different parties in office would therefore not necessarily
support different participation policies. If state participation is
an important issue supported by the public, any government, no matter
what its ideological position, would support policies maintaining or
expanding state participation. When public opinion is less concerned
with state participation, ideological differences in party positions
on the issue will be more evident. When public opinion becomes
hostile towards state participation, governments will take steps to
reduce or eliminate state participation. Thus the prime determinants
of the implementation of a participation policy must be the
prevailing conditions (supply, price, nationalistic, and ideological
considerations) and public opinion, not necessarily the ideological
position of the party in power.
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The public's interest in direct state participation in the
petroleum industry is likely to increase at times of crises in supply
and price, and will lessen as the crisis passes. In states where
governments have regulated various industries by mechanisms other
than nationalisation, public opinion will swing against direct state
participation once the crisis has passed. In states where democratic
socialist policies have more influence, public pressure might be
exerted to decrease the importance or role of the participatory
mechanism, but will probably not prove as dramatic a reversal as
would be expected in a less interventionist state.
The private petroleum industry would be expected to assume a
hostile stance towards state participation for several reasons.
Firstly, participation marks an expansion of government control which
would impinge upon its freedom of decision-making and the possibility
of maximum financial gain. Secondly, direct participation must
eventually result in the private industry's loss of its monopoly over
crucial information regarding matters such as reserve standings,
production potential, and marketing opportunities. Thirdly,
participation might result in more effective policy-making in other
areas including exploration, production, pricing, and fiscal
arrangements. In fact, the threat of nationalisation may in itself
go far to encourage the responsible behaviour of the private
industry. Regardless, it would be expected that the private industry
would lobby against any form of direct state participation and would
be opposed to it once such a policy was implemented.
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It must be remembered that governments have an entire spectrum
of participation policies at their disposal, but the creation of
public petroleum corporations has been the option of state
participation most often chosen by producer governments in the last
fifteen years.
By I960 Government [petroleum] companies numbered
seventeen but by 1970 there were thirty-three such
companies and [by 1981 there were] in excess of
fifty. In addition we should have regard to the
twelve or so companies — principally European and
Japanese — which operate on a similar basis to
private companies but are at least partly owned or
controlled by their respective governments. Thus in
all, there are nearly seventy Government or
Government controlled oil companies and it seems the
end is not in sight...^
Both producer and consumer states have chosen, for different
reasons, to establish national petroleum companies. Public petroleum
corporations in producer states have been primarily concerned with
exploitation, pricing, and marketing control. In these cases, the
underlying rationale is the assumption that private petroleum
companies will not consider the political and social impact of
resource development in their investment and production decisions and
will be exploiting petroleum solely to secure their own immediate
gain. By establishing a state petroleum company, the government
shifts the balance of power away from the private industry in this
arena and demonstrates its commitment to the proper regulation of the
development of the nation's resource. In consumer states, the
principal consideration has been to secure short and longer term
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supplies; many consuming nations have set up petroleum corporations
with a mandate for negotiating purchasing agreements with producers.
National security has been the motive behind the establishment of
public petroleum corporations in these states. There may be
overlapping considerations in states which have both producer and
consumer interests, but the emphasis placed on the various functions
performed by such public firms gives an indication of the priorities
of governments.
The three states under consideration in this study each
established public petroleum corporations to facilitate the direct
participation of the state in petroleum activities. These agents of
the government were meant to advance government policy objectives
through their choice of activities, to engage in transactions with
private sector firms in promoting these activities, and to provide
the government with information of importance to policy-making. The
relationship of a public petroleum corporation to both government and
to private industry is of great importance to the fulfilment of its
mandate. Public petroleum corporations are readily criticised for
operating like private firms, but without the private industry's
profit-motive -- i.e., they have conflicting objectives: national
versus corporate objectives. Their national objectives are those
established by the government of the day, and these are likely to
place political and social priorities above economic ones. Corporate
objectives would focus on financial criteria of viability and return
on investments. Public corporations may fulfil neither set of
objectives and thus alienate both the government, to which they are
accountable, as well as the private industry, with which they deal in
day-to-day operations.
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Given the difficulties associated with public corporations,
there must be political reasons beyond the realisation of national or
corporate objectives which justify their creation and operations.
"...[Njational oil companies have been established to deal with
specific economic, political, and social issues.... In fact, direct
intervention is more costly than indirect regulation. One must
understand that NOCs cannot be launched, nor survive, nor prosper
without consistent and sizeable government assistance." Given the
assumptions of rational choice theory, it seems realistic to argue
that one of the primary purposes served by public petroleum
corporations is the appeasement of public opinion. This chapter
proposes to examine the state participation policies and the public
petroleum corporations in Canada, Britain, and Norway with a view to
illuminating the rationale behind the introduction of these policies
and relating this information to the arguments generated from
rational choice theory.
1. PETRO-CANADA
There are a plethora of crown corporations in Canada which have
been created for a variety of reasons. Because of the vast size of
the country and the remoteness of many of its smaller settlements,
many transport and communication links have been secured by public
corporations whose functions include providing services for these
areas at a financial loss. Market failures have led to public
expectations of governmental intervention in markets thus affected.
There are also crown corporations which are granted monopoly control
over a given service or product and provide it at minimal cost to the
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public, possibly securing a profit for the government in some
instances. Clearly, economic viability is not the sole criterion
upon which crown corporations are established, yet it certainly
appears to be the principal avenue for criticism of the performance
of such public companies.
Virtually all of the producing provinces and a good many of the
consuming provinces have established crown corporations in the energy
industries including the Alberta Energy Company, Saskatchewan Oil
Company, Ontario Hydro, and the Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro
Corporation among others. Some of these firms obviously perform
functions as the sole producer and marketer of natural resources
owned by the provinces concerned. Others have been set up as players
of similar status to private firms and the governments responsible
have typically taken an equity share in these companies to secure a
certain return to the province for the development of the resource.
Crown corporations are familiar in the Canadian context and the
public accepts, by and large, the legitimacy of governments taking a
direct role in certain industries for a variety of reasons. However,
the establishment of Petro-Canada, the federal crown petroleum
company, provoked an intense debate which, more than a decade after
the fact, has not yet completely subsided.
The Trudeau Liberals were returned to power as a minority
government in 1972. One of their first initiatives was a policy
review in the energy field, and the publication of An Energy Policy
for Canada—Phase 1^ in July 1973 was the culmination of that effort.
The question of the viability of a national petroleum corporation had
been under official consideration for some time, and it was in this
policy statement that it was first raised as a concrete possibility.
Pratt notes that as early as 1971. the Department of Energy, Mines
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and Resources (EMR) commissioned the American consultant firm of
Arthur D. Little to prepare a report on national oil companies^. Its
author was Wilbert Hopper, appointed Assistant Deputy Minister in the
federal department of Energy, Mines, and Resources in 197^. and
shortly thereafter made the first President and Chairman of Petro-
Canada. According to Pratt, Hopper was very suspicious of the
possibility of marrying both the national and the corporate interests
of a national petroleum company in one entity.
Donald Macdonald, Minister of EMR in the 1972 government, had
suggested prior to the tabling of the July policy statement the
establishment of a federal petroleum company in order to engage
effectively in petroleum trade with other producer and consumer
nations^. His original intention was to establish a national
petroleum trading company in order to weaken the control over supply
and price held by the major multinational corporations, but this
proposal was rejected by the Trudeau cabinet. It has been suggested
that many of Macdonald's cabinet colleagues were concerned about the
criticism which such a policy might provoke from the business
community, and that the necessity of taking such a step was not
evident.
In the July statement, the advantages and disadvantages of a
national petroleum company were publicly discussed.
A 'national petroleum company' (NPC) would provide a
vehicle by which the government could seek to obtain
better knowledge of the domestic and international
petroleum industries thereby providing legislators
with more valid law-making insights. An NPC could
act to stimulate regional development in specific
areas of Canada. It could serve as a centre for
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Canadian research... It could play a role in
determining the criteria on which the government
might base its policies regarding economic rent
collection.^
Points raised in the discussion were that such an endeavor would
prove uneconomic, and that the benefits of state participation in the
industry could be achieved by means already at the disposal of the
government (i.e., "there is no discernable void to be filled in
Canada by the formation of a national petroleum company"^).
Furthermore, it was suggested that such activity could discourage
foreign investment, "thus initiating a slowdown of investment in
Canada's oil and gas industry which could result in an eventual
O
overall net cost to the Canadian taxpayer or energy consumer..."0,
although the high level of foreign investment is disparagingly
discussed on the following page of the document.
However, the developments in the Middle East and the price of
imported oil in the autumn of that year quickly overshadowed the July
statement; the government rapidly implemented various strategies on
several fronts to cope with the changing situation. The petroleum
industry was requested to freeze prices, an export tax was levied on
supplies destined for the U.S., and the establishment of a national
petroleum company was proposed^. The public agenda was dominated by
the energy issue -- security of supply and a stable and reasonable
price were the public's, and therefore the government's, immediate
concerns. The rapidly escalating cost of imported oil which supplied
all of eastern Canada's requirements and the security of that
imported supply necessitated an immediate redesign of the National
Oil Policy.
131
Although Canada was technically self-sufficient"^ in petroleum
at the time of the 1973 crisis, she was still heavily reliant on
previously cheaper imports for the satisfaction of the large market
in the central and eastern provinces. As mentioned in the discussion
of the National Oil Policy (NOP) in Chapter 2, the Canadian petroleum
market had been divided into two sectors in 1961: the western half
was supplied with more expensive domestic production and the eastern
half was reserved for less expensive imports. The events of 1973 led
to an immediate reevaluation of this policy resulting in the demise
of the NOP and a rethinking of pricing and marketing strategies for
domestic production. The concern with supply was exacerbated by the
National Energy Board's pessimistic forecasts of petroleum reserves
and future demand published in October 197^^, in which the immediate
reduction and eventual elimination of oil exports to the U.S. was
recommended. Where three years earlier, the Canadian Energy Minister
Joe Green had been publicly proclaiming that Canada's petroleum
1 ?
reserves would last centuries , there was now very public anxiety
about whether there would be sufficient petroleum to last the next
decade or two. Clearly the government and the Canadian public had
been knowingly or unknowingly misinformed about the extent of
Canadian petroleum reserves which further emphasised the insecurity
of petroleum supply and information.
Concern over security of supply and the government's need to
acquire accurate information about the nation's petroleum resources
led to the re-examination of the crown corporation option. A state
petroleum corporation might effectively manage petroleum trade with
other state corporations in the market, but it might also prove a
source of invaluable information through its participation in joint
ventures with private firms. "The definition of Canadian energy
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resources was important (1) to assure adequate supplies for Canadian
requirements; (2) to permit the development of policies concerning
the rate of use of Canadian resources for domestic and export
markets; and (3) to establish appropriate policies for the collection
of economic rent.""'" 3 In addition, a public petroleum company could
be used by the government to explore the viability of high-risk
ventures such as offshore exploration and oil sands development which
might not attract the investment of private industry because of the
long lead time and front-loading of investment in such ventures. As
Minister Macdonald said in March 1975. "The Government does not feel
assured that the private sector can be relied upon to mobilise all of
the enormous amounts of capital which will be required to secure
energy development consonant with Canadian needs over the long
term.
The Trudeau Liberals had managed to secure only 109 seats in the
1972 federal election, with the Conservatives capturing 107, the New
Democratic Party (N.D.P.) 31, and the Social Credit (SC) 14. The
N.D.P. had the capacity to ensure the government's survival or
failure, and its energy position was quite clear. It favoured the
protection of Canadian consumers in the form of a legislated price
for Canadian oil and the creation of a crown petroleum corporation to
participate directly in exploration, production, and marketing
operations^. Many Liberals agreed with the N.D.P. position, and it
is widely thought that Trudeau's energy policy statement of December
1 f\
6, 1973 was a product of the N.D.P.'s power in the de facto
Liberal-NDP coalition government. Prior to this statement, the
N.D.P. had "threatened to defeat the Liberals unless the Cabinet
agreed to make certain specific commitments on energy issues: the
list included a single oil price for Canadian consumers, the creation
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of a national oil company, the guaranteed extension of the
interprovincial pipeline into the Montreal area and accelerated
exploitation of the tar sands.The Liberal cabinet had already
discussed all of these policy options, and accepted the N.D.P.
recommendations after some debate on the pipeline extension. As
mentioned, the creation of a national petroleum corporation had been
brought up earlier in the year by Minister Macdonald and had been
shelved at the time. Although the N.D.P. wielded an obvious degree
of influence over the timing and implementation of these policies,
the international situation was equally important. To credit the
N.D.P., as some observers have done, as the catalyst of this change
in Canadian petroleum policy would be as incorrect as suggesting that
it was solely a Liberal initiative or that the developments in the
international marketplace were the only concern of the government.
It must be said that none of these policy options had been outwith
the consideration of the minority Liberal government in the months
prior to the Prime Minister's statement.
The publicly-stated reasons for the creation of Petro-Canada
were security of supply and the government's need for information,
but the political reality was that the Canadian public was greatly
concerned about petroleum price and supply, and that the promise of
the establishment of a public petroleum corporation secured N.D.P.
support for a minority government anxious to retain power. The OPEC
crisis further encouraged a change in energy policy, but it was not
until the Liberals were returned with a majority government in 197^
that they implemented the Petro-Canada legislation. This could
indicate that a majority Liberal government, if elected in 1972,
might also have pushed through similar legislation without the
demands of the N.D.P. Additionally, despite the N.D.P. threat of
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withdrawal of support, the minority Liberal government did not pass
legislation to create a public petroleum corporation immediately,
indicating that there were concerns other than for N.D.P. support
which were equally or possibly more important to the government. In
other words, the attribution of the creation of Petro-Canada to
pressure exerted by the N.D.P. late in 1973 is an incomplete
explanation. There were also uncertainties regarding the
international petroleum market and pressures from the petroleum
industry which might have induced the government to delay the
implementation of its participation policy.
The initial draft of the Petro-Canada legislation was given first
reading in the House of Commons in May, 197^. a few days before the
Trudeau government was defeated on its budget proposals. Donald
Macdonald was once again appointed Minister of Energy, Mines and
Resources after the return of a majority Liberal government in July,
and the Petro-Canada legislation was re-introduced as Bill C-8 in
October. Pratt suggests that the initial decision in 1973 must "be
interpreted, first, as a strategy by bureaucratic actors to extend
their control and influence over the energy sector and to expand
their departmental influence and, second, as a political decision
1ft
timed by a minority government to shore up its hold on office."
Once the policy option of creating a national oil company had been
considered by the government, the bureaucracy concerned would
probably have favoured the implementation of such a policy, although
evidence supporting this assumption is hard to find. The creation of
a national oil company would mean increased bureaucratic activity and
power, as the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources would be
involved in both drafting the legislation and staffing the
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corporation. It would also increase the Department's access to
information useful in preparing future policy changes and as
ammunition in future confrontations with various political actors.
The debate on the second reading of the Petro-Canada Act began
in the spring of 1975- The Conservatives had been soundly defeated
in the July 197^ election principally because of the stand of their
leader, Robert Stanfield, in favour of wage and price controls. The
Liberals opposed this policy in the election campaign, although they
introduced wage and price controls in 1975 in any event. However,
the Conservatives continued to fight the Petro-Canada issue as a
matter of principle. The Conservative Party felt it had to distance
itself from the Liberals and return to its ideological roots in order
to provide a real alternative for the Canadian electorate. Its
opposition to the creation of a crown petroleum corporation was based
on the principle that government interference in the market should be
as limited as possible. Furthermore, the Conservatives argued that
the implementation of an interventionist policy would prove costly
and the objectives of secure supplies and access to information could
be achieved through other policy instruments.
The Conservative government of Alberta under Premier Peter
Lougheed was adamantly opposed to the creation of a national
petroleum company for reasons additional to those espoused by the
federal Conservative Party^. Alberta was concerned that Petro-
Canada could be employed by the federal government to wrest both
economic rent and industrial activity away from the province. If the
corporation behaved like any other petroleum company, there would be
little reason for concern and there were possible benefits to the
province associated with its creation. Petro-Canada could be a means
of obtaining federal government commitment to high risk petroleum
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ventures in the province such as the development of oil sands plants.
However, the Alberta government was initially concerned that the
national petroleum company could be used as a weapon against the
rising economic influence of the province and would impinge upon its
jurisdiction over natural resources within its boundaries.
Albertan members of the federal Conservative caucus were
particularly critical of the proposed policy. Joe Clark, later
leader of the party and Conservative Prime Minister in 1979. argued
that the creation of Petro-Canada was an encroachment by the federal
government on the constitutional responsibility of the provinces for
natural resource development. "It [the federal government] wants
power. It is prepared to extend its influence and its activities by
intruding upon the jurisdiction of the provinces, by moving into the
private sector whatever the cost."^ As early as November 1976,
Clark was claiming that if the Conservatives won the next federal
election, they would "wind down Petro-Canada and sell it either in
whole or in pieces, as part of a broader policy of trying to minimise
pi
the proportion of gross national product spent by government."
His continued opposition to Petro-Canada later in the decade would
plague the Conservative party and contribute to its exclusion from
power in the general election of 1980.
The N.D.P. also criticised Petro-Canada as it was originally
conceived. To the N.D.P., the proposed national oil company
represented a mere technical instrument, not the challenge to private
industry for which they had hoped. Private petroleum companies would
maintain the same degree of freedom in terms of decision-making and
would simply consider the public corporation as yet another player in
the Canadian petroleum market, not a mechanism by which strategic
policy could be imposed. Statements in defence of Petro-Canada made
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by various Ministers of EMR and company directors have supported this
view over the years. "The Government has said that Petro-Can does
not represent a step towards nationalisation and that the private
companies should consider its creation as a governmental initiative
favouring private enterprise in Canada." Liberal governmental
spokesmen also took pains at the time of the Petro-Canada debate to
hold out "...the spectre of what the industry would face if the New
Democratic Party wins the next legislative elections."^3
Bill C-8, An Act to Establish a National Petroleum Company, was
passed on July 10, 1975 by a vote of 112 to 65. The mandate of the
new company, as outlined in section six of the Act, was rather broad:
(1) to undertake exploration and development of
hydrocarbons and other types of fuel or energy; (2)
to undertake research and development relating to
energy; (3) to import, produce, transport,
distribute, refine, and market hydrocarbons of all
descriptions; (4) to produce, distribute, transport,
and market other fuels and energy; and (5) to engage
or invest in ventures and enterprises related to the
exploration, production, importation, distribution,
refining, and marketing of fuel, energy and related
24
sources.
In addition to this set of responsibilities, the government
wished to emphasise the role Petro-Canada would play in the
exploration of Canada's frontiers for hydrocarbon potential by more
detailed measures. The legislation allowed Petro-Canada to assume
the government's 45% interest in Panarctic Oils Ltd., which was
actively engaged in petroleum exploration in the Arctic, and other
such joint ventures would be pursued by Petro-Canada whenever
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possible. Later projects in which Petro-Canada became involved
included the Polar Gas Project, the development of a transportation
system to move Arctic gas to markets, and the Syncrude project in
which oil sands were being refined and processed into synthetic oils.
Once the crown corporation had sufficient expertise and capital, it
would carry out research and exploration on its own initiative in
ventures that otherwise would not attract the investment of private
firms. In consequence, Petro-Canada was not assumed to have the
corporate objective of other petroleum firms — i.e., the
maximisation of profit. It was to operate in the national interest,
almost regardless of the cost, and the national interest as
determined by the Liberal government in the mid-1970s concerned the
accurate assessment of petroleum reserves, conventional and
otherwise, in the state. Petro-Canada was clearly to perform
functions which would contribute to the security of Canadian
petroleum supplies, and an important element of this was its
exploration role.
This is not to say that Petro-Canada had a free purse and no
concern for capital accumulation in its early years. It was
attempting to develop a cash flow which would support both a
substantial exploration and a research commitment. In 1976 Petro-
Canada purchased Atlantic Richfield, thus acquiring considerable
petroleum industry expertise. The cost of the take-over was $3^0
million, of which $239 million was financed by the issue of
debentures to the Royal Bank, and the remainder by the issue of
ordinary shares to the Crown^5# The objective of the purchase was
the acquisition of operating capability in terms of management and
personnel. In 1978~79> it acquired Pacific Petroleums Ltd., further
enhancing its operating capacity. This acquisition was extremely
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controversial both because of the cost ($1.3 billion) and because
Pacific had an extensive retail distribution network . Retail
activities were not mentioned in Petro-Canada's original mandate.
However, in these and later acquisitions, Petro-Canada was also
contributing to the reduction of the level of foreign ownership in
the Canadian petroleum industry, a role which would assume greater
importance after the introduction of the National Energy Program in
1980.
"As Petro-Canada was being conceived, foreign controlled
companies accounted for over 90% of the petroleum production in
Canada (the percentage was even higher in crude oil, but lower in the
case of natural gas...). Of the fully integrated firms, virtually
100% were foreign controlled since almost all the refining and
marketing capacity in Canada was under foreign control.The issue
of foreign control over the Canadian petroleum industry had also come
on the political agenda after the events of 1973- The Foreign
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Investment Review Act created an agency whereby the level of
foreign control in any given industry would be monitored and
controlled if necessary by the Foreign Investment Review Agency
(FIRA).
The information function Petro-Canada was to perform as a
"window-on-the-industry" for the federal government was also of some
importance once the company was firmly established. The crown
corporation, involved in day-to-day petroleum business, was supposed
to yield valuable information concerning other policy areas such as
depletion policy (the ascertainment of reliable information about
reserves so as to develop and market the resource responsibly) and
fiscal measures (to capture the maximum economic rent from the
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industry). However, Wilbert Hopper, Petro-Canada's chief executive,
has noted that information thus acquired has not always been used, or
used to best advantage.
You can't communicate if nobody wants to listen
and different ministers listen to different degrees.
Ministers listen to a lot of people. They listen
to Imperial Oil and to Shell and Gulf and Mobil, who
all come to see them. Those guys probably see the
minister more than I do.... I've had different
ministers and some don't wish to exercise 'a view
through the window' as we see it. Or we may tell
them and they'll not listen, or they may disagree....
The same is true with deputy ministers. Some
deputies want to hold the cards very close to their
vests, and are not awfully concerned about what I
have to say... Others are more open....
So, to begin with, it's an uneven course. In
addition, I have to say that I'm not the only one in
this company who communicates his views in Ottawa.
There are a number of people who do. There's not
just one conduit.^
In essence, the degree to which the government exploits Petro-
Canada' s unique position within the industry as a source of otherwise
confidential information depends entirely on the political and
bureaucratic actors involved. Information supplied by Petro-Canada
had to compete with that given by private firms and the industrial
associations as well, all of whom are attempting to gain ministerial
and bureaucratic attention. The advantage to the government which
Petro-Canada has provided in terms of information is uncertain,
although this function was one of the two emphasised at the time of
the initial Petro-Canada debate.
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Ministers and deputy ministers have taken advantage of Petro-
Canada's various roles or not at their discretion, but another aspect
of the relationship should be emphasised. The government, as sole
shareholder in the firm, exercises a great deal of control over the
management of the corporation. Firstly, the Cabinet is responsible
for the appointment of Petro-Canada's Board of Directors which in
turn selects the President and Chairman with cabinet approval. Thus
government control over senior management posts is assured. In
addition, Section 7(2) of the Petro-Canada Act requires the company
to comply with such policy directives as the government may issue
from time to time. Section 7(3) requires the annual capital budget
to be submitted to the Minister to obtain cabinet approval. In
addition, the fact that Petro-Canada is a crown corporation means
that it is subjected to greater public scrutiny in the media than any
private petroleum company, and is expected to be more forthcoming in
giving detailed responses to queries than its private counterparts.30
Petro-Canada has no power of its own to regulate or influence
private activity by any means other than its own operations. In
short, Petro-Canada is not a regulatory body. It is a state
corporation which can operate in the same way as a private firm in
the petroleum industry, within the terms of the policy objectives
outlined by the government of the day. Petro-Canada is subject to
the same taxation as other petroleum companies except in the case of
the Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax (PGRT) introduced in the National
Energy Program 1980. In this instance, Petro-Canada was excluded
from paying the tax because the funds thereby gained were employed to
encourage Canadian participation in frontier ventures through the
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Petroleum Incentives Program (PIP). For Petro-Canada to pay PGRT and
receive PIP payments would be meaningless as it already received
capital injections from the government for exploration purposes.
Capital injections received by Petro-Canada from the government
amounted to $380 million per annum until 1984^1. The company has
also had the right of borrowing $760 million from the government in
addition to whatever loans it could secure from private sources. By
1984, Petro-Canada was a large, integrated petroleum company on equal
footing with many of the multinationals. The government had a
burgeoning deficit problem and suggested eliminating the capital
injections. Petro-Canada's President, Wilbert Hopper, responded by
telling the federal government that if the cash injections were
stopped, Petro-Canada would cease its operations as a policy
instrument which indeed has appeared to be the case^.
These financial advantages were but one source of strain on
Petro-Canada's relations with private petroleum firms in the early
years of its operations. In addition, the federal government revised
the Crown land regulations in 1977^ which had been criticised as not
protecting Canada's long term interests. The net result of the
changes gave Petro-Canada a preferential position on Canada Lands
(territories and waters over which the federal government has
jurisdiction).
The original federal regime introduced in 1964^ had granted
uncontrolled entry into exploration leases on federal territories on
a first-come, first-served basis of application with a minimal work
requirement. The permit gave the \&S&e- the right to a production
lease, which imposed a royalty rate of 5# for the first three years
and 10% thereafter, with the Cabinet having the power to reduce this
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royalty rate. The result was that by 1972, approximately 85% of
Canada's continental shelf was covered by permits held by the major
multinational oil companies with minimal exploitation obligations^.
In a statement made on May 19, 1976, EMR Minister Alastair
Gillespie announced a proposal for a Petroleum and Natural Gas Act to
amend the federal fiscal regime, along with new Canada Oil and Gas
Land Regulations^. The bill received first reading in December
1977, but it lapsed and was not re-introduced. However, in the 1977
amendment to the Canada Lands regulations, Petro-Canada was given the
right to select, for oil exploration, up to 25# of existing and
future Crown lands for a period of seven years. In addition, the
crown corporation was given a "back-in" option on leases already held
by other firms. If significant discoveries had not been made by the
leaseholder in the first twelve year period, Petro-Canada could take
up 25# of the original lease. This retroactive imposition of state
participation in the Canada Lands was not appreciated by the
petroleum industry which claimed that it amounted to expropriation
without compensation.
In under four years, Petro-Canada became the second largest
producer of natural gas and the seventh largest producer of oil in
Canada37. its assets totalled approximately $2.1 billion, and it was
ranked as the sixth largest oil company operating in Canada and the
largest Canadian petroleum company. Petro-Canada was outstandingly
successful in terms of growth, yet criticism of the corporation
continued from both the private industry and the federal Conservative
party. In the election campaign of 1979, Joe Clark, Conservative
leader, pledged to dismantle or privatise Petro-Canada if elected.
In consequence, when the Conservatives formed a minority government
after the general election of May 22, 1979, the future of Petro-
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Canada was in doubt. However, the Conservative leadership had not
recognised the popularity of the national petroleum company. A
Gallup Poll taken in August 1979 revealed that Canadians rejected the
Clark government's proposals to privatise Petro-Canada by a majority
of two to one^®. Later in the year, the Conservative Energy Minister
changed his position to a review of Petro-Canada's assets with a view
to maintaining some and privatising others. Despite this
backtracking, Prime Minister Clark denied any shift in policy.
A task force to examine options for privatisation was set up and
it reported to the government in mid-October 1979^- It proposed to
divide Petro-Canada's functions and assets into two separate bodies:
Petro-Canada Exploration Inc. would become a major Canadian petroleum
company retaining approximately 97% of current assets; and a much
more limited government agency would retain responsibility for trade
with other state-owned petroleum companies, research and development,
and high-risk exploration ventures. The task force further
recommended a gift of $100 worth of Petro-Canada Exploration shares
to each citizen with the option of selling them after six months.
Individuals would be limited to a total of 1% interest in the company
and "eligible" institutions 3%« The estimated total cost of this
scheme to transfer Petro-Canada to the Canadian public was $3-8
billion. "For the Conservative Finance Minister John Crosbie, no
contemplation [of the plan] was required — the report that was the
subject of much hilarity among Petro-Canada management was dismissed
out of hand."^'-'
The Conservatives' policy regarding Petro-Canada was reworked
and finally appeared after the defeat of the government in December
on its budget. The "Program for a Strengthened Petro-Canada"^
received little public comment at the time of its publication, but it
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marked an impressive rhetorical shift for the Conservatives. From
the previous position of denunciation of the principles on which it
was based, the Conservative Party was now suggesting Petro-Canada
become 'the best and the biggest energy resource company in Canada'.
The document suggested the acceleration of Petro-Canada's growth by
giving it access to non-investment capital, the removal of budgetary
and operating constraints to allow for effective operation, and
increased Canadian ownership and control in the Canadian petroleum
industry by giving Canadians an opportunity to invest in Petro-
Canada. The new improved Petro-Canada would be a mixed enterprise
with 70% of its shares being privately owned (50% gifted, 20% sold)
with the government retaining a 50% controlling interest and control
over appointments to the Board of Directors. It was too little, too
late. The new policy proposal received scant public comment,
probably as it was published during an election campaign in which the
public seemed opposed to any sort of privatisation of Petro-Canada.
The public agenda was again dominated by the issue of petroleum
prices once again as a result of the Iranian revolution and the
second major acceleration of international petroleum prices.
The national oil company was not an interventionist
whim; it was a government response to the demands of
the electorate. Amazingly, the Tories never analysed
the situation in this way. In particular, they never
realised the powerful reinforcing effect that the
second OPEC crisis in 1979 would have on the
electorate's desire for an energy security blanket.
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However, the Canadian public was not entirely united on the
issue of Petro-Canada. As might have been expected, citizens in the
producing provinces in the west were in favour of the privatisation
of the national petroleum company, but did not have the electoral
weight of the heavily populated east where Petro-Canada was highly
regarded as symbolic of Canadian natural resource ownership. The
Conservatives relied too heavily on their support in the western
provinces on this issue and did not take a balanced view of the state
of public opinion expressed in the federal election.
The Liberal party was once again returned to office with a clear
majority under Pierre Trudeau in February, I98O. The new government
was committed to a new energy policy, including a revised pricing
policy to meet Canadian needs and a strengthened and expanded role
for Petro-Canada. The government's National Energy Program (NEP) of
October put into effect the Liberal^* objective of
"Canadianising" the petroleum industry, partly through discrimination
in favour of Canadian owned and controlled firms in Petroleum
Incentive payments for exploration on the Canada Lands, and partly
through a fund to be used by Petro-Canada to make further
acquisitions of foreign-owned firms. The Canadian Ownership Special
Account was funded from a levy on all petroleum consumption in Canada
and this account in turn funded Petro-Canada's post-NEP acquisitions.
In February I98I, Petro-Canada made its first acquisition under the
new arrangements, purchasing Petrofina Canada Inc. for $1.19
billion^. This acquisition continued to plague the current
Conservative government under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney elected
in September 1984. The Auditor General, Kenneth Dye, has, for the
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last several years, been unsuccessful in gaining access to
information which will prove whether or not the Canadian public paid
a greatly inflated price for the Petrofina assets.
In addition to the acquisition role, Petro-Canada*s rights in
the Canada Lands were altered in the Canada Oil and Gas Act 1981^.
In this Act, Petro-Canada's previous back-in rights were dropped in
favour of a carried interest of 25% in every lease on Canada Lands.
The "carried interest" concept means that the lesee must carry the
interest of Petro-Canada, i.e. must be entirely responsible for all
exploration costs until economically viable production is proven. At
this stage, Petro-Canada can exercise its 25% interest, assuming its
share of both expenses and profits. This policy change allowed
Petro-Canada the option of participation after the initial
exploratory work had been completed at the expense of the private
lessees, whereas the previous back-in right automatically granted the
interest along with the financial responsibilities attached to it.
This was intended to secure an increased government share of economic
rent and increased control over the potential depletion of federal
resources.
This policy, and indeed the entire "Canadianisation" thrust of
the NEP, created considerable difficulties in Canadian/American
relations*^. Both the U.S. government and American business had
persistently objected to the role of the Foreign Investment Review
Agency (FIRA) since its creation in 1973, and the NEP's
discrimination against foreign firms coupled with the carried
interest provision on the Canada Lands further increased tension
between the two governments. The Reagan administration was in its
early days, and although relations had never been better after the
Canadian assistance to American hostages escaping Iran in 1979, the
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NEP quickly provoked a hostile reaction south of the border.
Diplomatic channels were used to voice criticism of the government's
discriminatory actions against American firms, and mechanisms of
economic retaliation were considered within the Commerce Department
and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative^. Although the
Canadian government did not then revoke the offensive aspects of the
NEP, it agreed that similar legislation would not be extended to
other sectors of the economy. In May of the following year, the
government further agreed to pay compensation to firms affected by
the modified Petro-Canada back-in provision.
The reaction of the Canadian petroleum industry to the NEP was
no less immediate and extremely hostile. Although the intention of
the new policy was to favour the smaller, independent Canadian
companies, the harsher fiscal regime introduced in the NEP made cash
flow reductions inevitable. The Independent Petroleum Association of
Canada (IPAC), placed advertisements in newspapers across the country
denouncing the NEP. As a result of this action, Petro-Canada
withdrew its membership from IPAC and for three years remained
|iO
outside the petroleum associations °. In 1984 it joined the Canadian
Petroleum Association (CPA), but by that time its policy role had
been greatly reduced and the hostility of the petroleum community
towards the company had waned.
Criticism regarding Petro-Canada's independence from the
government came from other quarters. It has been suggested that the
crown corporation moved further and further from its original mandate
in its 1980s acquisitions, all of which concerned "downstream"
(refining and marketing) assets. After the 1981 Petrofina
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takeover, Petro-Canada went on to purchase BP Refining and Marketing
Canada in 1983, and the downstream assets of Gulf Canada in 1985.
By focusing on acquisitions at the downstream end of the business,
the Canadian public was paying for Petro-Canada to acquire a large
market share in the often unprofitable sector of the industry and for
increasing its public presence. Some critics were more cynical in
their view of the company's motives, ascribing to it ambitions of
monopoly control in the retail end of the Canadian petroleum market.
Even Petro-Canada's President admitted that the corporation does not
serve any national purpose in the retail sector*^. However, such
exposure certainly benefited Petro-Canada's public relations if only
by keeping its name and logo ever present to the Canadian public.
Financially, Petro-Canada was criticised as well, both for employing
accounting practices different from those used by other petroleum
companies and which are alleged to have led to an inflation of
company profits^. Finally, Petro-Canada's management was accused of
paying some executives salaries greater than those approved by
cabinet^.
In the federal election of September 1984, the Conservative
Party under Brian Mulroney was returned to power with an overwhelming
parliamentary majority. Although antagonism toward Petro-Canada
remained, the Tories were clearly concerned to tread carefully on the
issue of Petro-Canada, having learned a difficult lesson in 1980.
They replaced most of the corporation's Board, and imposed a new
mandate — to operate commercially with the emphasis on profitability
and to maximise the financial return to the government. Petro-Canada
was no longer to be regarded as a policy instrument, yet the
government reserved to itself the right to direct the company's
activities in the national interest when necessary^. The $210
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million that had been earmarked for Petro-Canada's use in 1985 was
cut off, and an additional $38 million in dividends were to be
extracted in 1986 by the government. Petro-Canada was no longer
viewed as a threat by the industry, and remained a symbol of national
pride in the minds of many Canadians.
In early 1986, there were rumours in Calgary, the Canadian
petroleum capital, regarding the possible privatisation of the
company which were fuelled by Energy Minister Carney's visit to
Europe in the spring of that year. In February, she examined models
of privatisation of other public petroleum companies in Britain
(Britoil) and France (Elf Acquitaine and CFP). However, with
international oil prices collapsing, it seemed unlikely that in the
near future the government's investment of over $3.6 billion in the
company could be realised by privatisation or any liquidation of
assets. Despite this, discussion of Petro-Canada's imminent
privatisation emerged once again in late 1987. although specific
details had not yet been finalised.
Petrocan suggests that psychology can overcome the
most distressing economics. Despite every adverse
argument one can marshall, the company survives and
grows because it remains an important symbol for
Canadians. Even Bill Hopper can only look on in
amazement. 'We get shit publicity', he says, 'but
gee, are we popular!'53
The creation and history of Petro-Canada appears to indicate
that it was primarily a political device used by succeeding Liberal
governments to bolster public perception of national control over
petroleum resources. It was created in the aftermath of the first
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OPEC crisis when the Canadian public had been shocked both by
international events and by the downward revision of Canadian reserve
estimates. Although Petro-Canada's mandate emphasised its
exploratory role in order to secure Canadian supplies, the company
purchased, at a substantial cost to the Canadian taxpayer, most of
its petroleum reserves in its 1970s acquisitions. Its post-NEP
activities focused on further acquisitions in the downstream sector
which had little connection to its original corporate purpose, and
these again were subsidised by the public via the Canadian Ownership
Charge. Despite continual criticism of its performance from the
financial sector and the private petroleum industry, Petro-Canada
remains one of the most popular of Canadian Crown corporations.
Attempts to dismantle it in the face of overwhelming public support
for its maintenance have proved disastrous for the Conservative
party, and in the initial climate of international oil price
depression, it seemed privatisation would elude the present
Conservative administration as well. Although the controversy
surrounding Petro-Canada has waned considerably and it no longer
performs any direct policy functions, it remains a popular symbol of
the desire for Canadian control over Canadian resources.
Nonetheless, public interest in security of petroleum supply and
price has likewise waned in the current environment, and the question
of Petro-Canada's privatisation has once more emerged. If the
Canadian government is truly interested in disposing of the national
petroleum company, it seems an opportune period in which to do so.
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2. THE BRITISH NATIONAL OIL CORPORATION
Public ownership in the British oil industry began in 1914 when
Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, acquired a 51/
state holding in the largest British petroleum company, Anglo-
Persian, now British Petroleum, This action was taken was to secure
oil supplies in the First World War, which was of the utmost
importance to naval operations. Although the British government
never attempted to exert pressure on BP in order to influence North
Sea developments, the holding was maintained until 1987 and was
justified on the grounds of security of supply. However, the events
of 1973 proved that the government's equity control of BP was
insufficient to secure the company's cooperation in landing its
petroleum supplies in Britain in emergency situations. The company
continued to operate on the basis of its previous contractual
agreements despite pressure from the government to redirect its
supplies to the U.K. Consequently Britain suffered from the supply
shortage and price increases much like any other large consuming
nation in 1973"74.
Shortly thereafter, the British National Oil Corporation (BNOC)
was created by the newly elected Labour administration to complement
the activities of the long-established British Gas Corporation (BGC).
Both these national petroleum companies have been privatised in
recent years, but their creation, mandates, and eventual demise tell
much of the dominant interests of the various governments responsible
for the development of North Sea petroleum.
Government activity in energy industries was familiar to the
British public of the 1960s and 1970s. After World War I, the
British coal industry was in a state of disarray (depressed demand,
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fragmented ownership, strained labour relations) and government
intervention followed in the 1930s. The government's involvement
began with the determination of price and output quotas in order to
stabilise the market, and by 1938 it had acquired powers to
reorganise the industry entirely^. In 1942, the government declared
its sovereignty over coal deposits and the industry as a whole was
nationalised by a new Labour government in 19^7-
The domestic gas industry was also under government control from
the early nineteenth century when "town gas" was produced from a
carbonisation process of different types of coal. Local monopolies
over the process grew up and were eventually controlled by
legislation, but the post-war Labour government nationalised the gas
industry in 1948, setting up the Gas Council at the same time^^. The
Gas Council was to oversee the operations of the local gas boards.
As for petroleum, the Petroleum (Production) Act of 1934^6 had
secured Crown ownership of all onshore petroleum deposits, and the
ratification in 1964 of the United Nations' Continental Shelf
Convention vested all rights to British offshore reserves in the
Crown. In the Continental Shelf Act^7 Df the same year, the British
government extended its licensing authority to the offshore with the
aim of establishing an attractive regime to secure exploration of the
North Sea potential. The Act received Royal Assent on April 15, 1964
and within one month the government placed the proposed licensing
regulations before Parliament. By May 15, the government had invited
applications for 960 exploration blocks by July 25^®. The
Conservative government was most anxious to determine the extent of
Britain's offshore petroleum resources.
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In the general election held in October of the same year, the
Labour Party came to power and immediately suggested that there
should be a greater British share in the licences than the 23% which
British companies had acquired in the first licensing round. In
particular, the Labour government considered that the nationalised
industries, the Gas Council and the National Coal Board, should play
a greater role in the development of national petroleum resources.
In 1965. the government passed the Gas Act^9 which granted
monopsony powers to the Gas Council. It was to be the sole purchaser
and distributor of North Sea gas, thus maintaining its control over
the British gas industry as a whole. The intention of the government
was to capture the maximum economic rent realised from North Sea gas
production. If the petroleum companies were allowed to compete for
the domestic gas market, secure a market share, and sell North Sea
gas at competitive rates, in the long term they could acquire
substantial economic returns. This was, in part, because the
companies had been granted exploration and production licences so
freely and at low cost while the government was actively encouraging
North Sea exploration. In setting up the Gas Council as monopsonist,
the government intended to sell North Sea gas to the British consumer
at a low price so that, in effect, such economic rents as would
result from North Sea gas production would be passed on to the
consumer or acquired by the Gas Council on behalf of the government.
The Department of Energy was to be the sole arbiter of what
constituted a 'reasonable' price for gas sales to the Gas Council. A
price of 2.3 cents per therm was established for North Sea gas which
was only one-third the price of an equivalent heating value of oil,
with limited provision for escalation. The one-third price ratio was
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retained throughout the decade^. By 1977. gas cost 5 cents per
therm, while oil was 2k cents per therm, and in 1981 gas cost 21
cents per therm while oil cost 62 cents per therm.
This policy resulted in a shift of exploration activity away
from the southern North Sea Basin (primarily an area of gas reserves)
to the northern North Sea Basin (where the potential for oil was much
greater)^1. With the likelihood of increased gas prices marginal at
best, most petroleum companies rapidly moved their activity into the
more promising oil sector in the late 1960s despite the high costs of
exploration and production in relation to the current international
price for oil. In the longer term, this might have proved beneficial
to the rapid development of Britain's oil resources, but it was not
an intended consequence of the original GC policy. Gas exploration
remained depressed throughout the 1970s as a result of the Gas
Council monopsony and of the increasing financial potential of oil
production after the first OPEC price increases.
The other consequence of the Gas Council monopsony was
distortion in the demand side of the gas market. As gas remained
very inexpensive in relation to oil, demand increased while
exploration and development declined. In this regard, the Gas
Council was having a much greater influence on the development of gas
potential and the depletion of gas reserves than the government had
perhaps intended. The advantage of the policy was supposed to be the
benefit to the gas consumer, but several authors suggest that much of
the economic rent was consumed by inefficiency in the operations of
the British Gas Company itself (BGC, as the Gas Council was renamed
in 1972). "It is no criticism of the Gas Council, which merely
operated within ground-rules laid down by governments, to say that
the price it paid for natural gas was so low that it lacked any
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proper standard of efficiency.... What would otherwise have been
rent in private corporations appears to have been translated in whole
or in part into organisational slack in a nationalised
corporation.in 1977. BGC reported a profit of $55 million per
annum, but critics of its accounting methods suggested a more likely
figure should have been $3*5 billion^. Robinson notes that "it is
probable that the lack of competitive pressure on BGC inflated its
costs so that its profits turned out to be small relative to the rent
available from North Sea gas."^
By 1980, concern arose within the BGC over the potential gas
shortage which might result in the late 1980s and 1990s as a result
of the exploration hiatus of the 1970s. In addition, the newly
elected Conservative government had pledged itself to privatisation
or at the very least, increased competition in the gas industry. As
a result, BGC began to offer higher prices for gas to producers in
the early 1980s, restimulating interest in the southern basin in the
process. However, in 1982, the government passed the Oil and Gas
(Enterprise) Act^5 which allowed gas producers to sell reserves not
already committed by the BGC to any other potential purchasers. The
procedure for making such sales was cumbersome and such direct sales
had not occurred by 1985^; however, the possibility of competition
had clearly contributed to a change in attitude both within and in
relation to the BGC.
However, in the early 1980s as the government was attempting to
reduce the dominance of BGC in the gas market, the corporation was
simultaneously attempting to adapt to future potential competition
while strongly resisting government initiatives to change its
mandate. Conflict arose between BGC, the government, and the oil
companies. "[I]t is entirely understandable that attempts to reduce
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BGC's market power by the two Thatcher administrations since 1979
should have been resisted by the Corporation...."*^ bGC had, through
government policy, developed control over British gas development
from exploration through pricing and marketing. It would have been
indeed unusual for the corporation bo accept the demise of
its power. Nonetheless, the government's commitment to privatisation
prevailed and in 1985. the government announced its intention to
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privatise BGC . The issue of BGC shares was made extremely public
through an aggressive advertising campaign which contributed greatly
to the success of the share flotation in late 1986. The Treasury
received approximately £6 billion from the issue. The government's
commitment to privatisation was initially ideological in inspiration,
but the financial rewards associated with its implementation in the
case of the BGC must have contributed to the zeal with which the
policy was pursued in other nationalised industries.
The national petroleum company, the British National Oil
Corporation, was created much later than the Gas Council, had a
different mandate, and was privatised before the BGC. Although not
established until 1975. the government was considering the
possibility of a public petroleum corporation as early as the mid-
60s. In 1966 and 1967. the Labour Party Fuel Study Group conducted a
review of U.K. Continental Shelf policy which resulted in a
recommendation that a National Hydrocarbons Corporation be
established. This corporation would "assume sole responsibility for
exploration and development in all the offshore areas not retained by
existing licensees."^ For existing licences, the national
corporation would takeover the petroleum interests of the National
Coal Board and the Gas Council. Krapels suggests that the proposal
was not adopted at the time "because the oil prospects were still so
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uncertain, and the establishment of a state company might have caused
some private firms to turn away from the British North Sea. There
was also the fear that such an action might have adverse effects on
British oil interests abroad."^ The government concentrated instead
on licensing arrangements and, prior to the second round in 1969,
announced its preference in granting licence awards to groups
collaborating with the national fuel companies.
The establishment of a national oil company was not seriously
proposed again until the return to power of a Labour administration
in the spring of 197^- In the aftermath of the first OPEC crisis,
Prime Minister Wilson wished to pursue the same objectives as his
predecessor, Mr. Heath, in terms of securing supply, increasing
government revenues as prices rose, and achieving a greater degree of
government control over the North Sea petroleum industry. However,
the Conservatives had been reluctant to secure these objectives via
extensions of the public sector, preferring a reform of the taxation
system as proposed in the First Report of the Public Accounts
Committee"^. The Labour party, on the other hand, advocated
nationalisation of the North Sea petroleum industry as the most
effective means of securing public control over development and a
fair share of the profits.
The Labour Party election manifesto expressed
Labour's determination to ensure not only that the
North Sea and Celtic Sea oil and gas resources are in
full public ownership, but that the operation of
getting and distributing them is under full
government control with majority public
participation. The Government have also made it
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clear that it is their intention to ensure that as a
result of the exploitation of these resources maximum
benefit is conferred on the community..
In the aftermath of the 1973~7^ OPEC crisis, with the British
public clearly concerned about petroleum supply and price, the time
seemed ripe for a dramatic change in participation policy. The
Labour government's White Paper of July 197^ entitled United Kingdom
Oil and Gas Policy^ described in detail the means by which the new
administration proposed to fulfil its campaign promise of majority
public participation in the petroleum industry.
The government intended to act on five fronts^. Firstly, a new
Finance Bill would be introduced which would place an additional tax
on profits made from Continental Shelf petroleum production.
Secondly, a condition of all future licences would be that majority
participation be granted to the state, should the state so require,
in all fields discovered under those licences. Thirdly, the
government intended to invite private petroleum companies to submit
their views on the appropriate means of implementing state
participation. Fourthly, the government would establish the British
National Oil Corporation (BNOC) to exercise its participatory rights.
Finally, the government would extend its powers in relation to
production and pipeline controls. The establishment of a national
petroleum corporation was to be part of a larger reorganisation of
the regulation of North Sea activities and the means by which the
government, along with new taxation arrangements, intended to capture
its share of profits. Interestingly, the establishment of BNOC was
legislated in the Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act 1975^. in
which the government also assumed far-reaching powers over petroleum
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production and pipeline development. It is clear that BNOC was but
one initiative among several by which the Labour government was to
establish maximum control over petroleum development.
The government's view on the concept of state participation in
the petroleum industry was defended by Energy Minister Varley in the
debate on the Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act. In this
statement, Minister Varley also implied that the decision to create
the BNOC was partly influenced by similar policy developments in
other states, such as the establishment of Norway's Statoil and
Petro-Canada.
The oil offshore is already the property of the
nation.... But as soon as the oil is produced by a
licensee, it becomes his own property, and the nation
has no further title to it. Except for the United
States, every major oil and gas producing nation has
taken participation in the producing industry. I am
not referring only to the OPEC countries, but also to
Norway, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and all the
EEC members with substantial oil and gas
prospects.... We believe that participation is the
best way of ensuring that the nation shares fully in
the benefits of North Sea oil. Participation gives
the nation a direct title to the oil produced. It
creates a partnership between the people of this
country and the oil companies. Further, only through
participation can the nation acquire its own direct
knowledge of, and capability in, oil and gas
production.7°
Through the British National Oil Corporation, the British
government acquired a direct share of the oil production from its
North Sea reserves to dispose of at its pleasure. This was intended
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to contribute to the security of national petroleum supplies and to
acquire for the Exchequer certain revenues which might otherwise have
accrued to the petroleum companies. Finally, the government was
clearly interested in developing its knowledge of and operating
capacity in the petroleum industry in order to help formulate and
implement policies to stimulate activity while gaining an appropriate
share of the revenues for the state. Direct participation through a
national petroleum corporation had been the mechanism by which other
states in similar situations had chosen to achieve these objectives,
and the British government saw no reason why it should not follow
suit.
The security of supply and revenue objectives BNOC would
theoretically achieve might well have been accomplished via other
policy mechanisms, and Krapels argues that "there is little or no
information pertaining to North Sea oilfield development that the
Government does not get, or could not get if so desired. The
existence of BNOC has no effect on the volume or kind of data the
Government can request."77 The Conservative Party agreed with the
Labour government on the desirability of all three objectives and
with the means by which the government proposed to achieve the first
two. After the publication of the Public Accounts Committee Report,
there was interparty agreement on the need to implement a special
petroleum tax of some description so as to secure for the nation a
larger share of petroleum revenues. Government regulation of the
petroleum industry was not at issue either, although the
Conservatives appeared concerned that retrospective changes in
licensing and production arrangements might be viewed by the industry
as a unilateral abrogation of rights without compensation. The two
parties disagreed on the details of policy designed to achieve these
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first two objectives, but it was only on the issue of a public
petroleum corporation that the Conservatives criticised the
government's general position which, they argued, would result in
unnecessary bureaucratic expansion. Patrick Jenkin, Conservative
Energy spokesman, said that "...majority state participation is no
more than the ugly unacceptable face of Socialism."7® In essence,
the concept of participation as defined by the Labour Party was
unattractive from the Conservative point of view. Whatever benefits
might accrue from direct participation by BNOC could be more easily
and less disruptively pursued by the reform of taxation and depletion
policies.
In his challenge to the proposed legislation, Jenkin recommended
the establishment of a regulatory agency such as the Alberta Energy
Conservation Board which performs both a regulatory and an
information function for the government and the public^. The
advantage of this type of regulatory instrument was its relative
independence from direct government control. The Opposition argued
that BNOC itself would increase the uncertainty in the petroleum
market and possibly be plagued by bureaucratic inefficiency. In
addition, direct participation might be viewed by the petroleum
industry as expropriation without compensation. Furthermore, the
National Oil Account from which BNOC was to be funded would siphon
off monies that would otherwise go to the Treasury. In short, the
creation of BNOC was an unnecessary policy risk and the exact role
the company would play was ill-defined. Despite Conservative
objections to this and other aspects of the bill, the second reading
vote passed by 286 to 258 votes. Hann suggests that "the debate over
the establishment of BNOC suggest that BNOC was not intended to be a
fin
means to an end but more likely, an end in itself...."
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The British National Oil Corporation was thus established in
Part 1 of the Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act 1975 and
O-i
commenced operations on January 1, 1976 . Government control over
the company was to be exercised through its role as the Crown's agent
in the petroleum industry and by various other administrative and
financial means of control. The Secretary of State for Energy was
responsible for the appointment of its Board members (including two
civil servants), had to approve the corporation's business, and could
give specific directives to the company which it was obliged to
follow. The finances of the company were likewise under ministerial
control. The National Oil Account, from which BNOC would derive its
capital, was also established in the Act. This Account was to be
funded by the state's income from oil and gas royalties and licence
fees and was to be examined annually by the Comptroller and Auditor
General. BNOC was additionally given an initial debt ceiling of $1.3
billion which could be increased up to $2 billion with ministerial
approval. Funds could be borrowed from the government or from other
sources if approved by the Secretary of Energy. Finally, BNOC was
exempted from the payment of Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT), introduced
in the Oil Tax Act 1975^* As was the case with Petro-Canada,
payment of such a tax would have taken money from one hand only to
give it back with the other -- with BNOC paying tax to the government
only to receive its capital from the same source. BNOC was also
given the petroleum assets of the National Coal Board petroleum
subsidiary, and it could be issued with exploration and production
licences at any time by the government in the national interest.
In short, the government had complete control over the policy,
administration, and financial development of BNOC. Despite this, the
corporation was expected to function much along the lines of a
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private integrated oil company. It was "[to combine] its functions
as an instrument of national policy, a commercial enterprise and an
advisor to Government."®® The means by which it was to do so was
through direct participation in North Sea petroleum activity. This
participation was a required condition of the licences granted from
the fifth round of exploration licensing onwards, from which point
BNOC was to have a 51# participatory right in all potentially
commercial fields. BNOC did not become a majority shareholder in the
licences via this participatory right; rather, it acquired the right
of access to 51# of the petroleum at the market price and carried its
share of the exploration expenses. The government wished to secure
its access to petroleum supplies from North Sea production and
develop the future role of BNOC. Thus, BNOC's majority participation
in all licences issued became a feature which the petroleum industry
had to accept if it wished to apply for exploration licences from
1977 onwards.
However, the arrangement of BNOC participation in licences
issued in the first through fourth rounds proved slightly difficult.
Production was already underway in several fields and BNOC's
retroactive assumption of a majority share in production could have
posed severe problems for the government in its relations with the
petroleum industry and the governments in which the headquarters of
the petroleum companies were based, principally the United States.
It was decided early on not to make such
participation a legal requirement, and it was soon
apparent that those North Sea firms which had
marketing operations in the UK would not sell BNOC an
equity share in their existing licences voluntarily.
Many were of the opinion that it made little sense to
165
make BNOC an equity partner in the licences of Shell,
Esso, BP, and the other major UK refiners because
BNOC would have to sell the oil right back to them if
British oil were to be used for the British
market....
Negotiations with the major companies eventually
led to a compromise: BNOC would be given an option to
purchase 51# of their North Sea oil, but it would be
obliged under most circumstances to re-sell the oil
ou
to the same firm at the same price.
The excepted circumstance would be in the case of a national
emergency as defined by the government. The guiding principle of the
negotiations was that individual petroleum companies should be made
neither better nor worse off by agreeing to BNOC participation.
Furthermore, the government wished to secure a seat and a vote for
BNOC on the operating committees of the fields already under licence
to gain access to the information it required both for itself and for
BNOC to perform effectively.
Negotiations began in 1975 and the only company which did not
conclude a satisfactory arrangement with BNOC by the following year
was Amoco, which was subsequently excluded from any fifth round
licence awards^. in July 1976, BP, BNOC, and the Secretary of State
for Energy signed an agreement whereby BP, in which company the
government still had an equity share, accepted the principle of BNOC
participation and further agreed to train BNOC staff in its refining
Pif\
and marketing operations . This settlement put considerable
pressure on other North Sea operators to reach agreements with BNOC,
and by 1977. agreements had been made with all companies concerned.
BNOC's participation in North Sea petroleum was assured for the time
being. The Chairman of Shell Transport and Trading explained the
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companies' change of heart by saying that "...now that BNOC is in
existence we may as well try to keep it on the right lines.
There were obviously other incentives to cooperate as well, as
Amoco's experience aptly illustrated.
The result was three different types of participation
arrangements for the public corporation. Firstly, BNOC acquired
equity participation as a result of its receipt of National Coal
Board interests and through its purchase of Burmah Oil in 1976.
Secondly, BNOC had unrestricted right of access to 51% of the oil
produced in a number of fields which it purchased at market price and
disposed of at will. Thirdly, BNOC had restricted access to 51% of
petroleum production from fields controlled by the oil companies with
major refining interests in the UK; in these cases, BNOC was required
to sell back its oil to the same companies at the price of purchase,
except in emergency situations. "[I]n the next few years BNOC, by
virtue of its equity share in several fields, will acquire over
150,000 barrels per day of its own oil; 400,000 barrels per day of
unrestricted option oil which will increase in later years...; and,
if the Government chooses to take its royalty payments in oil rather
than in cash, 300,000 barrels per day of royalty oil. In total, BNOC
might have 850,000 barrels per day to dispose of by I98O."®® BNOC
was expected to control 1 million barrels per day by 1981,
representing almost 40% of British North Sea production. In
emergency situations BNOC would have rights to the restricted option
oil, greatly increasing its ability to secure state supplies as the
major oil trader of North Sea production.
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In the fifth round of licensing BNOC paid its share of
exploration expenses on its own insistence^ and became able to
exercise an option to withdraw from participation at any future
point. BNOC would retain the right to re-enter by paying costs and
interest thereon from the point of its opting out.
In the advent to the sixth licensing round in 1978. the
government introduced a new feature in BNOC's participation right.
It would henceforth be on a carried interest basis — the private
company would be responsible for the entirety of exploration expenses
until BNOC chose to exercise its participation option. In addition,
companies were invited to bid for licences offering BNOC at least 51%
BNOC participation. The response of the petroleum industry was to
send a delegation of protest to the Department of Energy in June,
"insisting that the government's policy was so obstructionist that
the whole North Sea program was being bogged down disastrously. Amid
threats to boycott the new round altogether, they objected strongly
to proposals to give the best blocks to BNOC, to the government's
suggestions that the oil companies carry all the government's oil
exploration costs, and that they give to BNOC more than the statutory
51% equity stake in new blocks."90 Despite these protestations, the
Sixth Round proceeded on schedule. In addition to the industry's
complaints, the Public Accounts Committee had earlier in the year
called for tighter control of BNOC's finances, arguing that
Parliamentary rather than Departmental control through the National
Oil Account was the appropriate means of monitoring the corporation's
development. 9^
The Conservative government elected in 1979 heralded a major
change in the status of BNOC. As early as July 26, the new Energy
Secretary, David Howell, announced in the House of Commons that
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BNOC's exemption from PRT and its 'first option' in farm-in
arrangements were to be ended^. However, the corporation's access
to participation oil was to remain a feature despite the new
administration's inclination to introduce private capital into BNOC
in some way. Perhaps of greatest importance, "[t]he conflict of
interest that the oil industry felt was caused by BNOC being at
once partner, competitor, and advisor to Government has also
terminated. BNOC is to cease its functions as advisor to Government
and the Department of Energy is to be strengthened to assume this
role itself."93 BNOC's privileged position in licence awards was to
be eliminated and its future participation would be via negotiation
rather than at the minimum level of 51%- In the seventh round in
1980, BNOC's participation reverted to an arrangement similar to the
negotiations of licences awarded in rounds one through four. "With
BNOC having to pay market price for its participation petroleum, it
is clear that the primary interest of the present British Government
is in controlling the destination of the oil, rather than in enjoying
the economic benefit that hopefully comes from owning a true equity
share in an oilfield."9^
Although these changes appeared to be substantial, it must be
remembered that the Conservative party came to power pledged to
dismantle BNOC altogether as part of its larger commitment to reduce
state intervention in the economy. Hann suggests that the
"complexities of the financial structure of BNOC, the substantial
efforts made by Lord Kearton (the first Chairman of BNOC) to make it
as difficult as possible to break up the Corporation and the new
'appreciation' of the value of BNOC revenue to the incoming
Administration, resulted in government procrastination and ambiguity
with regard to BNOC."95 Grayson also suggests that the root of the
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new Conservative appreciation for BNOC lay in its financial
performance. "Through BNOC, the government was sitting on a large
pool of oil — and — thanks to OPEC and its increased oil prices —
the government found its hands on a profitable enterprise. During
1979, BNOC made a pre-tax profit of [$158 million]...."96 Hann
further notes that the Conservative government was prepared to use
BNOC's oil trading capacity to support the price of North Sea oil on
several occasions since the beginning of 1983^.
The government continued to make changes in BNOC, although not
in the direction of complete privatisation. The Oil and Gas
(Enterprise) Act 1982^® provided the government with powers to split
BNOC into two organisations, one of which would be sold to the public
in a share offer. Britoil would comprise BNOC's upstream
(exploration and production) interests and 51% of its shares were
offered to the public on the Stock Exchange in late 1982. In this
legislation, BGC was likewise split into two organisations, with its
upstream interests being transferred into a company called Enterprise
Oil which was similarly traded on the stock market. The government
retained a shareholding of 49% in Britoil, but, as in the case of its
shareholding in BP, it would not be used to further government
policies. The intention was that Britoil have identical status to
any other privately-owned petroleum company operating in the British
North Sea. BNOC would be retained solely as the government's trader
of participation oil, receiving royalty oil and purchasing option oil
at market price to dispose of profitably. The government was clearly
intending to use BNOC as the means of securing petroleum supplies in
the national interest when necessary, but the company was to justify
its existence outside emergency situations by selling oil profitably
in the marketplace. In any event, Kemp notes that BNOC's then
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existing trading position may not have been sufficient to secure
British supplies in an emergency^. Because almost all BNOC oil was
sold on a contractual basis, and most contracts were of a three month
duration, it remains doubtful whether BNOC could have legally
diverted its supplies. This would suggest one of three situations:
either the government was badly informed about BNOC's abilities; the
continued existence of BNOC was politically beneficial; or the
bureaucracy was interested in the preservation of BNOC and persuaded
the political actors to that position. The latter explanation does
not preclude the former two.
It was BNOC's position as a major oil trader which provoked the
final controversy culminating in the government's announcement in
March 1985 to disband the corporation"*-^. In 1984, BNOC suffered
considerable losses as a result of the decline in the international
price. As the price moved ever more rapidly downward, the company
could not dispose of its participation petroleum at the purchase
price, let alone profitably. In the autumn of 1984, these trading
losses became a matter of considerable public controversy, causing
the government some embarrassment, especially in view of its original
and frequently emphasised intention to reduce inefficient state
activity in various sectors of the economy. The result was the
government's decision to dismantle BNOC and to create in its place a
regulatory agency to be called the Oil and Pipelines Agency (OPA)
having responsibility for the disposal of state oil, the regulation
of pipeline activities, and the custody of the state's deactivated
participation agreements. BNOC had clearly outlived its usefulness.
The Labour government's creation of BNOC followed immediately on
the heels of the first OPEC pricing crisis, and met with opposition
from both political opponents and private industry. Nevertheless,
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BNOC was rapidly, albeit reluctantly, accepted by the private
petroleum companies in the series of participation agreements that
followed its inception. Although its main function was intended to
be the acquisition and disposal of state oil, in contrast to Petro-
Canada's emphasis on exploration and production, BNOC was nonetheless
fulfilling the same objectives of securing petroleum supplies in the
national interest and providing the government with information on
petroleum activities. In the late 1970s, it attracted much the same
criticism as Petro-Canada from the New Right. However, neither
Petro-Canada nor BNOC were subjected to immediate privatisation upon
the election of a Conservative government, despite the fact that the
British Conservative Party had included privatisation of BNOC in its
election platform. Eventually, BNOC was privatised in part in 1982
and fully in 1986 as its financial losses proved more costly to the
government than the political advantages of retaining the company.
Privatisation of both BNOC and the BGC secured immediate funds for
government and allowed the Conservatives to honour their ideological
position.
3. STATOIL
"Before the OPEC revolution had even begun Norway's Labour
Government had decided that since Norwegian capital would be unable
to intervene significantly in the offshore operations, state capital
should take the initiative."101 in this respect, as in others,
Norway is different from both Canada and the United Kingdom where
state petroleum companies were not established until after the first
OPEC pricing revolution.
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However, as in the cases of Canada and Britain, state
participation was not a feature of the original licensing regime in
the Norwegian offshore. The first round of licences awarded in 1965
did not involve state participation, although Lind and Mackay suggest
that preferential treatment was given to companies willing to form
1 DP
consortia with Norwegian interests. As suggested in Chapter Five
on depletion policies, both Norway and the United Kingdom were
anxious, at an early stage, to attract investment in the potential
petroleum resources of their respective offshore territories and
direct state participation seemed an unnecessary disincentive to
investors.
By the time of the second licensing round in Norway, held in
1969, the Norwegian government required that all licensees agree to
some degree of state participation in their awards either through net
profit sharing or a carried interest scheme. In the former, the
state would receive a guaranteed percentage of profits accruing from
any commercial discovery. This arrangement amounted to an additional
tax made on the licensees by the government, and the percentage of
state net profits was negotiated separately by licence area. The
carried interest system of state participation gave the state an
option to a percentage of participation after the initial exploration
work had been done. The licensee was responsible for the outlay of
all exploration expenses, "carrying" the interest of the state until
such time as a commercial discovery was made. The state could then
choose to exercise its right to participate, in which case it paid
its percentage share of exploration costs. The range of state
percentages ran from 5% to ^0% in various fields under the carried
interest agreements"*^. After the 1969 licence awards, the net
profit sharing scheme was dropped in favour of carried interest
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arrangements principally because the carried interest scheme offered
the government the advantages of participation which an additional
profit-sharing tax did not: namely, direct access to information and
to sources of petroleum in addition to its royalty oil.
In order to make the most of this potential information and
access to petroleum, the Norwegian Ministry of Industry proposed in
1971 that these participation rights should be vested in a 100% state
controlled joint stock company. This proposal was accepted
unanimously by the Storting in June, 1972, and Statoil was
established"*"^. Statoil was to operate like a private firm in the
Norwegian offshore, seeking to maximise profit. The government
clearly intended it to become the major player in Norwegian petroleum
activities, but its original mandate was rather vague. It was not
clear whether Statoil would be used by the government to pursue
regulatory objectives through its exercise of its participation
rights, or whether it was to be merely another means of rent
collection for the Norwegian government. Its functions were not
clearly defined until the publication of Report No.30 to the Storting
1973~7i+10^, in which its objectives were listed. These included the
expansion of state activities in the downstream sector, a major
operating role north of 62° North, cooperation with Norwegian
industry to build up an integrated petroleum sector, and influence on
the depletion rate as well as the management of state participation
interests in various licences.
The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) was established April
1. 1973. and was given the regulatory mandate of enforcement of
legislation applying to all petroleum companies operating in the
Norwegian sector, including Statoil"*"^. The NPD was also responsible
for the collection of seismic data in newly explored areas in order
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to assist the Petroleum Ministry in both its award of licences and
its formulation of appropriate policies. Later in the decade, the
subordinate position of the NPD to Statoil became evident; with its
expertise and power, Statoil could easily resist NPD directives.
Both organisations attracted criticism as a result.
The creation of the NPD further defined the role of Statoil as
being principally concerned with the management of state interests in
the offshore (rent collection) and the encouragement of Norwegian
industrial participation in offshore supply and services. Through
the exercise of this mandate, Statoil would acquire for the state
sufficient knowledge and expertise to assist in the formulation of
petroleum policies in other areas in addition to assuring that the
Norwegian industrial sector, and the Norwegian nation, was
benefitting from offshore activity.
'Norwegianisation' refers to the continued development of
Statoil and to increased involvement by the Norwegian
companies Norsk Hydro and Saga. It also refers to the use of
Norwegian goods and services on the Continental Shelf to
stimulate Norwegian industry and employment.
The government wants to be able to influence the
development and production decisions in order to control the
aggregate production levels and to facilitate participation
by Norwegian industry.^07
From the private companies' point of view, the participation of
Statoil in the carried interest scheme functioned much like any other
tax on petroleum activity, but clearly was not such a disincentive as
to discourage their continued investment in the Norwegian North Sea
throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. Objections to state
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participation via this mechanism were made on other grounds, but
Statoil itself rapidly became an accepted feature of, and later the
dominant company in, petroleum activity in the Norwegian North Sea.
As Arve Johnsen, Statoil's first chief executive, asserted: "After
all, we are not nationalising or confiscating. We have simply placed
our terms on the table and said to the companies, come and negotiate.
If they don't want to, they can leave — although our experience to
1 nA
date is that they want to negotiate."
Statoil's legal position is exactly the same as any other
petroleum company operating in the Norwegian North Sea, a situation
which was meant to strengthen its commercial acceptance. Its
activities are regulated by the NPD as in the case of any other
company, and it is subject to the same taxation as private companies
in the Norwegian sector. It is incorporated under the Companies Act
and not by a separate statute-*"^. However, although it has the
appearance of a private company in some senses, Statoil remains very
much an instrument of the state. Article 10 of Statoil's Articles of
Association states: "The Board shall submit to the General Meeting
[the Ministry of Petroleum], ordinary or extraordinary, all matters
which are presumed to involve significant political questions or
questions of principle and/or which may have important effects on the
nation or its economy.""*-'^ Government control over Statoil's
activities is grounded in this article; Statoil's commercial
interests are subordinated to larger national goals as defined by the
Ministry of Petroleum. The company must present its operating and
financial plans to the shareholders' meeting, and must accept the
conclusions of that meeting with regard to important decisions. The
Ministry is responsible for reporting to the Storting about Statoil's
activities. Any important issues concerning the national petroleum
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company are debated and decided upon in Parliament. Statoil's Board
of Directors are businessmen with their own objectives which may at
times conflict with those of the Ministry, but it is not within the
power of the Board to challenge Ministerial directives.
State participation through Statoil in 1969 licence awards
ranged from a 5% carried interest in the Frigg field to 17-5% net
profit sharing in other licences^''". Throughout the 1970s, prospects
in the Norwegian North Sea continued to attract great interest from
private petroleum companies, and the Norwegian state interest in
petroleum licences was steadily increased. The Norwegian government
wished to encourage the development of smaller prospects as well as
larger fields, and therefore developed a scheme whereby the
percentage of state participation would increase as the field size
increased. It was assumed that larger fields could more easily bear
the burden of higher percentages of state participation and still
remain attractive investments. In the third licensing round, state
participation ranged from a minimum level of 50% up to 75%, and the
upper level was increased in the fourth round to 85%^^^. The fifth
round in I98O had a maximum state share of 80% in some licence
awards. These state participation shares were implemented through
State Participation Agreements, signed as part of the licensing
procedure between the licensee and the Norwegian state, which would
be represented by Statoil in the actual operations of the licence.
The actual details of the agreements were negotiated between the
licensees concerned and Statoil.
Since 1973. the only mechanism of state participation has been
the carried interest scheme, whereby Statoil has an option to
participate up to its agreed percentage after commercial viability
has been proven. The private companies involved must carry the
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exploration expenses of the state company, thus bearing a heavy front
loading of investment. Exploration expenses are, it must be noted,
small in comparison with development costs and Statoil pays its
share of the latter-*--^. The private investor bore an onerous burden,
but the increasing value of petroleum and the bright prospects of the
Norwegian North Sea made Statoil's participation an accepted fact of
North Sea operations throughout the decade and into the 1980s.
Statoil was also automatically awarded a seat on the operating
committees of each licence from 1973. regardless of its participation
levelH^. In this way, the Norwegian government attempted to
increase knowledge and expertise within the state company, and to
gain access to information to help develop petroleum policies with
the prime objective of mitigating the potentially negative social and
economic impact of petroleum development on Norway.
By the late 1970s, the Norwegian state was the receipient of
from two-thirds to 90# of oil income generated from licences on the
Norwegian Continental Shelf^5. This income was derived from its
taxation and royalty policies, which constituted the highest
proportion of total government shares, and participation rights. By
exercising a public policy of "going slowly" in the area of petroleum
licensing and overall development, the Norwegian government had kept
control over the pace of North Sea exploitation. Through its fiscal
and participation policies, it had secured for the Norwegian public
purse a substantial share of the revenues accruing from the
development of a depleting, increasingly valuable natural resource.
Despite these achievements, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the
roles of Statoil and of the NPD came under increasing criticism from
both the public and politicians.
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Although there seemed to be a general consensus within Norwegian
society on the value of a mixed economy and the importance of state
control over the petroleum industry, arguments developed over
questions of degree and emphasis. Right wing parties queried whether
state objectives might not be better achieved by a reduction of
direct state participation (i.e., a restriction of Statoil's role)
1 1 (~)
and an increase in the activity of other Norwegian companies .
Statoil's dominance of the Norwegian petroleum sector had caused
conflicts between it and private Norwegian firms, and also between it
and the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. The NPD was seen as
ineffectual, and Statoil was viewed as a state company in name only,
pursuing the objectives of its Board with relatively little actual
government control. Statoil had spent approximately $1.7 billion in
its first seven years of operation, but it did not receive any equity
oil until early 1980 and its investments in petrochemicals, refining,
and marketing were yet to show profits. Coupled with these problems
came the realisation that predictions of potential production and
revenue from the Norwegian North Sea which were made in the early
1970s were unrealistically optimistic"'-^. In short, state policies
in general with regard to petroleum development became a political
issue, and Statoil was the example of how they had gone wrong.
"The growing criticism was channelled into the conservative-
liberal goal of 'clipping the wings of Statoil', and thus
reorganising it from a policy-oriented to a more purely business-
oriented and competitive-oriented, albeit state-owned,
1 1 O
corporation." In the early 1980s, the common belief was that
Statoil would account for nearly 15% of Norway's gross domestic
product"^ '■9. This represented nearly the equivalent of the remaining
contribution of the rest of Norwegian industry. The fear was that
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with Statoil's increased financial and other resources, it would
gradually assume an increasingly important role in petroleum policy
formulation, overshadowing responsible ministries and regulatory
agencies. Although Statoil was originally established as a private
company operating as the agent of the state, its increased power and
its often conflicting commercial and political objectives proved
increasingly problematic for its creators.
Statoil's role could be reformed by limiting its downstream
activities, or by limiting its participation in license awards (its
upstream activities). Unlike the Canadian and British situations
with regard to public petroleum corporations, privatisation was never
seriously considered as an option for Statoil. The public consensus
on the desirability of direct state involvement held, but various
instruments of state control became increasingly controversial.
The Conservative coalition government elected in 1981 lost
1 PC)
little time in announcing its intention to reform Statoil .
Statoil would no longer serve as a revenue collector for the state,
and it would relinquish its regulatory role to the Norwegian
Petroleum Directorate which, it was hoped, would reacquire the
position of ultimate control within the Norwegian North Sea. In
January 1982, the Storting cancelled the decision by the previous
Labour administration to give Statoil a minimum 50% stake in all
North Sea licences, although this decision was reversed within two
1 ?1
years . The political and financial benefits of retaining
Statoil's position in the Norwegian petroleum sector must have
outweighed the costs of the controversy over its power.
By 1984, Statoil's financial position had improved considerably.
Its 1983 profits increased €0 $893 million from $453 million — a 95#
increase from 1982. As sole shareholder, the state received more
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than half of these profits in addition to the over $890 million
1 ??
Statoil paid in taxes and duties . Clearly, the company was in a
position to make a substantial financial contribution to the
Norwegian state. In the face of these statistics, political actors
reevaluated the necessity of clipping Statoil's wings, as had
occurred with British Conservatives and BNOC. Labour Party spokesman
on industrial matters, Finn Kristensen, argued in March 1984 that
"The best way to keep Statoil under control is to strengthen the
control agency NPD and the Ministry of Oil and Energy."123 The fact
that Statoil remains the predominant petroleum company in the
Norwegian North Sea is an indication that this latter strategy has
proved more desirable than either privatisation or a restricted
function for Statoil.
Statoil's ability to make this significant contribution to
Norwegian public finances has been sharply curtailed in recent years
as a result of the depression of the international price for oil.
However, it is through the company's control over the bulk of
Norwegian production that the new Labour government, returned early
in 1986, has restricted exports in the attempt to support OPEC
1 ?U
pricing initiatives . The Norwegian government had very
consciously used Statoil to its maximum advantage in various aspects
of the company's mandate: financially and in terms of influencing
petroleum supply. Successive Norwegian governments have, indeed,
been relatively free to use Statoil to manage North Sea production
because of the general consensus supporting direct state involvement
in the economy. To date, Statoil has not outlived its usefulness
despite recurrent controversy, and it seems unlikely that it will do
so while the Norwegian people retain their affection for social
democracy, no matter which party is in power.
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In substantial ways, the creation and development of Statoil
differs from the experiences of both Petro-Canada and BNOC. Firstly,
the former public petroleum corporation was created by the Norwegian
government before the OPEC pricing crisis of 1973 to act as an agent
to handle state participation in the Norwegian sector of the North
Sea. In effect, Statoil's creation could be viewed as an
administrative decision rather than one based on nationalism.
Secondly, the way in which Statoil was to intended to operate
differed fundamentally from the other two public corporations:
Statoil was to behave like a private company with the prime objective
of maximising profit for its owner (the Norwegian state). It was to
be subject to the same fiscal and regulatory arrangements as other
petroleum companies operating in Norway. Statoil was never subject
to the kind of controversy surrounding the privatisation initiatives
of Conservative governments in the late 1970s in Canada and Britain.
There always remained a broad agreement in both the Norwegian public
and policy-making circles that direct state involvement in the
petroleum industry was both necessary and valuable. This was a
position born both from the history of social democracy within Norway
and from concern for the fragile balance of the small Norwegian
economy. The size of revenues from petroleum development had
potentially disruptive consequences for the Norwegian economy and
society and there was, therefore, general agreement that the
Norwegian government should have the means of mitigating negative
externalities. Only by direct governmental control over the pace of
petroleum exploitation, and by its capture of the largest possible
economic rent, could Norwegian society hope to benefit from the
development of vast petroleum resources. Statoil was the main agency
to assist the government in this endeavor, and although it fell prey
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to criticism in the late 1970s, there was never any doubt that it
would continue to operate. Reform was the issue, not elimination.
CONCLUSION
Through an examination of the participation policies of three
petroleum producing states, Canada, Britain, and Norway, several
hypotheses derived from rational choice theory appear persuasive.
Firstly, it was expected that direct state participation in the
petroleum sector would increase in response to strategic
considerations regarding supply, public demand for an increased role
in the development of a national resource, and when information for
policy-making in other petroleum areas was lacking. In both Canada
and Britain, public petroleum corporations were established almost
immediately after the first OPEC pricing crisis created supply
concerns and made petroleum a political issue. In response to these
pressures, governments in these two states adopted very public means
of demonstrating state involvement — Petro-Canada and BNOC. The
desire for more complete information also played a role in the
creation of these companies (both states publicly defended their
decisions in this way), but the prime reason for the decision to
participate through public corporations was political, not technical.
The costs involved in establishing and operating a company whose
prime objective was not profit maximisation suggest this contention.
The first impression is that Norway is an exception, but the
reasons for the creation of Statoil were similar. There was a public
demand for direct state participation and the state required
information for formulating its petroleum policies, especially the
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fiscal regime. The prime objective of the Norwegian government in
its regulation of petroleum development was to mitigate the potential
damage to Norwegian society and economy. With broad public consensus
concerning the necessity of direct state participation in petroleum
affairs, the creation of Statoil seemed to satisfy both financial and
political objectives. It allowed the Norwegian treasury to benefit
from participation revenues while the government was, at the same
time, using Statoil to assist in its go slow development policy and
its Norwegianisation efforts. The emphasis of the Norwegian company
was placed on its corporate activities rather than its political
purposes -- its prime objective was to be profit and it was to
operate as any other company in the Norwegian petroleum sector. This
is especially surprising given that a Labour government was
responsible for the initial establishment of Statoil. However, given
the broad consensus in Norwegian society in relation to state
involvement in industry, any government could have implemented the
participation policy chosen without fear of electoral defeat. With
the elimination of the electoral constraint, the government could
afford to emphasise its financial interests. The company outgrew its
mandate in the sense that it, rather than the government, controlled
petroleum policy. This might have been expected, given the initial
government drive to establish a strong and independent state agent in
the private petroleum industry.
The second part of the initial hypothesis also appears to hold
-- that as these strategic, public, and information pressures have
subsided, so too has the importance of state participation in the
petroleum sector. Once the initial oil price shock had subsided and
all three governments concerned had acquired information adequate to
their needs, all three public petroleum corporations came under
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increasing criticism. This criticism was stemmed by the second OPEC
crisis in 1979~80, despite the fact that Conservative administrations
had been returned to office in all three states in the years 1979~8l.
The financial gain which resulted from the second OPEC price crisis
also contributed to the value of the state petroleum companies to
their respective governments, thus postponing the privatisation
debates in Canada and Britain, and keeping the debate in the realm of
reform in Norway.
Thirdly, the relationship between party ideology and government
position on state participation has not proved to be strong. This
supports the rational choice hypothesis that governments of all
persuasions have similar objectives in mind: attaining or retaining
office, and subsidiary goals to assist the achievement of that aim.
In Canada, Britain, and Norway, parties of both the left and the
right have taken on rhetorical positions consistent with their
ideological position, but, once in power, have not necessarily acted
in accordance with those positions. The short-lived Canadian
Conservative government of 1979 reaped the wrath of the Canadian
public for its ideologically-motivated attack on Petro-Canada, and
its successor elected in 1984 did not made the same mistake. And it
was the Liberal government at the end of its term of office which
took away the policy role from Petro-Canada. In Britain, the
Conservatives forcefully argued against the creation of BNOC and
campaigned for its privatisation in 1979. only to postpone that
decision until 1982, and then only partially implemented it. BNOC
was finally eliminated in 1986, but only after its financial losses
created such an embarrassment to the government that it had little
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option. In Norway, the Conservatives came to power in an atmosphere
of intense criticism concerning Statoil, and initiated some policy
decisions to curb its power, only to reverse them later.
In short, rational choice theory has something valuable to offer
in the comparative analysis of policy outputs. The similarity in the
timing, mechanisms, and general objectives of petroleum participation
policies in Canada, Britain, and Norway might well indicate that
governments in these three petroleum-producing states have similar
interests concerning the development of their national resources.
Norway appears to be the different case in this policy area, but the
difference in its approach to petroleum matters results from concerns
over potential disruption to society and the economy from the rapid
development of a resource with enormous financial potential. Even
allowing for this, the development of Norwegian participation policy
bears more similarities to those of Canada and the United Kingdom
than might have been expected unless a rational choice approach is
adopted.
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Classical economic theory suggests that, at equilibrium price
should be equal to the marginal cost of production. The
international market for oil was obviously not in equilibrium after
the OPEC pricing initiatives of 1973/7^ and 1979/80. In the early
1980s, oil was selling for more than $30 per barrel, while the
exploration and development cost of high-priced North Sea crude
averaged about $12. "Gulf fields still run at about 50 cents and
experts have estimated that most of the world's ultimately
recoverable oil resources could be produced for less than $12 (in
1976 dollars).This discrepancy between the costs of production
and the price of sale is known as the economic rent. The opportunity
for the capture of large economic rents was great in this market
situation, and the question addressed by all governments with oil
resources in the seventies and eighties has been how to capture a
share of that rent while still leaving sufficient incentive for the
industry to continue investing in exploration, development, and
extracting the resource. Pricing policy partly determines who gets
what from the sale of oil; and indeed, it was OPEC pricing policy
which caused the initial breakdown of the relationship between cost
and price of oil.
As discussed in the chapter on rational choice theory as applied
to petroleum policies, pricing policies may take two basic forms:
determination by the market, or determination by government in either
set prices or through public petroleum corporation activity. In the
first case, the owners of the resource are demonstrating their
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confidence in the market's ability to deliver a fair return while in
the latter two, there are obviously considerations which make market
price determination undesirable. Government regulation of petroleum
prices, whether through administratively established price schedules
or public corporation activity, necessitates the evaluation of prices
above market levels (a benefit to producers), below market levels (a
benefit to consumers), or in line with market levels (in which case
they are symbols of sovereignty over the resource, and little else).
Price levels also affect reserve standings and investment and
influence other macro-economic indicators such as inflation,
unemployment, and exchange rates. Pricing policies of petroleum
producing countries must therefore be taken as an important
indication of the priorities and constraints of the respective
governments.
It is against the background of OPEC activities that the pricing
policies of Canada, Britain, and Norway have been developed. All
three governments claimed the right to determine the price of
petroleum produced within their territories; however, both market and
government pricing strategies have been employed. Canada is the sole
example among the three cases of a strategy of price control by the
government — while both the British and Norwegian governments have
determined that their country's oil should be sold at world market
prices. Accordingly, this chapter will comprise three sections: an
outline of OPEC pricing activities, a discussion of the Canadian
pricing policy, and an examination of the British and Norwegian cases
considered together.
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1. OPEC PRICING ACTIVITIES
"In an effort to provide stability for a system which is
inherently unstable, attempts at cartelisation have been common in
the history of the world oil industry. In 1928 the leading powers of
the day — British Petroleum, Royal Dutch/Shell, and Exxon — met at
the Achnacarry hunting estate and agreed on the principle that no
p
company should seek to expand its share of the market." The free-
rider problem illuminated by rational choice theory suggests that
there is an inherent tension between the self-interest of individuals
and the collective interest of the group. The Achnacarry Agreement
was ineffective as the parties to the agreement (and their
competitors) attempted to increase their market share at every given
opportunity. Although the benefits of collective action were
obvious to the parties to the agreement, their individual self-
interest dominated their actions to the detriment of the group's
collective interest. The recent collapse in the international price
of oil is, similarly and in a large part, the result of OPEC's
inability to remain a disciplined cartel. Given the premises of
rational choice theory, this outcome is not surprising.
Cartels are groups which have a monopoly of a good or service,
and to maximise their members' profits. The cartel
collectively restricts production and thus maintains a price higher
than the market price. Cartels are therefore concerned with two
issues: price and production levels, with the latter being the
mechanism by which the former is maximised. Rational choice analysis
suggests that cartels are inherently unstable due to the same
individual self-interest which drove each of the members to join the
group in the first place. Once the cartel has achieved a satisfying
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price level by the imposition of production quotas upon members, the
temptation to free-ride on the group becomes intense for the less
scrupulous members. Large gains can be made by individual cartel
members by undercutting the cartel price and increasing production in
order to capture a larger share of the market. This type of activity
must be clandestine if the cartel has an effective disciplinary
power; in the absence of discipline, individual members will have a
much greater opportunity to make large gains. Once one member
pursues this course of action, the other members must cut their
prices to maintain their market share. Consequently, the price
spirals downward as the market is flooded.
Cartels are most effective when the cartel's market share is
large, the concentration of production is high, demand is inelastic,
and governments do not attempt to control the cartel^. This
situation in the international petroleum market allowed for OPEC's
strength to burgeon in the 1970s and early 80s. However, cartels
tend to disintegrate when production outside the cartel threatens its
market share, when the development of substitutes threatens the
demand for the product, and when rivalry exists between cartel
members. OPEC benefited in the 1970s from conditions favourable to
cartel efficacy, but it has encountered the typical problems
mentioned above in the 1980s.
In his study of the international price of oil from 1880 to
1977. Ray^ asserted that major price increases followed the two World
Wars but that in both cases, the price returned to lower levels
shortly thereafter. These price increases were directly related to
supply shortages in wartime, but market equilibrium was quickly
restored. Prices remained fundamentally determined by the costs of
production and the balance between supply and demand. From the 50s
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through the 60s prices remained low, but as demand increased and
producer governments started to test their strength in relation to
the oil companies, prices began to climb in the early 70s. The
initial explosive jump which appeared to have put the international
petroleum market in perpetual disequilibrium occurred in October 1973
as a result of OPEC initiatives^.
The development of OPEC's influence from its inception in i960
through 1974 was outlined in some detail in Chapter 2. The effects
of the OPEC crisis of 1973"74 were OPEC's acquisition of control over
price and the demise of the concession system. This made OPEC the
dominant force in the international petroleum market, controlling the
bulk of free world reserves and production. OPEC had advanced from a
position of consultative negotiation with a hope of influencing the
pricing decisions of the companies to complete control of the
petroleum industry within its territories and the attendant influence
on the world petroleum market.
The response of the consuming nations to OPEC's pricing
initiatives was to establish the Energy Coordination Group (ECG),
later known as the International Energy Agency (IEA), at a meeting in
February 197^ in Washington D.C. "The ECG was widely, and probably
rightly, seen as an attempt to make a counter-cartel to OPEC in order
to defend the interests of the consuming countries in matters of
production and prices."^ The self-interest of consumer countries was
to be advanced by collective action, primarily on the prevention of
future vulnerability of the same extent to OPEC. Both Canada and the
U.K. joined the IEA, but for Norway, membership was problematic as
the intensely political debate over membership in the EEC had
occurred a mere two years previously. This debate had centred on the
potential constraints that membership in organisations such as the
198
E.E.C. might impose on Norwegian sovereign action. There remained
strong public concern in Norway that the development of petroleum
resources should remain firmly under the control of the Norwegian
government. IEA responsibilities might interfere with the exercise
of that control, especially in situations of crisis in the
international petroleum marketplace. However, Norway finally
accepted status as an associate member of the IEA in the spring of
1975 which allowed it to participate in all essential activities, but
exempted it from participation in the crisis management activities of
the group^.
The IEA's principal achievement was the determination of a
supply sharing scheme among its members in the case of a crisis
similar to that which occurred in 1973• Additionally, all its
members committed themselves to undertake steps to reduce petroleum
consumption domestically and generally to increase energy
conservation. Although the IEA was established after the damage of
the first pricing crisis was done, it nonetheless demonstrated to the
OPEC governments that the consuming nations were not going to leave
the security of their petroleum supplies entirely in the hands of the
OPEC producers. Beyond this, however, not much else could be done
collectively to mitigate the effects of the consuming nations'
vulnerability to OPEC actions.
It was assumed that the price increases just
experienced would of themselves sharply reduce the
demand for energy and hence for OPEC oil. This
tendency would be reinforced by official exhortation
to use energy less wastefully in the IEA member
countries. Next, non-oil sources would be developed
more quickly, thanks to official efforts and to the
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stimulus of the oil price jump. So, too, would oil
and gas resources in the main consuming countries,
more profitable as they would now be. After a few
years, demand for OPEC oil would drop so that the
cartel would begin to disintegrate. The consuming
countries would then impose less one-sided
O
arrangements for oil pricing.
From 1973 through 1976, total oil demand and total energy demand fell
faster than GDP in OECD countries and the share of non-oil sources of
energy inputs increased. The combined effects of the price increases
and IEA efforts were reducing demand for OPEC oil.
In response to these developments, OPEC became more conservative
in its pricing policies. A principal feature of OPEC activities
throughout the decade was the Saudi Arabian assumption of cartel
leadership given its extraordinary productive capacity^. Moran's
analysis, Modelling OPEC Behaviour: Economic and Political
Alternatives^, suggests that the Saudis' effective monopoly over
incremental production within OPEC had led them to agonise over their
price leadership role several times in the 1970s. The implementation
of a two-tiered pricing structure in 1976 was one demonstrable
instance. In this case, demand was quite strong and OPEC was
producing at 85% of capacity, yet the Saudis argued for price
restraint in the face of other OPEC members' hawkishness. Moran
concludes that the political circumstances in which these decisions
were taken demonstrates that the Saudis were motivated in their
actions by the desire to advance national political objectives, not
necessarily OPEC objectives . However this may be, the two-tier
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system was so difficult to manage that prices were reunified at the
Stockholm meeting of July 1977• The Arabian marker price then stood
at $12.70 per barrel.
By February 1979. the impact of the Iranian revolution and the
loss of two million barrels per day of its production was felt on the
world market when spot prices reached $23 per barrel against a market
crude level of $13.34 for that quarter. The general consensus is
that the loss of Iranian production was not in itself a serious
problem in the international petroleum market. Kemezis notes that
other OPEC members, principally Saudi Arabia, "...neutralised part of
the Iranian loss so that net shortfall was limited to 1 to 3 million
1 ?
barrels per day over a short time." This shortfall represented
only a small portion of free world demand, which was averaging
approximately 48 million barrels per day in 1979- Rather, it was
third party spot market sales of crude which were causing the price
increases. These spot market sales were based on both the buyers'
memories of the 1973~74 shortages and the sellers' maximisation of
the opportunity to reap huge financial gains. The latter group aimed
to capture the rent available between the official OPEC prices and
what the market would bear in a period of perceived shortage. The
rise of the spot market therefore became a key feature of the second
pricing crisis, and the collective interest of the IEA was not
sufficent to prevent its members from free-riding — from actively
trading on the spot market. The efforts of this 'counter-cartel'
proved meaningless in an actual supply crisis as the self-interest of
its members determined their respective actions.
The Cond-fi-p"t- of a floor price for OPEC oil was introduced by
the cartel in March 1979. but surcharges and other sales taxes could
allow for any individual member to achieve any price which the market
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would bear above the floor priced. OPEC's actions in this instance
were clearly defensive: it apparently did not wish to act too hastily
in terms of official increases, yet it clearly wished to be realising
some of the benefits of the perceived shortage that had been going to
middlemen sellers up to this point.
In June 1979. spot sale prices were running at $40 per barrel
against the $14.5^ OPEC price. An OPEC meeting of that month in
Geneva moved the marker crude price up to $18 per barrel and the
newly admitted surcharge principle was now limited to $2 per
barrel^. Thus, a ceiling price for OPEC oil was to accompany the
floor price in an effort to stabilise the volatile market. Just
prior to the OPEC conference in Caracas in December 1979. Saudia
Arabia retroactively increased the price of its marker crude by $6
per barrel, to $2^ as of November 1. In November 1980, Saudi Arabian
light was priced at $32.00 per barrel, and in October 1981 the posted
price was increased again to the $3^ per barrel level, its height,
where it remained until the pricing problems of 1983-
The same basic forces produced both the 1973_7^
oil crisis and the 1979 crisis. At the heart of each
crisis were high levels of consuming country
dependence upon Middle East and North African oil.
There was nothing inevitable about this; rather, it
was due to the failure of the consuming countries to
develop effective energy policies and the major oil
companies' emphasis on producing the 'easy' oil in
these areas. In both cases, moreover, the growth of
US demand for imported oil was the underlying factor
that put the most pressure on world oil markets.
Both crises were triggered by political events
not directly related to oil: the fourth Arab-Israeli
war in 1973 and the Iranian revolution in 1979' Each
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crisis involved only a minor loss of supplies;
however, the impact of this loss was greatly
aggravated by the competitive bidding among the oil
companies that followed and consuming country
policies, particularly in the United States, that
misallocated supplies.5
The fact that the OPEC price increases of 1973~74 and 1979~80
were implemented successfully without the group having to allocate
production quotas suggests that the inelasticity of demand for OPEC
oil was a key feature in the international petroleum market
throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s. In fact, OPEC cannot
be technically considered a cartel until it imposed production quotas
in March 1982. However, its success in achieving prices for its
petroleum substantially higher than the costs of production speaks
more of the inability of the consuming nations to coordinate a
strategic defense than of OPEC's clever manoevring. Although the IEA
was intended to prevent precisely the type of panicked spot market
purchasing which in fact provoked the second series of price
increases, in the event it was powerless to coerce its members into
disciplined restraint in a period of uncertainty. Once again,
individual members attempted to maximise their own interests and
broke faith with the IEA objectives by competitively increasing their
stockpiles at almost any price, and in so doing, encouraged OPEC to
increase prices further. The same free-riding activity within OPEC
would lead to the demise of its control over the international price
of oil.
Oil consumption in the free world peaked at 51-6 million barrels
per day (MMb/day) in 1979. but declined to 47 MMb/day in 1981 and 45
MMb/day in 1983^. OPEC production was 30-7 MMb/day in 1979.
203
accounting for approximately 60% of free world production, and it
declined to approximately 17 MMb/day by 1982, representing far less
than half of free world production for that year. In addition,
Britain and Norway were exporting North Sea production by that time,
and U.S. domestic production had sharply increased. In short, the
control which OPEC had as a result of its preponderant share of the
world market declined significantly in the early 1980s. Furthermore,
some economists maintained that the full effects of the 1979~80 price
increases in terms of stimulating fuel efficiency had yet to be
experienced. Griffin and Teece concluded that OPEC's price fixing
power had passed its zenith and that a price decline was the
situation for which consuming nations should prepare^.
The difficulties OPEC had in coping with this reduction in
demand were manifest as early as 1982. OPEC called a special
consultative meeting in March that year at which a production ceiling
of 17-5 million barrels per day was set; it was the first time the
Organisation had called upon its members to limit supply in order to
1 Pidefend the posted price °. The July meeting was suspended
indefinitely after angry exchanges between Iran and Saudi Arabia over
production quotas. Total OPEC production at the time was over 1
MMb/day above the March quota despite the underproduction of .5
MMb/day by Saudi Arabia and .35 MMb/day by Iraq. Iran, with the
support of Libya and Nigeria, was agitating for a quota of 1.2
MMb/day on the strength of its economic need. The Iranian delegate
further suggested that Saudi output might be further reduced in order
to allow for the Iranian increase, at which point the meeting ended
in disarray 9. The December meeting was once again geared toward the
preservation of the $34 marker price, but individual members
continued to discount their crudes and sell above their quotas.
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Finally, on March 14, 1983. the marker crude price was reduced $5 per
barrel to $29, and production quotas totalling 17.5 MMb/day were
PD
again agreed .
Demand was slack in 1984 and spot prices for North Sea crudes
fell to between $26 and $27 per barrel in October 1984, in response
P1
to which Norway reduced the official prices of its crude by $1.50 .
This action prompted a price war which has ultimately resulted in the
recent collapse of the price of oil.
A price war is a good example of the game of chicken, as
discussed in Chapter 1. Both players dare each other to defy a
disastrous outcome in order to assert their superiority over their
competitor. In a price war, participants incrementally reduce the
price of their product for two possible reasons: in order to maintain
their market share or to encroach upon the market share of their
competitors. The competition is forced to lower its prices to meet
the initial reduction, or face the loss of its market share. Once
all the players are in the game, the downward spiral of prices begins
to threaten the profitability for each of them, but each player
realises that the one who can stay in the game the longest will win
the ultimate goal -- the custom of its competition. There is
therefore an incentive to stay in the game, but there is also the
knowledge that continued participation might result in disaster.
There are three possible outcomes in the game of chicken: both
parties swerve; one party swerves; or both collide in a car crash.
The price war could be stopped by an agreement between all parties to
avert the ultimate catastrophe, or one or two players might "chicken-
out" and sacrifice their market share in the short-medium term in the
hope of building up in the future. The calamity of the car crash in
chicken would be the non-optimal outcome for all players in a price
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war — a complete price collapse. In this case, all players would be
rendered unable to participate as production would cease if prices
remained below cost long enough.
In I985-I986, the uncoordinated self-interest of OPEC, Norway,
and Britain ultimately resulted in the collapse of the international
price of oil. The chicken game between the OPEC and North Sea
producers resulted in a price war which eventually reduced the
international price of oil below $10 per barrel. In mid-October,
1985, Britain quickly followed the Norwegian initiative in reducing
the price for its oil, and OPEC ministers met in Geneva on October 29
to attempt to avert an all-out price war between the North Sea
producers and the Organisation. Nigeria had already followed the
North Sea lead, defecting from the OPEC price scheme and cutting its
crude prices $2 per barrel unilaterally, but a price cut on the $29
marker crude was rejected by OPEC. Further cuts in production
appeared necessary, but the cooperation of Norway and Britain was
not forthcoming. The North Sea producers were not willing to be co-
opted into OPEC, nor were they willing to give up part of their
increasing market share in order to support a higher price for oil.
At the October meeting, OPEC ministers decided to cut the
cartel's production by a further 1.5 million barrels per day to 16
MMb/day, with Saudi Arabia committing itself to cut its own
production to whatever level would be necessary to mitigate the
effects of cheating members and defend the $29 price^. The action
was not sufficient to stem the price fall, and the marker crude was
trading at $27-70 in late November despite production cuts^3. OPEC's
next meeting was in Geneva on December 19, but was adjourned to
decide upon a course of action which would enforce the existing
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production ceiling. Sheikh Yamani, the Saudi oil minister, warned
the North Sea producers on December 30 that any further cuts in their
nji
prices would result in a disastrous price war .
On January 14, 1985. Norway dropped its official price structure
altogether, allowing its crude to be sold at spot market prices^.
OPEC met in Geneva later that month, but the meeting focused on
differential pricing of crudes and the next meeting did not occur
until July at which a price cut was again rejected. OPEC ministers
instead decided to try to clamp down on individual countries'* discount
schemes. However, Saudi Arabia announced that it would double its
crude output to its quota level of 4.35 million barrels per day no
matter what the outcome of the next OPEC meeting. "The fall in oil
revenues ha[d] depleted the Kingdom's foreign reserves, cast grave
doubt on its ability to balance the budget and caused alarm within
the Royal Family about the possible political implications."
As a price cut in the official marker crude had been rejected by
the cartel, Saudi Arabia began to arrange the sale of its crude in
the autumn on netback prices which guarantee the producer an agreed
percentage of the spot market price of refined products made from the
oil sold^7. jn effect, the Saudis were abandoning the OPEC pricing
structure for contractual arrangements based on what the free market
would bear. At the OPEC meeting in Vienna in early October, half the
OPEC members requested increases in their production quotas and the
official pricing system seemed doomed. The price war between North
Sea and OPEC producers began in earnest. Either one side would have
to sacrifice its own self-interest to the interests of the other, or
catastrophe would result. At the December meeting, Yamani predicted
the shape of the potential catastrophe in the international petroleum
market in the hope of averting this eventuality: prices below $20 per
207
barrel in 1986 if OPEC and non-OPEC producers did not cooperate to
pO
limit supplies . OPEC then agreed to focus on maintenance of an
appropriate market share, playing the North Sea producers' game,
rather than the defence of official price levels.
Prices continued to fall on the spot market throughout January,
and North Sea crude prices stood at $18 per barrel by the end of that
month^. Yamani's predicted catastrophe had become reality. The
price slide continued throughout the spring despite several OPEC
meetings and various efforts to cut production and solve the problem
of oversupply. The low point was reached in April, when prices fell
below $10 per barrel as a result of OPEC's failure to reach agreement
in late March^O. Prices then rallied slightly, and in May the new
Norwegian Finance Minister announced that Norway was prepared to
cooperate with OPEC on production cuts if Britain would do
likewise^. The Norwegian government had had enough and was clearly
not interested in the continuation of an uneconomic price for its
petroleum. The price rallied to $15 per barrel in May on the
strength of an expected agreement between the North Sea and OPEC
producers^. However, the British government refused to cooperate on
principle, noting the benefits of depressed energy prices on
industrial activity and the price for North Sea oil dipped below the
$10 mark late in July, recovering to the lower mid-teens level in the
autumn.
At its meeting in June 1986, OPEC did not agree on the
distribution of new production limits within its membership^. The
delegates left the conference with recommended quotas to discuss with
their governments, and reassembled in Geneva on July 28 to decide
upon the exact production arrangements. A target price range of $17
to $20 by year end was agreed upon with an accompanying production
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restriction of 16.8 million barrels per day, which was increased to
17 MMb/day at the October meeting. In the December meeting,
production quotas were reduced to 15.8 MMb/day and OPEC reasserted
its commitment to a fixed price policy for its production, the target
being Sl8 per barrel^.
OPEC's policy of securing an appropriate market share in the
face of encroaching North Sea production had indeed secured an
increase of 17% in OPEC exports in 1986, but at the expense of a 44%
loss in revenues as a result of the price collapse. The strategy of
a return to a fixed price may assist its members to adhere to the
stringent production quotas required to support the desired price
levels, but this strategy remains vulnerable to the self-interest of
individual OPEC producers. In June 1987. OPEC agreed an official
price level of $18 per barrel and agreed to a production ceiling of
16.6 MMb/day for the remainder of the year, boosting the spot market
price of oil to above the $20 mark for the first time since the
beginning of 1986^5. However, prices slipped in the autumn and it
remains to be seen whether OPEC members will be able to discipline
themselves in the medium and longer terms. Rational choice theory
would suggest that this is unlikely, and that the oversupply of oil
on the international market will remain a feature which contributes
to a lower price for oil until such time as non-OPEC sources are
significantly reduced.
The rise and fall of OPEC's dominance over the international
petroleum market in the last fifteen years is a remarkable example of
the self-interest of individuals as both the driving force behind
group cooperation and its eventual means of destruction. The
inherent instability of cartels is due to the tendency of all self-
interested individuals to free-ride on collective benefits, and the
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history of OPEC's pricing and production efforts certainly
illustrates the force of this tendency. However, the discussion of
OPEC pricing policies serves a dual purpose in this chapter: it not
only illustrates some concepts of rational choice analysis such as
the pursuit of individual benefit, the free-rider problem, and the
game of chicken. More importantly, it sets the environment in which
the pricing policies of the three case states were developed.
2. CANADIAN PRICING POLICIES
In a federal state such as Canada, state powers are
constitutionally divided between two levels of government. In the
case of petroleum, the Canadian provinces own the natural resources
discovered within their boundaries and have complete control over
their development, production, and sale within the province itself.
However, the federal government is responsible for interprovincial
and international trade and commerce. Consequently, conflict between
the two levels of government over the pricing of petroleum has been a
feature of federal-provincial relations in the past fifteen years.
This outcome is not surprising if a rational choice approach is
adopted. Both levels of government are interested in retaining
office and the attainment of instrumental goals to assist in that
endeavor. Political resources, like economic resources, are scarce,
and the competition for them is often a zero-sum game in which one
party benefits at the expense of its competitors.
Petroleum prices were left to market forces in Canada prior to
1973. although the market itself was somewhat restricted by the
implementation of the National Oil Policy in i960. The resources
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within Alberta were developed and sold by petroleum companies seeking
the establishment of a healthy and profitable industry and a large
market share for Canadian petroleum. The Alberta government shared
these priorities. Watkins and Walker have concluded that
"... throughout the period 19^7 to I960 wellhead price movements were
consistent with the pattern expected under competition: equal
netbacks on all sales and changes in wellhead prices reflecting
changes in the market interface.The main competition for
Alberta petroleum was oil produced in the U.S., and price
fluctuations reflected both U.S. crude price changes and changes in
the exchange rates between the American and Canadian dollars.
However, in February 1961 the Conservative federal government
began to influence indirectly the price of petroleum when it
implemented the National Oil Policy. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the
principal thrust of the NOP was to divide the Canadian petroleum
market into two halves along the Ottawa Valley Line: the western half
would be reserved for higher priced domestic petroleum, while the
larger market in eastern Canada would be reserved for lower priced
imports. This policy removed the necessity of maintaining
competitive prices for the western Canadian petroleum industry, the
objective being to secure a market for the petroleum and allow the
industry to develop accordingly. The unstated objective of the
federal government was to benefit the large voting populace in
eastern Canada with less expensive oil. Although the government did
not institute any direct pricing control in this policy, there is no
doubt that the NOP had a very strong impact on the price of Canadian
oil.
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The petroleum industry was strongly divided on the question of
the NOP. The multinationals made it clear both to the government and
to the Borden Commission (which recommended the market division) that
they wished to retain the large market in the east for the oil it was
importing into Canada. This sector of the industry did not want to
lose a share of its market to the independent producers which were
becoming established in Canadian petroleum production. As for the
smaller independent and Canadian companies, there was a feeling that
the Canadian petroleum industry could develop the capacity for
serving the entire Canadian market if it was allowed access to the
eastern market. They could then increase the price of their product
and invest the profits back into exploration and development of
Canadian reserves, boosting production in a relatively short period
of time to meet increased demand. This issue split the industry's
lobbying group, the Canadian Petroleum Association. The independent
and Canadian companies broke away from the larger organisation to
form the Independent Petroleum Association of Canada (IPAC), and
although they lost on the issue of the NOP, they continued to make
representations to the government^?. These developments amply
illustrate the differences in interests between the large
multinationals and the smaller independent and junior Canadian firms.
The result of the NOP was that Quebec and the Maritime provinces
had access to cheaper imported crude, while most of Ontario and
western Canada was served by higher priced Canadian production. By
1970, Ontario refiners were paying approximately 27 cents more per
barrel for Alberta crude than their colleagues with access to
imports, but adjustments between 1970 and 1973 allowed for the
212
establishment of equality in price between Canadian and U.S.
delivered prices in Chicago^". At this time, the price for Canadian
oil was under $3-00 per barrel.
The NOP decision ... reflected a delicate balance
between the needs of a number of interests. Markets
were being regulated, but not in an imposed,
draconian way. There is no question that the NOP
satisfied the multinationals and the U.S. government
and served to enhance the continental integration of
the Canadian and U.S. oil markets ... [and it] also
won the support of the Canadian provinces
affected....
The only Canadians who could be said to have been
hurt financially by the NOP were the consumers in
Ontario who had to pay for the marginally higher
priced Canadian oil. J.G. Debanne argues, however,
that the Ontario government accepted the NOP and the
higher retail prices it entailed in exchange for the
concentration and expansion of a large refining and
petrochemical industry within the province.39
The NOP remained in effect until the first OPEC price increases
forced the Canadian government to reappraise its petroleum pricing
policy. With the price developments in the Middle East, Canadian
prices increased 95 cents in four escalations between 1972 and 1973
before the federal government announced an export tax on Canadian
production in September 1973^. This tax was intended to increase
the price of Canadian exports to world levels, and was initially set
at 40 cents per barrel. It was increased to $1.91 per barrel in
December, to $2.22 per barrel in January 197^, and to $6.60 per
barrel in February^^. The export tax allowed the federal government
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to acquire a share of the dramatically increasing economic rent
available from petroleum production. This rent would otherwise have
been distributed between the governments of the producing provinces
(in royalties) and the petroleum industry (had prices been left to
market determination).
The decision to freeze prices was taken quickly and
followed the action of Imperial Oil (the acknowledged
price setter) to increase prices. Of equal
importance, the freeze decision was viewed by Alberta
to be one of the first instances of small creeping
unilateral acts by Ottawa, which were to escalate
over the rest of the decade in a series of mutual
acts of 'political aggression' reflecting the
different national and regional interests involved
Z12
and the different political parties in power.
As noted in Chapter 3. the Liberal party formed a minority
government supported by the N.D.P. at this time, and was under
considerable pressure to agree to some of the N.D.P.'s positions on
energy, which included the establishment of a national petroleum
company and a Canadian price for Canadian oil. Prime Minister Pierre
Trudeau made a Parliamentary speech on December 6 which outlined the
Liberal government's response to the OPEC crisis^. The government
planned to extend the interprovincial pipeline to Montreal, thus
ending the Ottawa Valley division of market and allowing domestic oil
to be used by the majority of Canadian petroleum refineries, and to
establish a unified price system for the whole country. An Oil
Import Compensation Program would be set up in which monies would be
used to subsidise those refineries which continued to rely on
imports. The government resisted moving towards the international
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price of oil for domestic production, arguing that it was entirely
unrelated to the cost of producing Canadian oil and that prices
should rise, but remain below international levels to remain fair to
all Canadians. Both the Oil Import Compensation Program and the
proposed made-in-Canada price for domestic oil sheltered the populous
eastern Canadian provinces (as well as the rest) from a higher price
for oil.
Ontario, the other major provincial actor in petroleum pricing
disputes, sided with the federal government in arguing that higher
prices would have detrimental effects such as inflation, higher
levels of unemployment, and a major transfer of wealth to Alberta.
Alberta, on the other hand, had a keen interest in the price of oil
moving rapidly towards international levels. As the producer of 85#
of Canadian petroleum, the province argued for a market-based pricing
system which would reflect the value of its depleting resource in a
volatile market. The province, in a largely symbolic gesture of
sovereignty over its resources, established a provincial Petroleum
Marketing Commission to regulate prices of petroleum within the
province^. However, its function was limited to the relative
pricing of different oils produced within the province and it had no
jurisdiction over interprovincial prices which remained
constitutionally with the federal government. Petroleum prices
outside Alberta's borders would have to be negotiated between the two
governments.
In late January 197^. at the First Ministers' Conference on
Energy, the federal Energy Minister, Donald Macdonald, presented the
government's scheme for the unified Canadian priced. The wellhead
price of oil would be increased from $4.04 to $6.05 per barrel, and
the two dollar increase would be used to reimburse eastern Canadian
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refiners reliant on more expensive imported oil. This policy was
intended to satisfy both Ontario and Alberta, providing a subsidy for
the former and an approach toward the international price for the
latter. It satisfied neither, and the other provincial premiers
criticised both the increase in prices and the federal subsidy. The
conference ended with a compromise in which subsidies for imports
would be funded by the export tax on Canadian production through
April 1974. During this period, a permanent formula for a one-price
system would be determined. This policy gave the federal government
administrative control over the subsidy program and the attendant
revenues with which it could be seen to benefit all Canadians. Both
the governments of the producing provinces and the petroleum industry
lost the opportunity of increased rent as the price was restricted
and the federal government increased its revenue share. The export
tax remained and the wellhead price was increased to $6.70 per barrel
on March 27 where it would remain until July 1, 1975^*
The Liberals returned to power with an absolute Parliamentary
majority in the July 8, 1974 federal election, and the new government
moved to consolidate its position on petroleum pricing by the passage
of the Petroleum Administration Act (PAA)^7. The PAA "...provided
the federal government with the authority to set the price of
Canadian oil and gas in the event that a negotiated price could not
hO
be arrived at through agreement with the producing provinces." In
this Act, the federal government assured its supremacy over petroleum
pricing, having anticipated continued disagreements with the
governments of the producing provinces.
A further First Ministers' Conference on Energy was called for
April 9-10, 1975. to discuss the pricing arrangements after the
previous agreement expired on July 1^9. By this time, the federal
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government had come to believe that higher wellhead prices were
necessary, partly due to the pressure of the producing provinces, but
also because Canadian petroleum exploration had declined dramatically
in the two years since 1973- Although prices had been increasing,
there was very little increase in profitability. Both exploration
and development rigs were moving to the U.S. where prospects in terms
of price and return on investment were much more attractive^®.
However, the Ontario government opposed further price increases at
this meeting, arguing that the increases to date had largely
benefited the federal and producing governments at the expense of
consumers. The Conference was adjourned without agreement. This was
the last First Ministers' Conference at which the establishment of
petroleum prices was discussed. The federal government exercised its
newly acquired power under the Petroleum Administration Act and
raised the price to $7-75 when the previous agreement expired^-*-. The
international price was then near $12 per barrel, and although the
federal government fulfilled its intention to move the domestic price
closer to the international price, it also maintained its policy of
protecting Canadians from the full effects of parity with the
international market.
In May 1977. the producing provinces and the federal government
concluded an agreement whereby the price of oil would increase by 95
cents per barrel twice a year, moving toward the world price. This
policy was agreeable to the governments of the producing provinces,
representing a consistent effort to increase the domestic price to
the international level in the longer term. It was also agreeable to
Ontario and Quebec, the largest provinces, as it represented
continued protection for petroleum consumers. By late 1978, Canadian
prices were at 80% of the world price^. However, in 1979
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international prices escalated once more as a consequence of the
Iranian revolution, and there was a new party in power in the federal
government.
The minority Conservative government under the leadership of Joe
Clark came into office in May, 1979. Although energy was not a key
election issue, the Conservatives had campaigned on a radical energy
platform which included the dismantling of Petro-Canada and a
revision of Canadian petroleum prices. Of more importance to the
voter in 1979 was the Conservatives' assertion that they would better
be able to manage federal-provincial relations than the Liberals,
especially as Conservative governments were in power in both Ontario
and Alberta. It should be remembered that in the early months of the
Clark government's term in office, spot prices were climbing to their
peak of $40 per barrel, while the Canadian price was increased from
$10.98 per barrel to $11.85 on July 1, 1979 and $12.65 early in 1980.
Despite negotiations undertaken immediately with the
Conservative government under Premier Lougheed in Alberta, the
Conservative federal government was unable to design a pricing and
fiscal regime which was agreeable to the province in time for the
tabling of its first budget in December. Over the autumn, petroleum
pricing had become the subject of a public debate between Premiers
Davis of Ontario (also Conservative) and Lougheed of Alberta, and the
federal government was caught between its two major provincial
barons, unable to satisfy both at once. In Alberta, bumperstickers
on many cars read: "Let the eastern bastards freeze in the dark"
while the Ontario government tabled a policy paper in November
counselling the federal government to use its declaratory power (the
ability to pass any legislation as might be required to preserve
peace, order, and good government) to fulfil its responsibilities.53
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The federal Conservatives were, in principle, sympathetic to a
move toward higher prices, but wanted to maintain electoral support
in Ontario. Consequently, the Clark government initially offered
Alberta a major price hike, $5.20 per barrel a year, in exchange for
Alberta's agreement to recycle oil revenues through two new federal
institutions, the National Energy Bank and a Stabilisation Fund.
"Alberta refused to make an equity contribution to either, so the
federal government decreased its price offer to the $3.^5~3-90 range,
with the energy self-sufficiency tax...."5^ This tax was the key
issue in the defeat of the Crosbie budget tabled December 11.
Finance Minister John Crosbie proposed an increase of 15 cents
per gallon on the excise tax on refined petroleum products, the
"energy self-sufficiency tax", in order to encourage conservation and
provide the federal government with badly needed revenues for its
energy programs. The combined forces of the Liberals and NDP
defeated the Conservatives on the budget vote^, and the federal
election in February 1980 returned the Liberals to power with an
absolute Parliamentary majority. Ontario voters had been enraged by
the apparent capitulation of the Clark government to Lougheed as
evidenced in the $5.20 increase offer, and the election was lost in
Ontario ridings. The Liberals had lost 23 Ontario seats in the 1979
election, dropping from 55 to 32, while in I98O they captured 52
Ontario seats and 7^ of the 75 seats in Quebec.
As a party and as a government, the federal
Conservatives never quite came to grips with either
of the major planks of their energy policy -- Petro-
Canada and oil and gas pricing. This was, in part,
because the Progressive Conservative Party embodies
two major lines of division: the ideological cleavage
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between right-wing and moderate elements, and the
regional division between its Ontario and Alberta
power bases. For the Petro-Canada privatisation
issue, the right-wing-moderate cleavage was key; for
pricing, the Ontario-Alberta cleavage had primacy.^6
Back in office, the Liberal government wasted little time in
introducing its National Energy Program (NEP) as part of its first
budget which was tabled on October 28, 1980^7. The NEP was discussed
in more detail in Chapter 2, but basically it introduced federally
established pricing schedules which were to maintain Canadian
petroleum prices below world levels, and a new fiscal arrangement
under which the federal government was to receive a larger share of
the economic rent from petroleum exploitation. The impact of the NEP
on the producing provinces was that revenues declined. It was, in
part, a very obvious move by the federal government to reduce the
economic power of the producing provinces, particularly Alberta. A
subsidiary objective of the federal government was to mitigate the
political impact of a rapid increase in oil prices which otherwise
would have occurred under the Liberal regime. To this end, prices
were to increase gradually toward world levels in accordance with
schedules set by the federal government, although it intended to keep
Canadian prices below the world level.
"[Sjenior officials ... questioned their ministers as to how
firmly they were wedded to non-world-price scenarios. The reply was
emphatically that the Liberals' commitment to a blended 'made in
Canada' price was an unalterable one."5^ The rejection of world
market prices was made by ministers, overriding doubts expressed by
the bureaucracy, and the rationale was undoubtedly political rather
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than economic. The Liberals had just fought an election campaign
against the Conservatives, and had learned from their opponents'
mistakes. Carten suggested that the Liberal pricing regime would
achieve two objectives for the government: firstly, a direct transfer
of wealth to the consuming provinces (i.e. Ontario and Quebec) to
which it owed its Parliamentary majority; and secondly, the
imposition of a series of excise taxes on the lower priced petroleum
similar to a direct tax on provincial revenues^. in this way, the
federal government advanced its voter support and increased its
revenue base with which it could further increase its popularity. The
Liberal government was also interested in patriation of the Canadian
constitution in this period, and any assertion of central authority
was considered advantageous to its constitutional programme.
The NEP provoked a hostile reaction from the producing provinces
and the petroleum industry. Alberta Premier Lougheed imposed a
production cutback totalling 180,000 barrels per day in three stages
in order to force the federal government into negotiations over
pricing and fiscal arrangements. As in 197^-75. industry activity
slowed down and rigs once again moved south of the border. The lower
price combined with increased taxes made petroleum extraction in
Canada less profitable.
After the second production cutback in early 1981, the federal
government negotiated seriously with the province and a July meeting
between the two sides resulted in a compromise which was reasonably
satisfying to both sides. The federal single-price system was to be
abandoned for a more complex system of vintage pricing ('old' and
'new' oil would be differentially priced so as to reflect differing
costs of exploration and production, with new oil receiving
approximately the world price), and the scheduled increases were
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speeded up. The new pricing scheme and a new federal petroleum tax
were made official in the September 1981 Memorandum of Agreement on
Energy Pricing and Taxation (EPTA)^O signed between the federal and
Alberta governments. The EPTA was almost of greater benefit to the
province symbolically than in practice, as it confirmed the
province's ownership of the resource and gave Alberta a strong
negotiating position for further pricing arrangements. It also
reassured the Albertan public that its government could assert
provincial rights in the face of a centralising federal government.
However, the basic federal pricing policy remained intact as most
Canadian production was classified as 'old' oil, which price remained
under the international level.
The pricing schedules of the EPTA were based on the assumption
that world petroleum prices would continue to rise by 2% per annum in
real terms throughout the duration of the agreement, i.e., through to
December 31» 1986. This did not happen and the EPTA had to be
amended in June 1983 to reflect the softer pricing conditions in the
international market^"*". Two categories of oil were defined for
pricing purposes. Conventional old oil, discovered before 1974, had
a price frozen at $24.90 per barrel, about 83# of the world price,
while the new oil category was extended to all discoveries after 1973
and received the international price. "The effect of these measures
was that about 35# of Alberta oil would qualify for the world price.
Industry cashflow would increase by about $210 million, and both
governments would benefit from the stability created."
In September 1984, the Conservatives returned to power with a
large majority under their new leader, Brian Mulroney. The party had
campaigned in the west on a platform to dismantle the NEP. The new
Energy Minister, Patricia Carney, commenced formal negotiations with
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the governments of the producing provinces and the petroleum industry
almost immediately upon coming to office, and by early in the new
year, progress was being made^3. After eleventh hour negotiations
concerning taxes, on March 27, 1985. the Western Accord*^ was made
public. This was an agreement between the federal government and
the provinces of British Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan which
virtually eliminated the NEP. Prices for oil and gas were to be
deregulated and the fiscal regime established under the NEP
dismantled.
It is a great irony indeed that, in June 1985. the Canadian
government deregulated the price of oil, a mere six months before the
ultimate collapse of the international price. After a decade of
sustaining a price level below that realised in the international
market, the deregulation of petroleum prices in Canada coincided with
the most dramatic price decline ever. The economic rent which the
federal government had consistently allocated to Canadian petroleum
consumers in the face of producer discontent was vanishing even as
the producers celebrated their achievement of deregulation. The
federal government has not taken steps to support the price of
Canadian oil, whether consumed domestically or exported, although, in
1986, some industry representatives argued for a floor price for
Canadian production.
The competition between the federal and provincial levels of
government on the question of petroleum pricing is made
comprehensible if rational choice theory forms the basis of analysis.
Both levels of government are interested in attaining or retaining
office and the instruments which assist in that endeavor. Economic
rent from petroleum production is seen as an instrumental goal by
both governments and the competition for it is a zero-sum game in
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which the petroleum industry, and ultimately the Canadian consumer,
has lost. The federal government's policy of maintaining domestic
oil prices below the international level was a very obvious effort to
acquire voter support in the most populous provinces, and it
succeeded. Unfortunately, the cost was the lost opportunity of
maximum economic rent from oil production in the 1970s and early
1980s. Deregulation was implemented too late.
3. NORTH SEA PRICING POLICIES
"The future changes in the price of oil are as enigmatic to the
British and the Norwegians as to anybody else in the western world.
Both are essentially marginal producers, in the sense that their
volume of production makes up only a small fraction of the oil being
traded in the world market. They cannot control prices by their
level of output."^5 There is no doubt, however, that both the
British and the Norwegians have greatly influenced OPEC pricing
policies in the last few years. The growth in oil production in the
North Sea contributed to the erosion of OPEC's market share which
prompted the 1986 pricing crisis. It is from North Sea producers
that OPEC has actively sought cooperation in limiting the
international oil supply since 1985. Consequently, the pricing and
depletion policies of the U.K. and Norway have been of great interest
to OPEC and the rest of the world. Although they appear to differ
markedly on the question of depletion, the two governments of the
North Sea producing countries have implemented similar pricing
policies which are administered differently but have similar
objectives and results.
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Taxes are paid on company profits and on oil produced, and in
both cases relate directly to the price at which the oil is bought or
sold. Because most of the large oil companies are vertically
integrated, their downstream (or refining) operations could purchase
crude at artificially low prices from their upstream (or
exploration/production) operations for the purposes of V.* W<biW-Vies.
Consequently, the concept of the 'posted' or tax reference price, as
discussed in Chapter 2, became the norm in OPEC countries and in oil
producing countries where large multinationals have integrated
operations. The posted price is a tax reference price which
eliminates the possibility of low transfer prices (the price at which
petroleum is transferred between various arms of the company) within
integrated companies. It also reduces the possibility of
disagreements over tax assessments between companies and governments.
Posted prices can, however, vary substantially from market prices
occasionally, and the former are consequently adjusted upward or
downward by the government as the situation necessitates.
Prior to 197^. the British government did not differentiate
between the transfer price and a possible posted price for oil — the
government merely accepted the companies' transfer prices as the
price base on which taxes would be calculated. In Norway at this
time, legislation provided for negotiations on price to take place
between the companies and the government to decide on a posted price
as closely related as possible to the market price. "If the
government and the companies were unable to agree, the government had
the right to establish the value of oil in accordance with the
equitable market price. It has been argued that the Norwegian
government legally would have the right to use, for example, the OPEC
posted price as its tax base."^
225
In Britain after the Second World War, the government's
objective in energy pricing policies was to protect the coal industry
in the face of competition from less expensive imported oil^.
However, from the mid-1950s, consumption of coal declined rapidly and
demand for petroleum increased to the point that it provided 47% of
zro
UK primary energy consumption by 1973 • With increasing demand for
oil, the British government was anxious to develop its petroleum
resources as rapidly as possible. In order to encourage investment
in the North Sea, the British government initially offered generous
licensing conditions, lenient taxation, and world prices to companies
interested in offshore exploration within its territories. "All
United Kingdom Governments have agreed that North Sea oil should be
priced at its world market value even for domestic sales."^9
After the 1973 price increases, the government devised a new
fiscal regime and introduced the British National Oil Corporation,
but retained liberal licensing procedures and the world price
(especially attractive in a market in which it was rising
dramatically) to sustain development. The objectives of the new
fiscal terms and the national oil company were to ensure that the
British nation would receive a share of the windfall profits to be
made on the increasing economic rent to be had from oil exploitation,
and, at the same time, to secure a government presence in North Sea
operations. Later, as a result of participation agreements with the
companies involved, BNOC was to assume the role of oil trader with a
right to purchase 51% of the oil produced in the North Sea and an
opportunity to sell it back to the companies at the same price. The
price at which it purchased and resold the oil was the world price,
or rather a price determined by third-party contractual arrangements
for various qualities of North Sea crudes. BNOC was not involved in
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price-setting; it merely sold the oil back to the refining interests
in Britain at the same price at which it had purchased. Although
BNOC could have influenced the price of British oil simply as a
consequence of the large volumes it was trading in the late 1970s,
there is no evidence to suggest that it did so, nor that it had a
mandate to do so. Its primary role was to secure British petroleum.
BNOC's oil trading competence was called into question in the
early 1980s when it was purchasing North Sea crude in an
international market of declining price. As discussed in Chapter 3.
BNOC was selling its supplies at a loss due to long-term purchasing
agreements and its inability to attain the price it originally paid
when it came to resell the oil. The controversy which arose
coincided with the implementation of the Thatcher government's
privatisation programme, and BNOC was eventually privatised totally
in 1985. The government then established the Oil Trading Authority
to retain its ability to secure supplies of North Sea production in
times of emergency, but it continued to allow British oil to be sold
at world prices. The British government has taken no action to
support the international price of oil in the current environment of
depression. This might be considered a further indication that the
essential purpose of BNOC was not to influence the price of oil, but
to secure supplies.
The British oil price was therefore not set administratively, as
it was in Norway. Rather, British oil is taxed on the price
determined in an open market contract — an arm's length transaction.
With BNOC actively trading 51# of British North Sea production,
verification or administrative enquiry into these contractual prices
was unnecessary. "The contract price is the only price reference;
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the terms of sale are not to be influenced by any commercial
relationship between the buyer and the seller; the seller is to have
no direct or indirect interest in the further disposal of the oil."7®
"It has been stated explicitly as official policy [in Norway]
that the prices of North Sea petroleum products used by households
and firms should equal world prices."^ As mentioned earlier, the
Norwegian government initially negotiated with the companies to
determine an appropriate posted price; but just as in the British
case, it reflected the international market value of oil.
The Norwegian Labour government of 197^. like the British,
introduced a new fiscal regime in the wake of the OPEC price
developments, but, unlike the British, its new tax system was
accompanied by a new pricing system. Norwegian oil production was to
be taxed on the 'norm' price for oil. "It is defined as the real
market price of the same type of crude over a given period as
determined by independent traders in a free market. It has been
explicitly stated that the purpose of the norm price is not to
increase taxes but rather to avoid long arguments with the companies.
In this respect the Norwegian norm price differs from the posted
price used in OPEC countries prior to 197^-"^ The government
reserved the right to decide the price of oil unilaterally, but the
norm price was in effect an administrative tool by which market
prices would be monitored and averaged out for tax reference
purposes. It was set quarterly by the Petroleum Price Board in US
dollars (converted to Norwegian kroner for taxation purposes), and
the decisions of the Board could be appealed to the Ministry of
Petroleum and Energy by the companies involved^. Statoil had
nothing to do with the determination of the norm price, although as a
dominant force in the Norwegian petroleum sector, it produces and
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disposes of a large proportion of Norwegian oil and therefore
assisted in the implmentation of the norm price policy. It had a
similar position to that of BNOC in its oil trading capacity.
However, the fact that the Norwegian government established its own
form of posted price indicates that it had less faith than the
British government in the ability of the national petroleum company
or the bureaucracy to verify arms' length contractual prices.
Perhaps the Norwegian government was also hesitant to place yet more
regulatory power in Statoil. In the end, the result of its norm
price policy was not dissimilar to the British pricing policy.
On October 15, 1984, Norway reduced its norm price (via an
announcement by Statoil of a new price for its contracts) by $1.35
per barrel^. The norm price structure was officially abandoned by
the Norwegian government on January 14, 1985'-*. Uncertainty in the
international petroleum market with regard to future price trends led
to this initiative. The price war which developed between the North
Sea producers and OPEC must have made impossible the administration
of the norm price policy. Once Norway had reduced the price of its
oil, Britain had to follow to remain competitive, and although
official OPEC prices were maintained, spot prices followed the North
Sea trend as well. As discussed in the section on OPEC, a price war
is like a game of chicken, where players hope to outlast each other
— maintaining their market share despite losses on price, while
avoiding catastrophe — price collapse or resource exhaustion.
OPEC warned the North Sea producers about the consequences of
not limiting their production in the interests of maintaining the
international price level, and efforts were made to open negotiations
between the OPEC and North Sea producers. Norway initially refused
discussion with OPEC officials, but some contact was made after a
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change of government which brought the Labour party back into office
in May 1986. It is likely that the reduction of the international
price below $10 per barrel in April further encouraged the Labour
government to negotiate with OPEC. The Norwegian administration
appealed to Britain to open similar talks, although the former
refused to agree publicly to cut production to support the
international price. The British government refused, and shortly
thereafter Norway restricted exports in an effort to reduce the
oversupply which was depressing the international price^.
Despite the Norwegian initiatives, the British government
remained committed to free market principles and refused to support
either the OPEC cartel or the price of its own oil. Although each
reduction of $1.00 in the price of oil reduced U.K. government
revenue by $285-^30 million per year, the government continued to
stress publicly the benefits of the lower price of oil on the
inflation rate and the reduction of unemployment^?.
The United Kingdom and Norway have very similar interests and
concerns when it comes to petroleum pricing. The geographical
situation of the resource is identical and its relatively recent
development has meant that exploitation is a costly and risky
business. Although the macro-economic and social impact of petroleum
development varies greatly between the two countries, pricing
policies for both have been determined by the international petroleum
market. However, "...both countries have a vested interest that OPEC
does not break down, with a collapse of the oil price. It is equally
important for both countries that the OECD economies do not suffer an
economic setback because of a scarcity of oil, or because of a sudden
jump in the price of oil."?® OPEC is not entirely broken, and the
OECD countries are currently enjoying the benefits of low cost energy
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which should greatly enhance their economic performance. Both
Britain and Norway have attempted to walk the fine line between the
maximisation of their interests as oil producers and the maximisation
of their interests as members of the consumer community. The result
has been the enjoyment of high oil prices when the international
market has so dictated, and the acceptance of low oil prices as is
the present case. On close examination, there appears very little
difference indeed between the two countries on pricing policy.
CONCLUSION
The petroleum pricing policies of Canada, the United Kingdom,
and Norway are indicative of the political objectives of each
government. Canada, as the only state which had a policy of
government established prices below those of the international
market, has been the clear loser in financial terms. Neither federal
nor provincial governments nor the petroleum industry were able to
capture the maximum economic rent from the exploitation of the
resource in the 1970s, and deregulation coincided with the collapse
of the international price of oil. Britain and Norway, on the other
hand, implemented pricing policies based on the international market
price for petroleum initially due to the necessity of a high price to
encourage investment in a costly exploration and development
situation. Both states subsequently utilised their fiscal regimes to
capture the economic rent in the course of production and sale of
petroleum. However, the price of petroleum was not a political issue
of the same magnitude in the North Sea states as in Canada.
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The federal division of powers was the necessary condition for
the development of the federal/provincial conflict over petroleum
pricing and fiscal arrangements which was a striking feature of
Canadian politics throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. This
conflict centred on which level of government should have ultimate
responsibility for the determination of natural resource pricing and
taxation, but the controversy did not concern merely the federal and
producer governments alone. Consumers and the electorate were also
involved. The majority of Canadian voters reside in Ontario and
Quebec, so federal elections are won and lost in eastern Canada. The
bulk of Canadian petroleum consumption also occurs there.
Consequently, the price of petroleum became a crucial issue in both
Liberal and Conservative federal governments' attempts to retain
office and this complicated intergovernmental relations with the
producing provinces. Both parties, once in power in Ottawa, found
themselves caught between the interests of Alberta and Ontario, and,
regardless of the party affiliations of those two provincial
governments, found the conflict difficult to manage.
The retention of office in the federal government was more
important for both parties than the capture of maximum economic rent
through increased petroleum prices. Consequently, both parties
attempted to appease the large voting population in Ontario and
Quebec which inevitably alienated western Canadians. Canadian
petroleum pricing policy was directed toward reducing the impact of
the OPEC price revolution on the consuming population by keeping
Canadian petroleum prices well below world levels. Once the issue
had faded from the immediate public agenda, in the mid 1970s and
again in the mid-1980s, the federal government was able to move
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toward world prices, either through price increases or through total
deregulation, in order to appease producer interests (both government
and industry).
The Canadian government was able to use petroleum pricing policy
for political ends for two reasons. Firstly, because the petroleum
industry was well established in the producing provinces, the
government, unlike the British and Norwegian governments, did not
have to introduce incentives for investment in petroleum development.
Secondly, there was a tradition of federal intervention in provincial
natural resource development in the implementation of the 1961 NOP
and even earlier, because the federal government retained authority
over natural resources after the creation of the western provinces.
Although this authority was relinquished in the 1930 Natural
Resources Acts, which returned the power to the provincial
governments of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta, it left a legacy
of expectation of federal intervention in natural resource
development, bitterly remembered in the west.
None of the conditions which required and allowed for the
political use of pricing policy were present in Britain and Norway.
Neither state had a federal arrangement which complicated
jurisdiction over natural resources; both central governments were
entirely responsible for the development of petroleum policies.
Unlike Canada, both states had an exploration and development
situation which required huge sums of capital investment and
consequently both governments had to introduce incentives to
encourage investment. Part of the incentive to invest was a
guarantee of world prices for the product, of no great significance
in the 1960s, but crucial in the 1970s and 1980s when production came
onstream. With the emergence of enormous economic rent potential,
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prices were allowed to rise and the capture of that rent was made
principally through the fiscal system. As prices declined, the North
Sea governments lost a large share of the revenues to which they had
become accustomed, but nonetheless, neither has attempted to sustain
price levels through new pricing policies for domestic consumption or
for export, although Norway encouraged cooperation with OPEC on
production through the restriction of exports in late 1986.
In conclusion, all three states had the sovereign right to
determine the price of their natural resources, but different
political and historical circumstances in Canada resulted in
petroleum prices being held below the international levels by the
federal government. Both the United Kingdom and Norway based their
prices on those in the international market, and the principal
difference between the two states' policies was an administrative
one, with Norway having utilised the 'norm' price system from 1974-
1984 while Britain relied on contractual prices throughout. The end
result was the same: world prices for North Sea production which
encouraged investment in North Sea petroleum and now necessitates
some readjustment of government balance sheets. In all three cases
the party allegiance and, indeed the party election manifesto, has
not been the crucial factor in the fundamental policy options chosen.
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Depletion policies regulate the development and production of a
non-renewable resource such as petroleum. There are several
different reasons why the owners of such resources might wish to
implement depletion policies. Firstly, there may be some
consideration for the future consumers of the resource; conservation
of some level of future supplies may seem a responsible and prudent
policy. Secondly, conservative depletion policies may be necessary
to maximise the ultimate retrieval of the resource. Future
developments in technology might allow for greater extraction of the
resource in total. Thirdly, depletion policies may be used to
support high price levels; by reducing production and restricting
supply, the owners might increase their immediate return by receiving
higher prices for their product.
However, regulation is a broad concept and can be approached
from several different perspectives.
One can view regulation in several ways... For
example, one can visualise it in relation to
government efforts to affect conduct at the various
'stages' in the production cycle of the industry.
Thus regulation occurs at the point of initial
exploration, at later development and production
stages and in the transportation and marketing
stage.... A second way to view regulation is to
visualise 'types of behaviour' that regulation is
attempting to affect, such as 'policing' versus
'developmental' behaviour. Regulation can be
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directed towards 'preventing' things from happening,
in short a policing function, or a public utility
style of regulation designed to prevent abuses of
monopoly power such as in the case of pipelines.
Developmental regulation, on the other hand, involves
an attempt to induce/require certain positive kinds
of preferred behaviour as well."*"
Government depletion policies concern the encouragement, in the
various stages of the petroleum production cycle, of preferred
behaviour on the part of the petroleum industry by governments. Thus
depletion policies can be examined through the various regulations on
petroleum exploration, development, and marketing in addition to
production, or they may be more narrowly (and commonly) considered
solely in the terms of promulgated production policies. This chapter
proposes to concentrate on the latter interpretation in the cases of
Britain and Norway where such policies are a matter of public record,
but will have to explore some aspects of Canadian petroleum
regulation in order to determine what, if any, depletion policy
exists in Canada. In addition, the licensing regimes in all three
states will be examined as a less explicit demonstration of
government attitudes regarding resource development.
The depletion rate of an exhaust!ble natural resource is of
vital importance to governments which own or control such resources.
It directly affects the length of time during which production is
economic and profitable, and it is in turn affected by changes in
price, production costs, and technological advances, all of which
influence estimates of reserves and production rates. Depletion does
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not only concern production rates, but is also closely related to
exploration rates and the investment environment. It influences and
is influenced by these latter two factors.
There are several policy mechanisms which may be employed to
determine depletion rates. A government can dictate a level of
production over the natural resource. This is a very public form of
regulation, demanding constant assessment of the relative advantages
and disadvantages of various production levels and leaving the
government directly accountable for the impact of the production
level. In a less explicit depletion policy, governments can create a
more or less attractive environment for exploration by utilising a
lenient or stringent licensing procedure for exploration, or by
determining prices for the resource either above or below the
international price. In addition, they can encourage or discourage
investment by imposing a lenient or stringent fiscal regime on
production. Governments may also employ regulatory bodies to affect
the behaviour of the petroleum industry. This approach enhances the
relative influence of the bureaucracy and allows the government to
distance itself, if necessary, from the policy.
Depletion policy, in the sense of production regulation by
government, did not exist prior to the first OPEC pricing crisis.
Before the early 1970s, a concessionary system of licensing was
employed not only in the Middle East but also in North America and
other petroleum-producing regions. In these concessions, oil
companies (usually the large multinationals) were leased large tracts
of territory by the owner for the exploration and production of such
petroleum resources as might be found. The companies determined both
the rates of exploration and of production and, in exchange, the
owners of the resource were given a revenue share through nominal
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payments made for the concession and a royalty paid either in like or
kind. The advantage of the concessionary system to both parties was
clear: owners of resources without means to develop them were able to
gain some benefit from production by others, and those with the
expertise but not the ownership were allowed to exploit the
resources.
The consequence of the concessionary system was that the large
multinationals were almost in the position to take independent
decisions over the exploration, production, and sale of petroleum
products without actually owning the resource, although there was
usually consultation with the owners. It was in fact the frustration
of OPEC producers in the face of a price cut made unilaterally by the
oil companies which spurred OPEC into action on petroleum pricing and
state participation.
"The case for government depletion controls in theory is based
on the assertion that an imperfect industry is unlikely to bring
p
about an optimal depletion rate." A calculation of the optimal
depletion rate depends on the interests of the party making the
calculation. Governments will vary in their calculations from as
rapid development as possible to a very conservative rate. In the
case of the Middle East and North African concessions, the companies
were seen by governments as depleting the resources too quickly, thus
contributing to an oversupply in the international market and
undesirable price reductions. The rationale behind OPEC's actions in
the 1970s was to achieve a reasonable petroleum price for its members
by collectively agreeing a policy over petroleum resources and
establishing a price for OPEC oil which was unrelated to
exploration/production costs. Later, OPEC unsuccessfully attempted
to restrict production in order to sustain its price levels. In this
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case, production policy was not concerned with the conservation of a
depleting resource, but was rather an instrument of pricing policy.
However, the original impetus to OPEC action in the early 1970s was
the virtually unrestricted control over petroleum resources which was
exercised by the oil companies in the concessionary arrangements.
Governments which implement depletion policies are indicating
that the production rates established freely by petroleum companies
in their territories are in some way unsatisfactory. Governments of
producer countries, whether OPEC members or not, tend to have
different objectives in mind concerning the speed of production and
therefore employ a discount rate on petroleum investment which is
different from that of the private industry. The general assumption
is that governments will tend to deplete resources more slowly than
will the industry largely because of concerns regarding the
political, economic, and social impact of petroleum development which
may not be considered important from the industry's viewpoint.
"However, the oligopolistic oil industry does not necessarily
deplete resources 'too fast'.... Oligopolies tend to price higher
and fix output lower than in a competitive market situation [in order
to sustain a desired price level] resulting in a tendency to deplete
oil 'too slowly'."3 The general assumption that the petroleum
industry is solely interested in maximum production rates clearly
ignores its interest in a premium price for its product. There may
be equally strong incentives for reducing output in order to secure
certain price levels or continuity of activity in the longer term,
especially in a market made imperfect by producers joining together
to advance their interests (i.e. maximise their profit). Even if it
could be proven that the private industry does not deplete natural
resources more rapidly than government, all things being equal, the
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rhetoric of depletion control is based on the assumption that it
does. This is because the general assumption is that governments are
unified bodies interested in maximising the public interest.
Rational choice theory challenges that assumption by suggesting that
governments are comprised of self-interested actors who are in
competition with each other for scarce political and economic
resources. In consequence, the 'public interest' is often defined by
the interests of dominant political actors.
For the petroleum industry, the expected rate of return must at
least equal the average rate of return on investment elsewhere in the
economy. For governments, there is likely to be greater interest in
the social rate of return which is influenced by the absorptive
capacity of the economy. "In other words, the greater the potential
for using the revenue in the domestic economy, the higher the
expected social rate of return."^ If the domestic economy cannot
absorb petroleum revenues effectively and such revenues must be
invested outside the domestic economy, a slower depletion rate might
be the optimal policy for the government. If the domestic economy
can be buoyed by petroleum revenues, or if the government can make
political gains from the acquisition and/or employment of such
revenues, then a more rapid depletion rate would be expected.
The ^o\vYui*\ rate of return is largely determined by macro-
economic factors such as the balance-of-payments position and the
exchange rate. From the rational choice perspective, governments
would implement depletion policies to maximise their revenues
whenever possible. Depending on the trends in the international
price, the domestic political and economic situation, and the
estimates of petroleum reserves, a more rapid depletion policy would
be chosen over a conservative one in the case of a government with a
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high ^olvWcftA rate of return. Governments with low pc4iW_c. rates of
return, i.e., which cannot productively utilise huge amounts of
revenue, would be more likely to implement conservative depletion
policies. However, political and social considerations will strongly
influence the the government's preferred rate of resource
development.
Regional, social and environmental effects related to
oil are determined by the rate of extraction. It can
generally be assumed that these spin-off effects can
be handled best when the economy is prepared for the
new market and its impact of the infrastructure and
the environment. These considerations imply control
and they theoretically tend to lower the social rate
of return expected by governments.5
However, it is arguable that given the short time horizons of
governments in democratic countries (ie., a maximum of four to five
years between elections), particular governments might have a shorter
term view than an industry which is counting on making profits from
petroleum investments for far longer than five years. The
uncertainty of price in the petroleum market since the OPEC
revolution has been a further incentive for governments to encourage
rapid exploration and production -- the bird in the hand philosophy.
Therefore a government with an extremely high potOVicm discount rate
might tend towards a more rapid depletion of the resource than would
the industry.
The petroleum industry is concerned not only with profits
available from exploitation, but also with the discovery of
additional reserves in order that future profits may be made.
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Governments, on the other hand, may be constrained in the formulation
of depletion policies by pressing political, economic, and social
concerns which have little to do with the "repletion" rate. In terms
of political rhetoric, governments tend to be primarily concerned
with reducing depletion rates rather than increasing repletion rates.
This is partly because the public is more interested in conservation
— the preservation of resources already available — than in
exploration — the discovery of future potential. The public may be
partly interested in the preservation of the resource for future
generations, or it may prefer to prolong the productivity of a known
commodity at known prices to the uncertainty of the future. An
indication of the government's true objectives in the exploitation of
public resources is whether political rhetoric and policy match.
Depletion policies give information about the social discount
rate and they may also indicate the relative bargaining position of
the government in relation to the industry. "A government opting for
a high rate of extraction will necessarily be more exposed to the
demands and needs of private companies controlling the relevant
technology than a government opting for a low rate of extraction."
Governments may also be largely dependent on the petroleum industry
for the information necessary for the design of a depletion strategy,
unless a public petroleum corporation is at their disposal. There
are also uncertainties in the size and future economic viability of
reserves which "...cast doubt on the government's ability to alter
depletion rates to achieve an optimal outcome — even if one was
theoretically attainable.In addition to illuminating other
petroleum policies such as price and marketing, depletion policies
can be an indicator of government priorities in resource development
and in relations with the private industry.
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As mentioned, depletion policy can be examined from the broad
perspective of government regulation of all aspects of petroleum
activity, or it may be evident in production policies alone. In the
former case, all regulatory activity undertaken by the state has an
effect on the rates of the exploration for and development of the
resource. In the case of Canada, which has no production policy,
regulations concerning the acquisition of exploration licences, the
prorationing system in Alberta, and export policy changes will be
examined in order to identify Canadian depletion policy. Both the
U.K. and Norway have public production policies which can serve as
indicators of their respective depletion policies, but it is
important to examine their production records in order to assess the
impact of these policies. The licensing system will provide an
initial and common basis of comparison between the three countries on
the question of depletion policy.
1. LICENSING PROCEDURES IN CANADA, BRITAIN, AND NORWAY
Exploration licensing can be considered an important factor in
the overall depletion policy of a petroleum producing country. As
mentioned earlier, the old concessionary system in effect handed over
all depletion decisions to the multinational petroleum companies.
The number and size of exploratory licences, and the frequency of
their allocation, must, by definition, affect the possibility of
petroleum discoveries and their subsequent development. A lenient
licensing regime therefore would be an indication of a high polvnCaA.
discount rate and a depletion policy favouring rapid exploitation.
2^7
Licenses for petroleum exploration are generally allocated in
one of two ways: either by competitive bidding in an auction or by
discretionary allocation by the government.
In a competitive auction each bidder gains by
giving up more expected economic rent to the point
where all the expected economic rent has been
captured by the government.... Over time as bidders
acquire information and expertise the difference
between expected and realised economic rent would
tend to diminish. Thus the auction system.., by
employing the price mechanism, enables the government
to capture the maximum economic rent as well as
ensuring economic efficiency in that the successful
bidder will be the lowest cost bidder.
In a discretionary allocation system licences are
awarded on the basis of a set of criteria established
by the government. These criteria may include
political or bureaucratic considerations and may be
o
discriminatorily enforced.
The discretionary system has the additional advantage in that it is a
very public means of controlling the allocation of exploration
licences. The government can be seen to favour domestic firms over
large multinationals and it can impose conditions on the exploitation
of petroleum resources by altering the criteria on which various
applicants are assessed. In short, the discretionary system of
allocating licences emphasises government control, whereas the
auction system maximises the capture of economic rent.
However, the two are not mutually exclusive. Auction systems of
licence awards are often supplemented by specific requirements built
into the licence contracts. The discretionary system can be
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associated with a more stringent fiscal regime designed to capture
the economic rent. The choice of the method employed indicates the
interests a government has in public perceptions of control and
maximum revenue.
A. Canada
Petroleum production in Canada began in Alberta in the early
part of this century; Canadian procedures for the licensing of
petroleum exploration were initially designed for that province. The
licensing system in Alberta (and subsequently the other petroleum
producing provinces) is based on auction and is often referred to as
a bonus bid system. At regular intervals, the provincial government
publishes a list of various blocks to be put up for auction.
Petroleum companies then submit sealed bids for exploration blocks to
the provincial government. The company with the highest bid is
awarded the exploration licence. In addition to the bonus payment
(or auction bid, whichever it is termed), the company must pay the
government a rental fee and a royalty on production. In Alberta,
royalties are based on a sliding scale depending on the rate of
production and the time of discovery.
In addition to the licensing regime, the Alberta government
created the Turner Valley Gas Conservation Board in 1932 to control
the flaring of natural gas in the Turner Valley oilfield^. In 1938,
the Petroleum and Natural Gas Conservation Board was established
(renamed the Energy Resources Conservation Board — ERCB — in 1975)
in order ensure effective conservation of Alberta's petroleum
resources-*-^. Its responsibilities include the evaluation of
applications for new or expanded energy projects, the regulation of
existing energy facilities, and the provision of a data base
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regarding Alberta's energy resources. With regard to petroleum, the
ERCB assesses the site and proposed facilities for all wells drilled
within the province, and regulates drilling and petroleum production
so that technical and engineering standards are maintained and
reservoir life is maximised. The ERCB monitors all petroleum
production in the province and also maintains a comprehensive data
base on Alberta petroleum geology. It also administers Alberta's
prorationing scheme in which individual wells are allowed to produce
at certain rates depending on the geological and engineering
particulars of the project. The objective is to maximise reservoir
life rather than to restrict the flow of petroleum on to the market
for strategic purposes.
At the federal level, a regulatory system quite different than
that which exists at the provincial level was introduced by the
1 1
Canada Oil and Gas Lands regulations of 1961 .
The COGL provided for a system of long-term
exploration permits and production leases. The
exploration permits were available for a nominal sum
and were generally issued on a first come, first
served basis. The permits were for a definite term
(usually nine to twelve years) but were for
exploration rights only. These permits could be
renewed but at the sole discretion of, and on terms
set by, Ottawa. Any subsequent production
arrangements under COGL were provided through
1 P
separately negotiated leases.
The leniency of the Canada Lands licensing regime is an
indication of the desire on the part of the Canadian government to
encourage petroleum exploration in a forbidding environment. The
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lack of competitive auctions in the award of exploration licences is
a significant departure from the regime established in Alberta. The
length of the licences was generous, although only renewable at the
discretion of the federal department of Energy, Mines, and Resources.
However, the terms were retroactively changed once petroleum
extraction in these areas was well-established. In 1977 Petro-Canada
received a 25# working interest in renewed Canada Lands exploration
licences, and in the National Energy Program 1980, this provision was
modified to a carried interest so that Petro-Can did not immediately
have to pay its share of historical exploration expenses. The COGL
regulations were also modified in the NEP so that the federal
government obtained an automatic 50% share in any area designated for
production. This retroactive imposition of government participation
on the Canada Lands regime was viewed by the petroleum industry as
confiscatory and unfair, and was seen by the American government
particularly as a provocative initiative on the part of the Canadian
government. However, it demonstrated the federal government's
interest in maximum participation once exploratory interest had been
secured.
The National Energy Board (NEB) was created in 1959 on the
recommendation of the Borden Commission enquiring into energy and the
Canadian national interest^. In 1957. John Diefenbaker, leader of
the Conservative Party, called for the establishment of a national
authority to regulate energy. After the Conservatives were returned
to power later in the year, his government established a Royal
Commission on Energy under Henry Borden; one of its terms of
reference was to enquire into the desirable extent of the authority
vested in such a body. The resulting legislation proposed an
independent authority with powers to licence the imports and exports
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of natural gas and exports of electricity as well as evaluating the
building of interprovincial and international pipelines. The Board
was required to hold public hearings on major issues which came
before it, and it was expected to perform advisory functions for the
government on all energy matters. The NEB today performs many of the
same functions at the federal level as the ERCB at the Alberta level.
It has responsibility for monitoring and reporting to the government
on all federal aspects of energy, not only those pertaining to
petroleum matters. Its regulatory functions include controlling the
transportation, import, and export of energy and setting utility
rates and tariffs.
It seems clear that the NEB's decisions are not based on a
conservative notion of depletion. It authorises exports of petroleum
whenever domestic supplies and reserves are plentiful. It has only
limited exports immediately following the two OPEC crises in order to
safeguard domestic supplies. In its own literature, the NEB appears
proud of the increase in Canadian energy exports.
Exports of natural gas climbed from 3-1 billion cubic
metres in i960 to a peak of 28.3 billion cubic metres
in 1979 and then declined [as a result of an increase
in U.S. production] to 20.2 billion cubic metres in
1983. Oil exports soared from 7*1 million cubic
metres in i960 to a high of some 80.5 million cubic
metres in 1973 and subsequently declined sharply as
Canada directed a growing share of its production for
domestic consumption. In 1983. oil exports amounted
to 30-2 million cubic metres. Over this period, from
i960 to 1983, Canada's net exports of electricity
increased from around 5.000 gigawatt hours to more
than 35,000.14
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This is hardly the tone of a body concerned primarily with the
conservation of Canada's energy resources. However, when imported
supplies are threatened, the NEB can and has restricted exports of
domestic production of all energy sources.
After assurances made as late as June 1971 by the federal Energy
Minister, Joe Green, that Canada had "...923 years of reserve oil and
392 years of reserve gas...at 1970 production rates, reserves
were revised downward in the early 1970s. By the time of the first
OPEC price crisis, it was apparent that Canadian petroleum supplies
were not as inexhaustible as they had seemed but two years earlier.
However, approximately 50% of Canadian oil production was then being
exported and about 45% of requirements were being imported at rapidly
increasing prices^. The federal government consequently restricted
exports to the US in an attempt to safeguard supplies for Canadian
use. In response to this federal initiative, the Alberta government
established the Alberta Petroleum Marketing Commission (APMC) in
order to strengthen its control over petroleum within its borders^.
The ApMC sets the prices for oil differentials within Alberta and
18
according to the Mines and Minerals Amendment Act proclaimed by the
Albertan government in December 1973. all producers within the
province are required to sell their oil through the marketing
commission.
In October 1974, the NEB warned that Canadian oil supplies were
inadequate to serve Canadian markets and that exports should be
phased out^9. By 1976, when the federal government published its
PO
Energy Strategy policy statement , the government's primary concern
was the safeguarding of Canadian supplies and the reduction of
Canada's reliance on insecure foreign imports. The government made
several proposals to achieve these objectives, including appropriate
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energy pricing, energy conservation, and increased incentives for
exploration and production. The government acknowledged that energy
self-sufficiency (complete satisfaction of domestic requirements from
domestic production) could not be realised by 1990, but that energy
self-reliance (significantly reduced dependence on imported sources)
was a realistic goal.
Despite growing concerns over Canada's ability to satisfy its
energy needs throughout the 1970s, no rationing schemes of any kind
over production or consumption were ever implemented. In the
n A
National Energy Program 1980 , a certain emphasis was laid on oil
substitution, greater efficiency in petroleum use, and greater
conservation efforts. However, the government did not impose
exploration or production restraints, nor did it allow the price of
Canadian petroleum to rise to international levels which certainly
would have impacted consumption.
In 1980, after the introduction of the NEP, the Alberta
government implemented actual production cutbacks. As discussed in
Chapter 4, Premier Lougheed announced a total production cutback of
180,000 barrels per day in supplies destined for eastern Canada in
response to the unilateral introduction by the federal government of
the National Energy Program . This cutback was to be administered
through the ERCB's authority over prorationing in Albertan wells, and
was to occur in three stages of 60,000 barrels every three months.
The first two cutbacks were implemented, but the third was
forestalled by the Alberta-federal agreement on energy pricing and
taxation reached in September 1981^3. This action had nothing to do
with petroleum conservation or a depletion policy; it was a strategic
ploy designed to bring the federal government back into serious
negotiations with Alberta. However, it demonstrated that the
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Albertan government had the power, in addition to the constitutional
authority, to cut petroleum production when it desired. This power
has never been used for purposes of conserving the resource;
depletion policy has not been a concern in Alberta.
In short, depletion policy in terms of production cutbacks or
controls does not exist and has never existed in Canada either at the
provincial or the federal level. However, both levels of government
have taken appropriate means of regulating the petroleum industry
with regard to exploration licensing and production rates to promote
good engineering practice and the preservation of reservoir life.
With existing regulatory bodies and legislation, the option of
designing and implementing a conservative depletion policy exists in
Canada, but both the Alberta and the Canadian governments have chosen
to ignore depletion policy in favour of encouraging energy
conservation at the consumption end of the market. This is partly a
consequence of the historical development of petroleum policy in
Canada in addi+ion to the obvious political costs of a federal
depletion policy which would challenge public expectations.
According to National Energy Board statistics, Canadian oil
reserves have remained at a life index (a ratio of reserves to
production) of approximately ten to twelve years for the decade
commencing in 1973 despite a continual decline of estimated
oli
established reserves . This indicates that estimated reserve
additions are largely matching production rates. With regard to
natural gas, the life index hovers at approximately twenty-five
years. Therefore it could be argued by either governments or the
industry that a depletion policy is not necessary in Canada. Market
forces are apparently ensuring a continued supply of petroleum. The
recent collapse of the international price will no doubt affect the
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attractiveness of investment in Canadian petroleum exploration, and
should these life indices deteriorate substantially, the government
may well be compelled to consider a more conservative depletion
policy. For Canadian oil producers or government officials,
depletion only refers to the depletion allowance granted for
petroleum taxation purposes.
Canadian political rhetoric about oil consumption conflicts
directly with the federal policy of maintaining the price of Canadian
crude below the international level. The best way of restricting
consumption of a product is to increase its price. If the federal
government was seriously concerned with the efficient use of Canadian
oil supplies, prices would have been allowed to rise along with the
international price. The policy of a made-in-Canada price no doubt
affected the consumption of Canadian petroleum, although the extent
to which it did so cannot be measured. Not only does the Canadian
government not have a depletion policy concerning production, but in
actual fact it has clearly been less concerned with restricting
consumption than the policy statements would indicate. Canadian oil
and gas has been produced and consumed with little regard for longer-
term supply issues. The only real restriction ever imposed was on
exports to the United States.
B. The United Kingdom
The exploration licensing regimes of the United Kingdom and
Norway were formulated in the 1960s after large discoveries of gas
were found off ^oUcuruL The North Sea as a potentially rich
petroleum-bearing site then became of great interest to petroleum
corporations. Both governments had to decide rapidly on the means
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which would be employed to licence exploration activity. Both
governments were also interested in retaining, as far as possible,
maximum control over the development of petroleum resources.
In the U.K. , the Petroleum (Production) Act 19342^ set out the
regulations under which onshore petroleum activity would take place,
and in the Continental Shelf Act 196426, these licensing provisions
were extended to the offshore. Under the 1934 regulations, companies
were able to make uninvited, non-competitive applications for areas
of exploration interest to them. Conditions of the licence such as
safety requirements were incorporated into standard clauses in the
licenses, but in general terms, the acquisition of a petroleum
exploration licence was not an onerous task. In the Continental
Shelf Act, the licensing system was left largely intact but an
important change was made in the method of licence allocation.
"Instead of leaving it to companies to apply for production licences
at the times and for the areas that they might themselves determine,
we divided our designated areas into blocks of an average size of 250
square kilometers and provided for the grant of licences only after
licensing 'rounds' in which the blocks chosen by the government would
be offered for application by the companies."2^ By restricting
exploration and production licences, the government took the power to
make decisions on which areas would be open for exploration at which
times. However, further government control was put in place by the
choice of the discretionary method of licence award rather than the
award by competitive auction.
The debate between the use of auction or discretionary methods
of licence allocation was not intense in Britain. Angus Beckett, the
civil servant in charge of oil policy from 1964 to 1972 has stated
publicly that "...under rounds one to four, the primary aim was rapid
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North Sea development so as to provide breathing space in which to
pOevolve a long term energy strategy." The discretionary system
offered the government great flexibility to allocate rapidly large
tracts for exploration, and terms were designed leniently to
encourage companies to invest in the North Sea. The auction system
was rejected due to its heavy front-loading of capital investment,
thought to be a disincentive to exploration in the formidable North
Sea environment. The companies favoured the discretionary allocation
of licences for precisely the same reason: licences obtained by this
method were believed to be far less expensive than those acquired by
a bid in a competitive auction. It has been suggested that both the
Treasury and the then Ministry of Power were reliant upon the
cooperation of Shell and BP in commencing North Sea activities, and
that these companies both favoured the discretionary award over a
potentially more expensive auction*^.
The discretionary method of licence allocation was reviewed
several times during the 1960s and 70s. After the second licensing
round in 1965, the debate between discretionary and auction
mechanisms began, but the government decided that the discretionary
method was successfully encouraging rapid exploration. The fourth
round in 1971 saw the government's first experiment with a combined
discretionary/auction award. The government's position was that
unexplored territory would, by definition, be unattractive in an
auction, but by the early 1970s large tracts of seabed had already
been explored and seemed very promising. The government felt that it
could safely offer some blocks for auction and capture a larger share
of the economic rent while still making discretionary awards for most
of the blocks. Four hundred twenty-one blocks were offered, of which
267 were licensed. Fifteen blocks were auctioned raising a total of
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$90 million^. Shell/Esso made the highest bid: $50 million for one
block, ($32 million higher than the next highest bid) demonstrating
both a lack of geological knowledge (the two wells drilled on it
proved dry) and a lack of experience in auctions in the North Sea
environment. Although the government found this capture of rent
surprisingly successful, the auction of licences was not repeated
until the 1980s under the Conservatives. It has been suggested that
the discretionary/auction debate reveals a division of the interests
between the Department of Energy and the Treasury, and that the
Department of Energy had the upper hand in the 197. The
Department of Energy was interested in the maximum exercise of
bureaucratic control while the Treasury was interested in the maximum
capture of economic rent. These interests were conflicting, although
not mutually exclusive. However, the Department of Energy was
supported by the interests of the oil companies themselves which
acknowledged the possibility of increased expense under the auction
system. The combined interests of the Department of Energy and the
petroleum industry outweighed the fiscal interests of the Treasury
and the auction system was used only occasionally as a secondary
instrument of capturing economic rent.
An auction was included in the eighth licensing round announced
in September 1982^2. Once again, fifteen blocks were put up for
auction, and seven were awarded, raising more than $55 million. The
ninth round in 1985 also included an auction, raising more than $135
million in bids^3t but the tenth round in May 1987 did not have an
auction component. The reduction of available economic rent after
the collapse of the international price of oil made redundant the use
of auctions in later licence awards. Although the Conservative
government appeared willing to employ auction elements in licence
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awards in order to gain immediate revenue, the discretionary
allocation of licences remains the basic means of government control
of North Sea activities. The government, whether Conservative or
Labour, has not been principally motivated by the capture of economic
rent from the licensing mechanism. It has been concerned with
maximising Department of Energy control over the awards themselves,
the attendant regulations, and work requirements.
The discretionary system offers the government a great deal of
control in terms of regulating the behaviour of the licensees.
"[B]ecause the discretionary system transfers economic rent to the
licensee, the government will attempt to 'buy' something for the
economic rent such as requiring a rapid rate of exploration (as
compared to the rate determined by the market), requiring reserves to
be sold to the government at a lower than market price (i.e. natural
gas and the Gas Council) or by increasing taxation."3^ Furthermore,
in the discretionary award of licences, companies could be easily
encouraged to purchase goods from British suppliers and in other ways
fulfil the government's objectives. Punitive measures such as the
exclusion from future awards could be taken against companies which
did not comply with government wishes. The government was under no
obligation to divulge its method of making choices in these matters,
although criteria on which these decisions were supposed to be made
were published well in advance of licensing rounds. "The Department
has indicated that it uses a system of points for weighting the
various factors it takes into account, but has refused to disclose
what factors attract what points."35
Exploration licences are contractual in nature and imply both
financial and work responsibilities on the part of licensees in
exchange for the Crown's granting of production rights over its
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resources. Royalties (fixed at 12.5% of the value of production^)
and area fees were paid by the licensees to the government in
acknowledgement of state ownership of the resource. Royalties can be
wholly or partly remitted at the discretion of the Secretary of State
for Energy in order to encourage development of marginal fields. On
the question of work responsibilities, the licensees were obliged to
agree a work programme with the government which had to receive
Department of Energy approval and had to comply with safety
regulations^. In addition, the licences have a tripartite
structure: the initial term of four years during which 150-250
kilometers of seismic work must be undertaken; a second term of three
years during which at least one well must be drilled; and a third
term of thirty years during which only one-third of the original area
licensed is retained by the licensee for production purposes^®. The
licensee may at any time relinquish all or part of the licence by
giving at least six months' written notice expiring on the
anniversary date of the start of the licence.
In 1964, Frederick Erroll, Conservative Minister of Power,
outlined the government's preferences in the award of exploration
licences. Although the first consideration mentioned with regard to
licence awards was the "...need to encourage the most rapid and
thorough exploration and economical exploitation...."39 Qf North Sea
petroleum, Erroll wanted to protect the national interest and noted
that an important consideration would be the extent to which foreign
interests were benefitting from British petroleum production. The
requirements for licence applicants included the incorporation of the
firm within the U.K. so that it was taxable in Britain. Furthermore,
the government pledged to examine both the applicant's work
programme, contribution made to date, and future potential
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contribution with regard to the development of North Sea resources
and the British fuel economy generally. The level of equitable
treatment of British petroleum interests in the home countries of
applicants was also considered. The government appeared primarily
concerned with the issues of tax avoidance and of potential economic
benefit to the U.K.
The first licensing round was held in 1964 and "...was hurried
through by the Conservative government so that it could be completed
between the passage of the Continental Shelf Act and the impending
general election."^'-' Presumably there was political advantage to be
gained by the government if it was seen to make rapid progress in
North Sea development. Fifty-three licences covering 348 blocks were
awarded. U.K. participation was 30#, with the Gas Council
representing the public sector with 3# interest in the awards^. In
the second round, the new Labour government granted 37 licences
covering 127 blocks. "The main addition to the licensing criteria
was an indication that proposals to facilitate nationalised industry
participation would be viewed favourably." U.K. participation
increased to 37# with the public sector share rising to 6# as a
number of companies offered partnerships to the Gas Council and the
National Coal Board. The third round in June 1970 once again
preceded a general election and awarded thirty-seven licences
covering 106 blocks. In announcing the round in July 1969, the
Minister of Power, Roy Mason, outlined additional criteria by which
the applicants would be evaluated^. These included the applicant's
work programme and ability to carry it out, previous applications and
exploratory endeavors, facilities for disposal in the U.K. of any
petroleum produced, potential contribution to U.K. economic
prosperity, balance of payments and employment contributions with
262
reference to regional considerations, provision for public
participation, and involvement by the Gas Council, NCB, or other
British interests. Additionally, new areas in the so-called Celtic
Sea were to be licensed and in these awards the Gas Council had a
mandated 50% interest. According to Hann, U.K. participation dropped
to 36%, but the public sector share increased to 13%^. The fourth
round in 1971 saw the experiment with a limited auction, as mentioned
earlier. The criteria for discretionary award remained the same, and
tenders for the auction were subject to the Secretary of State's
right to reject any bid.
The fifth round was held in 1976. The Labour government had
created the British National Oil Corporation in 1975 and intended
that either BNOC or BGC would have a 51% interest in all blocks
awarded. The majority interest of the public corporation was a right
to production which, if exercised, necessitated that BNOC or BGC
would bear its share of the exploration costs. Amoco publicly
resisted this development and was subsequently excluded from any
fifth round awards^. Licences were issued for forty-four blocks.
In August 1978. companies were given the opportunity to offer BNOC
greater than 51% interest in their licences, and could additionally
offer to carry the state company's interests for all or part of the
exploration costs^. Consequently, in the months preceding the sixth
round awards, companies were actually in competition to provide
increased state participation in order to be awarded exploration
licences.
The Conservatives returned to power in 1979 and introduced a
less interventionist element in the next licensing round, although a
competitive auction was not implemented. "In May 1980 the government
announced that, for the seventh round of leasing, about twenty of the
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ninety blocks to be offered would be sold on application for [S10]
million each (about a tenth in real terms of what Esso offered for
the highest price block in 1971)."^7 The government selected the
areas open for purchase, but the companies were able to choose to
apply for specific blocks on offer and make the required payment if
interested. Additionally, BNOC and BGC were eligible to apply for
licences on the same bases as other oil companies; their preferential
h O
status in licence awards was eliminated . The government was
clearly not interested in eliminating BNOC's function as an oil
trader and the security of supply this could offer. Forty-two blocks
were awarded in the company-selected areas and forty-eight in others,
raising an initial payment of $430 million.
The eighth licensing round was announced in September 1982 and
was received by an oil industry highly critical of the recently
modified offshore taxation system. Fifteen blocks in the northern
North Sea were offered for auction, and 169 others in both frontier
and Southern Basin areas. Seven of the auction blocks were awarded,
raising more than $55 million, while discretionary awards were made
for 63 licences totalling 70 blocks, which was well below the
government's target of licensing 80 to 85 blocks^. By 1985, the
government had provided some tax relief in the North Sea to
compensate companies for the declining world price of petroleum. The
ninth round which followed also included an auction which raised $135
million. Ninety-three blocks were awarded, which exceeded government
expectations^®. The tenth round, awarded in May 1987. granted 51
blocks despite depressed prices and reduced exploration budgets. As
mentioned, it did not contain an auction component^-*-.
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"The licensing system laid the foundation for political
involvement and manipulation in the oil sector."5^ The use of
discretionary awards clearly concentrated power in the hands of the
Department of Energy both in terms of timing and size of areas to be
licensed for exploration, and also in terms of regulating the
behaviour of company activity in the North Sea. In addition, the
contractual nature of petroleum licences allowed the government to
sacrifice an indeterminate amount of economic revenue in exchange for
the satisfaction of other objectives, including increasing
participation of state petroleum corporations in the mid and late
1970s. Once again it appears that party politics did not
significantly alter the government's use of the licensing mechanism.
Both Labour and Conservative governments retained the discretionary
awards while both parties also implemented limited auction elements
in various rounds in order to maximise immediate revenue. The
principal contribution of the Labour government was predictable, viz.
licensing was used as an incentive to encourage the increasing
participation of public corporations in the exploitation of North Sea
resources. The special contribution of the Conservatives was to
eliminate BNOC's equity interest in all North Sea licences and
eventually to dismantle the corporation. In terms of the
fundamentals of licensing procedures, however, the parties appear to
have been in general agreement both about the means and legitimate
objectives of the government in granting exploration and production
rights in the North Sea.
"If a free system of licence auction (backed up by taxation) had
been consistently operated from the first round it is clear that
revenues accruing to the Government to date would have been higher,
possibly by a considerable margin."53 Regardless, it is equally
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clear that the licensing mechanism has proved an ample arena for the
strategic bargaining between politicians, civil servants, and the
petroleum industry. The government's objectives have been to give
sufficient incentive for industry investment while still securing its
political and bureaucratic objectives. The industry has the option
of voting with its feet and simply refusing to invest if the
conditions are considered unattractive. Because the licenses are
contracts, freely entered into, exploration activity has fallen when
the government's terms have seemed unreasonable, as in 1982. The
debate over the appropriate means of awarding licences also
highlights the competition between the Treasury's need for immediate
revenues and the Department of Energy's desire to maintain control
over North Sea activity. The combined interests of the Department of
Energy and the oil industry, despite the financial advantages of the
auction system, assure that the discretionary award of petroleum
licences is likely to be a permanent feature of Britain's petroleum
policy.
C. Norway
In a process similar to that in the U.K., the Norwegian Ministry
of Industry vets all applicants for licences and makes selections
based on technical and commercial grounds. For several reasons,
auctions have never been employed in the Norwegian sector of the
North Sea. Norway has a stronger political tradition of social
democracy and greater concern over foreign economic dominance than
does the U.K. The Norwegian treasury does not need immediate
revenues in the way which encouraged the British government to
include an auction element in some licensing rounds. "Gradually, a
new policy based on the petroleum industry as a means of stimulating
266
the country's industry was evolved. Licensing is linked to
industrial efforts by the interested oil companies' offers of
industrial cooperation."5^
The Royal Decree of April 9. 1965-^ outlined the original
licensing regime in Norway. As in the U.K., blocks would be offered
by the government for application by interested parties, although the
blocks were of approximately twice the size of those in U.K.
waters^. As in Britain, the Norwegian government designed the
licence terms to include a brief initial term of exploration before
partial surrender of the licence. Work programmes were to be
negotiated between the licensees and the government, and remuneration
of the state took the forms of area fees and royalties. Similarities
between the British and Norwegian licensing systems were intentional
and had been proposed in the government document on petroleum
activities of 1964.
In the North Sea area it is particularly natural and
simple for the international oil companies to make
comparisons between the compensation systems of the
various North Sea states.... The compensation system
may thus cause the companies to concentrate their
exploration in the areas where the financial
considerations are most favourable.57
The Norwegian government was conscious of the need to attract an
interest in exploration, and consequently attempted to design a
liberal licensing regime. The larger size of the exploration blocks,
the less rigorous terms of surrender (only one-quarter of the
territory had to be surrendered after six years, and a further
quarter after three more by contrast with the U.K. where two-thirds
267
of the licence had to be given up after seven years^®)f and a lower
royalty rate (10% as opposed to 12%) were all designed as incentives
to investment in the Norwegian sector. In addition, the 1965 Tax Act
created a regime more favourable to petroleum companies than to other
firms'^.
The Royal Decree of 1972^ established a licensing system which
regulated all phases of petroleum activity. Area fees were increased
and a sliding scale of royalties based on increasing production was
introduced. The surrender requirement was changed to half the
original acreage after six years. Statoil was established and
received an automatic share in all licences. The companies carried
the exploration costs and when a commercial find was made, Statoil
could choose to exercise its participation rights and contribute its
share of development and production (but not exploration) costs. The
tightening of the Norwegian regime appears to indicate that the
government could afford to increase its control and revenue share
once exploration interest had been firmly established in the
Norwegian sector.
On March 22, 1985 a new Petroleum Act^ was passed which
reaffirmed the licensing principles developed in the 1970s. An
exploration licence covers a limited area and lasts three years.
Before a production licence is awarded, the impact of the petroleum
activities on all aspects of Norwegian society (political, economic,
and social) must be evaluated by the Ministry. A new addition in
1985 was that the Ministry acquired discretionary power over the
administrative procedure to be used in each individual case when
compiling the impact assessment report. In addition, the 1985 Act
required the submission of a detailed development plan, outlining
information about the installations to be used for the production and
268
transportation of petroleum. The plan must also detail the
licensee's use of the Norwegian offshore supply industry so as to
promote Norwegian goods and services. "The rationale for requiring
the presentation of a development plan is that the development phase
involves extensive obligations for the licensee. Concurrently, it is
of substantial importance for the authorities to ensure that
environmental, safety, and societal interests have been considered
before development commences."
Production licences are no longer limited to companies with a
Norwegian subsidiary and are initially granted for a period of six
years with possible yearly extensions for a maximum of four more
years. The licensee must execute an agreed work programme in this
period, after which the licence is extended for one-half the original
area for a maximum of thirty years. The licensee may be required to
enter into agreements with other companies, the government, or public
corporations. In addition, the licensee must pay a duty per square
kilometer of the licensed area and Norwegian royalties are levied on
a sliding scale of production, which is to say that royalties
increase with increasing levels of production. The Ministry can also
appoint inspectors to monitor North Sea activities, and on the basis
of their reports, the authorities can take various means to encourage
better performance from the licensees. If the latter do not comply,
operations can be shut down by the Ministry.
There is a 'Norwegianisation' policy attached to petroleum
licences in that licensees are required to familiarise themselves
with Norwegian suppliers and, if possible, purchase their goods and
services. "The concessions stipulate that Norwegian goods and
services should be used whenever they are competitive with respect to
quality, maintenance, availability, and price.
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Finally, Statoil has had, since its inception in 1972, a
majority interest in all petroleum activity in the Norwegian North
Sea. As discussed in Chapter 3. the rationale for the creation of
Statoil was that the state should retain majority interest in all
licences in order to maintain control over petroleum activities.
Statoil was not to have a role in petroleum policy development, but
was to be a very important partner representing the state's interest
in all petroleum activities undertaken in Norwegian territories.
The first licensing round was held in 1965- Seventy-eight
blocks were awarded in comparison with 3^8 by the U.K. government,
although the Norwegian blocks are roughly twice the size of the
British (500 square kilometers compared with 250 square
kilometers^). The criteria for awards included technological
capacity and willingness to form consortia with Norwegian companies.
As in the U.K., both the industry and the state "...were interested
in rapid exploration to assess the quantity of recoverable reserves.
The state gave itself no participation rights in the first round of
awards."^5 in the second round in 1969, only 14 blocks were awarded,
of which 12 involved some level of state participation varying from
5# to 40#66. xhe terms remained generous in order to keep up the
interest of the multinationals which had the expertise and the
capital to develop the Norwegian resources. The third round in 197^
awarded only 8 blocks, and Statoil was granted a 50# carried interest
in 4 of the 5 licences, and 55# in the fifth "...with an option to
increase its participation up to 75# in accordance with an agreed
scale based on the eventual size of the discovered reserves."^ A
further 9 blocks were reserved for Statoil development plans to be
arranged with private companies, but this exclusive licensing did not
take place presumably because of Statoil's inability to operate
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independently at the time. The fourth round in 1978 marked the high
point of state control through Statoil's licence interests.
"Provisions were made for the gradual take-over of all production by
Statoil, through such arrangements as increasing Statoil's percentage
of ownership of a block as production increased and setting five-year
limits on the licences awarded to other companies so as to permit
future participation by Statoil." The Conservative coalition was
elected in 1979 and these plans for an increased role for Statoil
were promptly jettisoned. Statoil retained its majority interest in
all future awards, but was not granted the increasing status which
the Labour government had envisaged for it.
Since 1979. there have been eight licensing rounds with a total
of 135 blocks awarded, over half of which have been awarded in the
last two rounds which have emphasised northern frontier waters.
Norwegian participation in these licenses remains at around 60%, the
level at which it has been relatively constant since the third
round^9. Licences remain at the discretion of the government, and
applicants must agree, as before, to Statoil participation and to the
other criteria concerning financial and work arrangements which have
been a part of the Norwegian process since the early 1970s.
Licensing rounds have been more frequent in the last six years,
although the total area licensed remains small by comparison with
Britain.
The principal differences between the licensing procedures in
Britain and Norway are in the timing and size of licence awards and
the role of the public petroleum corporation in Norway. Although
Norway opened North Sea activity with a more lenient licensing regime
than the British, by the early 1970s terms were toughened in order to
increase state control, participation, and revenues. However, both
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Britain and Norway have licensing regimes based on the discretionary
award of licences over government-delimited blocks of exploration
territory. Area fees and royalties are paid by companies, and work
programmes negotiated between licensees and the government. In order
to encourage efficient exploration of the licensed areas, both
governments have introduced surrender clauses so that a certain
percentage of the original licence must be given back to the state
after several years of exploration activity. The similarity in the
regimes may partly be accounted for by the fact that, in some senses,
the British and Norwegian governments were in competition for
exploration investment in their respective areas in the 1960s. Once
interest in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea had been secured,
the Norwegian government was able to pursue its original policy of a
slower rate of petroleum development through the limitation of
licence awards.
2. DEPLETION POLICIES IN BRITAIN AND NORWAY
Explicit policy statements concerning petroleum depletion have
been issued in both Britain and Norway, whereas in Canada, as
previously mentioned, this has not been the case.
In Britain, the 1964 Continental Shelf Act extended both the
petroleum licensing and regulatory powers granted to the government
in the 1934 Petroleum Production Act to the offshore areas of the
North Sea. As previously indicated, the principal objective of the
British government in the early period of North Sea development was
to secure a rapid pace of exploration. This was, in part, due to
Britain's weak balance of payments position; it was assumed that
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rapid exploitation would assist in redressing the trade balance and
provide increased revenues for the government. The government
therefore concluded that "the balance of advantage to the U.K. lay in
exploiting and extracting these reserves of gas and oil as quickly as
possible."^ Consequently, government controls over depletion were
not discussed seriously until the early 1970s. In the initial period
of North Sea exploration and gas production, the government let the
depletion rate be determined by the producers within the bounds of
good oilfeld practice, much like the Canadian case.
However, in the environment of the early 1970s, when
expectations were that oil prices might rise indefinitely and U.K.
reserves were found to be larger than originally anticipated, this
policy was called into question. "The Committee of Public Accounts
in 1973 received evidence from the Department of Trade and Industry
who for the first time suggested that the government was considering
the possibility of phasing out its rapid exploitation policy and that
they could foresee circumstances in which there would be an
'advantage in delaying the exploitation' of North Sea oil
reserves."71 The Labour Party campaigned in the general election of
the following year on a platform which included "some general
references to the need for the development of the United Kingdom's
offshore oil and gas to be under public control.When Labour was
returned to office, depletion policy was on its agenda. As early as
May 197^. the new Secretary of State for Energy, Eric Varley,
indicated that the government was reconsidering the idea of rapid
development and was looking favourably at a policy of longer term,
more balanced North Sea production. In the July White Paper on
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Offshore Oil and Gas Policy the Labour government stated that it
intended to 'take power to control the level of production in the
national interest'73.
At the time of this policy announcement, Britain was suffering a
supply crisis similar to other oil consuming nations. The Heath
government had arranged bilateral oil supply agreements with both
Iran and Saudi Arabia, in addition to attempting to influence BP to
favour Britain in its supply allocations, all without tangible
result^. The public concern over the nation's petroleum supply
resulted in considerable pressure on the new Labour government to
demonstrate its ability to control North Sea development. A
conservative depletion policy, further increasing Britain's
dependence on insecure imported oil, would seem at odds with the
reality of the supply crisis; but a depletion policy of some type
would nonetheless reassure the anxious British public that the North
Sea was being developed for its benefit. Parliament empowered the
Secretary of State for Energy with extremely broad and ill-defined
control over petroleum production in the Petroleum and Submarine
Pipelines Act 1975^. but the employment of such powers seemed at
best unwise given the immediate supply and balance of payments
positions. "Thus the 1974-9 Labour Government constructed the legal
framework for the introduction of a depletion policy although, as far
as can be known, they did not implement any aspects of it with
respect to oil."7^
Although the Labour government's intentions regarding state
participation, tabled at the same time, proved controversial outside
and within the House of Commons, its proposals concerning depletion
policy were hardly discussed. There was a consensus that the
prospect of ever-increasing oil prices made oil in the ground
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increasingly valuable. Another factor was Norway's go-slow depletion
policy which contributed to ensuring that her reserves would far
outlast the British.
The mechanisms favoured by each party varied, but the general
objective of depletion control was agreed. The Scottish Nationalists
argued for a restriction on annual production to 50 million tonnes of
oil equivalent, while the Conservatives favoured the establishment of
an Oil Conservation Authority along the lines of the Alberta Energy
Resources Conservation Board^. The Labour plan was to vest in the
Secretary of State for Energy sufficient discretionary power to
control petroleum production in the national interest.
The vagueness of this power made the petroleum industry rather
uneasy, and on December 6, 197^, the Secretary of Energy, Eric
Varley, issued guidelines under which the powers of his office were
to be exercised in the attempt to reassure producer companies.
We propose ... to take powers of control for use in
the future, but it remains the Government's aim to
ensure that oil production from the United Kingdom
Continental Shelf builds up as quickly as possible
over the next few years... This will help our
balance of payments, contribute to our Government
revenues, stimulate our industries and make our
energy supplies more secure.... I wish, therefore,
to assure the oil companies, and the banks to which
they will look for finance, that our depletion policy
and its implementation will not undermine the basis
on which they have made plans and entered into
commitments.
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The Varley Guidelines indicated that delays would not be imposed on
the development of finds made up to the end of 1975 under existing
licences. Development restrictions on later discoveries would be
made after full consultation with the companies involved. Production
cuts would not be imposed on fields under existing licences until
1982 at the earliest, or until four years after the start of
production, whichever proved later. Furthermore, production cuts
would not be imposed until 150# of the capital investment in the
field was recovered. Finally, production cuts would be limited to
20# at most with an appropriate period of notice to be negotiated
with the industry. The petroleum industry active in Britain was
assured that the Varley guidelines, although lacking the force of
law, would be followed.
The Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act received Royal Assent
on November 12, 1975- Its major sections comprised the creation of
the British National Oil Corporation, the amendment of existing
petroleum production licences, the establishment of government
control over submarine pipeline and refinery development, and
miscellaneous provisions including the establishment of the National
Oil Account.
In the area of depletion policy, the PSPA 1975 granted the
Secretary of State broad discretionary powers of control over North
Sea petroleum production that had been indicated in the White Paper.
It "...gives the Minister power to approve, modify, or reject
programmes submitted by producers, which must specify their capital
investment plans and propose maximum and minimum annual production
rates for oil and gas. The Minister can reject programmes either on
the grounds that they are contrary to 'good oilfield practice' or
that production plans are not in the 'national interest'; producers
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then have to modify their proposals."79 There is no appeal against
the ministerial decision. The Minister is required to give notice to
producers if their production either exceeds or falls below desired
levels, but if his decision appears in conflict with principles of
good oilfield practice as understood by the companies involved, the
national interest as defined by the Secretary must take precedence.
This power of the Secretary of State for Energy to decide
production levels in the national interest greatly concerned the
industry, only partially placated by the Varley guidelines. The
on
Energy Act 1976 further enhanced the discretionary powers of the
Minister by enabling him to control the production, supply,
acquisition and use of petroleum and other fuel substances, and to
give directives to producers and suppliers in the case of any energy
emergency. If these powers are to be exercised, they must be
preceded by an Order-in-Council. It has not been necessary to put
the Energy Act into effect, but it again demonstrates the Labour
government's desire to have broad discretionary powers over petroleum
and other energy sources.
During the late 1970s, the Varley guidelines made impossible the
implementation of depletion powers granted to the Secretary of State
in the Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act, 1975* Companies
submitted development plans to the Secretary, but up to 1977. the
only control imposed was a restriction of the flaring of natural gas.
The only delay imposed on North Sea petroleum activity occurred in
1980 in the development of the Clyde field. The anticipated North
Sea production 'hump' flattened of its own accord as various fields
took longer to develop than expected; the implementation of a
conservative depletion policy was therefore not required.
277
The next statement of the British government on depletion policy
came after the Conservatives were returned to power in 1979* On July
23, 1980, the Secretary of State for Energy, Mr. Howell, announced
the government's intention to prolong high levels of petroleum
81
production to the end of the century . The rationale for this
policy was strategic and security of supply considerations following
the second OPEC pricing crisis. U.K. production would be controlled
to equal U.K. consumption, and Britain would become an exporter
again in 1990. Once again, there was an apparent conflict between
concerns for secure supply and resource conservation. Measures would
be taken by the government to increase exploration while at the same
time initiating some form of depletion control. On this latter
point, Mr. Howell was imprecise although he indicated that both
production cutbacks and development delays were being considered.
The only result was the previously mentioned delay in the development
of the Clyde field. On June 8, 1982, Energy Secretary Nigel Lawson
announced that production cutbacks would not commence before the end
op
of 1984, effectively extending the existing non-policy . The
political advantage of appeasing public opinion through the
government's posture on depletion policy was far greater than any
benefits which might have been realised by its implementation.
"The overt use of depletion controls ... seems unlikely due to
opposition from private companies and also due to the impact on tax
revenues.The Labour party was, in principle, more disposed
towards the implementation of depletion control than the
Conservatives, but neither party in office exercised the powers which
Labour had secured for the government on this issue. Whether the
prospect of the loss of revenue in the form of royalties and taxes or
opposition from the petroleum industry and the Treasury is
278
responsible for the lack of depletion policy in Britain remains
unknown. The policy remains as it was originally formulated in the
aftermath of the first OPEC crisis, but the broad discretionary
powers are not used. There is not therefore a petroleum depletion
policy in Britain, although there have been policy statements made
and powers acquired after both OPEC crises.
So far the U.K. and Norwegian governments have opted
for remarkably different depletion policies. In the
U.K. both Conservative and Labour governments have
advocated a high rate of extraction, whereas Norway
has quite consistently opted for a moderate rate of
production.... It can of course be argued that the
U.K.'s normal production of 120 million tonnes is not
particularly high for an industrial country of 56
million people. Furthermore, Norwegian production of
90 million tonnes, which in Norway has been set as a
moderate level, is not moderate for a country of 4
million people. However, this does not alter the
basic difference in the perceived time horizon for
Oh
oil production in the two countries.
The Norwegian "go slow" policy of petroleum depletion is well
known, and, at first glance, contrasts quite starkly with the British
policy of rapid exploitation. The reason for the difference in the
two countries' policies in this area relates to the differing
perceptions of the social rate of return. In Britain, the political,
social, and economic advantages gained from rapid development are
perceived far to outweigh any benefits which might derive from
developing the resource more slowly. In Norway, the social rate of
return is much lower, largely due to the limited absorptive capacity
of the Norwegian economy. Difficulties might be experienced in
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Norway as a result of a rapid rise of petroleum revenues and a lower
rate of resource exploitation has been the means by which problems
have been avoided.
Norwegian depletion policy does not take the traditional form of
production controls; rather, Norwegian production is limited by the
limited issue of exploration and production licences. It has not
been the policy of the government to halt developments or restrict
production already underway, but, as mentioned previously, the
licence rounds in Norway have been less frequent and offered less
territory than the British licence rounds.
Several factors contribute to the Norwegian government's ability
to pursue this policy. Norway's abundant hydro-electric capacity
makes the production of domestic oil not nearly as urgent as it has
been in Britain. Over 40# of Norway's energy requirements are
satisfied by indigenous hydro-electricity^. Oil consumption in
Norway averages approximately 8 million tonnes per annum, in
comparison with Britain's use of 90 million tonnes, while the
O/T
petroleum reserves of the two countries are roughly similar .
Norway's population of 4 million generates a national income only
one-eighth the size of that produced by Britain's 56 million
citizens. In short, the differences in the energy requirements,
sizes of populations, and national economies between the two major
North Sea oil producers Iwe, important implications for the rate at
which the resource has been extracted. Norway's smaller demand for
petroleum, smaller population, and smaller economy means that the
rate of depletion of the resource can be slower than in Britain, and
that, some argue, it must be slower to protect the smaller economy
from inflationary effects. Add to this the general mistrust of
foreign capital prevalent in Norwegian public opinion, and the
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implementation of a conservative depletion policy seems inevitable.
The social rate of return on petroleum revenues is evidently much
lower in Norway than it is in Britain.
In the 197^ Parliamentary Report, Petroleum Industry in
Norwegian Society®^, the government made its claim for control over
Norwegian petroleum production.
It is important to have public direction and control
of the exploitation of resources ... first and
foremost the scope of the operations on the
Continental Shelf must be controlled by regulating
exploration activities. Once a discovery is made,
technical, economic, and political reasons will tend
to require that the resources be exploited as rapidly
as possible. The harsh climatic conditions on the
Shelf mean that the individual fields must be
exploited at a relatively rapid pace, before the
installed equipment has to be removed. This reduces
the possibilities of regulating the rate of
extraction once production has commenced.... One
appropriate method of control might be to delay the
development ... of individual finds. This will be
facilitated by increased government participation in
the activities on the Shelf....®®
The government's objective was to have proven reserves equivalent to
10-15 years of current petroleum consumption, so a target production
rate of 90 million tonnes of oil and gas equivalent per year was set
in this report. This consumption/reserves ratio corresponds almost
exactly with the Canadian case of a 12 year life index of reserves
which has been maintained by the petroleum industry for the last
decade without any government action either on depletion policy or on
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the encouragement of exploration activity. In contrast to Norway's
production/consumption ratio, the U.K. production target of 150
million tonnes equivalent is only about 50# greater than domestic
consumption. Norway's target production of 90 million tonnes is over
ten times greater than her annual domestic consumption. Many would
argue on this basis that the so-called "go slow" policy applies not
so much to petroleum depletion in Norway, but more aptly to the care
and precision with which the Norwegian government has formulated its
petroleum policies, taking into consideration the most important
political, economic, and social factors.
The next statement on depletion was made in the 1979/80 white
paper on petroleum activities^. This document contained nothing new
and the target rate of depletion set in 1975 was confirmed. The
government remained committed to what it termed a moderate, as
opposed to maximum or minimum, rate of extraction. In fact,
Norwegian production has not reached the target range, so the
introduction of development delays and the use of Statoil to control
output has not been necessary. Despite below target production
rates, Norway has been a net exporter of oil since 1975- A state
which was conserving its petroleum resources would not be an active
exporter of production. As in both Canada and the U.K., the powers
to implement a strict depletion policy have been put in place in
Norway but have not been exercised.
The only restriction of Norwegian petroleum occurred late in the
summer of 1986 when exports were reduced in an attempt to support
OPEC's production and pricing initiatives'^. Norway's depletion
policy had been based on the assumption of increasing prices for a
depleting natural resource with relatively inelastic demand. Per
Kleppe, Finance Minister made this point succinctly in 1975'
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As long as some of Norway's petroleum reserves remain
below the North Sea, our assets are probably well
placed. A gradual rise in the relative price of
petroleum would represent interest earned on these
untouched assets. Reasoning along these lines, this
kind of investment compares favourably with financial
investment abroad.9^
With the recent collapse of the international price of oil,
Norway's production as well as her untouched petroleum assets have
also dramatically declined in value. Early in 1986, the new Labour
administration opened discussions with OPEC and attempted to
encourage the British government to likewise consider restricting
production in order to support OPEC's efforts to restore the price of
petroleum. Britain refused to enter into such talks. In the autumn,
the Norwegian government restricted its country's exports of
petroleum by 10 percent for November and December, and this policy
was extended into 1987-^. Norway implemented this policy by refining
and storing the bulk of the petroleum it receives in royalty,
amounting to a restriction of supply of approximately 80,000 barrels
per day. This policy could be considered one of depletion, but in
fact it is a short-term strategy aimed at bolstering prices rather
than a long-term policy concerned with resource conservation. The
means by which it is implemented do not affect production or even
exploration for Norwegian petroleum.
Norway's conflicting interests as part of the community of
international petroleum producers and as a member country of the 0ECD
had implications for its depletion policy earlier as well. "It is
well known that Norway rejected membership of the EEC in 1973. and
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one of the major reasons was the fear of external interference in oil
and fishing policies."93 The following year, Norway declined full
membership in the International Energy Agency (IEA), the OECD
organisation responsible for supply sharing agreements and emergency
preparedness set up after the first OPEC crisis. Joining the IEA
might have necessitated a more rapid exploitation of Norwegian
resources than was in accordance with Norwegian national interests.
The problem was resolved by Norway becoming a part member of the IEA.
This absolved her of supply obligations but allowed her to
contribute to the IEA's data base and energy information network.
The general conclusion to be drawn on depletion policies in
Britain and Norway is that they are different, but less dramatically
so than is commonly suspected. Britain espoused a policy of rapid
depletion, while Norway chose a more moderate depletion policy
through the limited issue of exploration licences. Neither country
has a depletion policy in the sense of limiting production; nor does
Canada. Relative to the size of her population, economy, and
petroleum reserves, Norway is a prolific petroleum producer whose
actions in terms of international supply are of equal significance to
OPEC as those of the U.K.
It is interesting that in this period of petroleum price
decline, Britain has been attempting to maximise her interests as a
consuming nation while Norway is clearly promoting her interests as a
petroleum producer. The Norwegian economy is so heavily dependent on
petroleum she is almost obliged to explore every avenue possible to
support price levels. Britain, on the other hand, with her larger
industrial economy, can wear either the producer or the consumer hat,
depending on the situation. The British government has greater
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latitude in dealing with the public when the international petroleum
market moves dramatically — the British economy can be presented as
a winner in either case.
Norway can more readily afford to forego short-term revenues in
order to acquire a greater return in the longer-term as her social
discount level is lower than in Britain. However, her "go slow"
depletion policy is perhaps more evident in the political rhetoric of
Norwegian public debate than it has been in results. Norway has
become one of the leading non-OPEC oil producers in the world and
this position could not have been achieved with a genuinely
conservative depletion policy.
CONCLUSION
The application of rational choice theory to an examination of
depletion policies would lead to the expectation that PoU4\cod rates of
return are the prime determinants of whether or not a government will
impose a rapid or conservative depletion policy. Where governments
can make effective use of large and immediate revenues, there will be
a faster rate of resource exploitation. Where the social rate of
return is lower than the expected increase of price over time, a
slower rate of depletion is expected.
In the three cases of Canada, Britain, and Norway, none of the
states have imposed depletion policies over production rates as
anything other than a short-term strategy to achieve other policy
objectives (as in Alberta in I98O and Norway in 1986). Conservation
of the resource for future generations seems not to enter into the
public discussion of petroleum exploitation at all in Canada and
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Britain, and the U.K. openly espoused a policy of rapid exploitation
for much of the 1970s. All three states have taken the necessary
legislative steps to ensure that they can implement depletion
policies in terms of production cutbacks and development delays,
although none have found the need to use their powers except as a
short-term strategy to achieve other policy objectives. Norway
remains the sole exception on the question of depletion; her "go
slow" policy of licensing territories for exploration is the only
serious attempt by any of the three states to control the rate at
which the petroleum resources are exploited, but in relation to
Norwegian petroleum consumption, her depletion policy is not very
conservative. The explanation for her different policy lies in the
lower poUVicri rate of return she enjoys as a result of her smaller
population and economy in relation to the size of her petroleum
resources.
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The purpose of this chapter is to examine the development of the
petroleum fiscal regimes in Canada, Britain, and Norway. There is a
plethora of economic studies which analyse, with the aid of economic
models, the implications of minute petroleum taxation adjustments.
Most papers concerned with petroleum policy are of this nature. The
precise economic and financial implications of tax changes will not
be of prime concern here. In keeping with the other chapters on
participation, pricing, and depletion, this chapter attempts to
clarify the similarities and dissimilarities in broad policy
objectives and mechanisms in each of the three case states. Although
the subject is an economic one, the analysis of it is political.
The petroleum fiscal regime is itself a concept which can be
defined in a number of different ways. In the broadest sense, it
includes all aspects of government policy which impact upon revenues
associated with petroleum development. Thus participation, pricing,
and depletion policies could all be viewed as partial determinants of
the petroleum fiscal regime. State ownership of depleting natural
resources not only justifies policy action on all these fronts, but
implies that various policy directives will impinge upon each other.
"A licensing system that implies a 'free' transfer of a valuable
right from the public sector to the private sector creates a demand
for a tax regime that captures the value of this right and returns it
to the government.""'" However, for the purposes of this chapter, and
in more general usage, the petroleum fiscal regime comprises the
principal revenue-capturing policies — taxation and royalty
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instruments — of the governments of the producer countries.
Royalties themselves are, in effect, another form of taxation
although, in the political rhetoric of fiscal debate, royalties are
more strictly speaking payments to the owners for the privilege to
develop and produce. Taxes are applied to all manner of profits from
economic activity undertaken within the jurisdiction of the state
and, in the case of petroleum activity, they include both corporate
income taxes and such special petroleum taxes as may be deemed
necessary for the maximum capture of economic rent. Both taxation
and royalty policies are commonly thought to make up the particular
fiscal regime of any given petroleum province.
The development of fiscal arrangements concerning a non¬
renewable resource must indicate the economic interests, particularly
in situations of price appreciation, of the responsible government.
The degree of economic rent available will determine the potential
revenues which might accrue to the owner of the resource through the
taxation system. Economic rent, or surplus value, is the difference
between the cost of production (including an appropriate return on
the producer's investment) and the revenue from sales. In the
hypothetical situation of perfect competition, economic rent does not
accrue as marginal costs of production are exjual -t©
and therefore price. In the real world, there are many market
situations in which prices are quite independent of costs of
production, and this has been particularly evident in the case of
petroleum since the first OPEC pricing crisis. Since that time, the
international price of petroleum has been relatively independent of
the costs of production, especially within the high-production, low-
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cost petroleum provinces of the Middle East. The issue of petroleum
economic rent has therefore been one of intense concern to all
producer governments, OPEC and non-OPEC alike.
In petroleum development, the investment-production lead times
are very long and investment in exploration must come well in advance
of any revenue from production. This implies two things: firstly,
that the estimated costs of producing today's barrel of oil were
based on price expectations at the time the investment decision was
made; and secondly, that the price of today's barrel of oil may bear
little relationship to its actual cost of production. When costs
remain relatively constant and prices appreciate, economic rent
appreciates as well, and vice versa. When prices appreciate greatly
beyond expectations, as occurred in 1973"4 and 1979-80, the economic
rent available from the exploitation of the resource is high simply
because the only fields deemed economically viable at the time of the
investment decision were those which could produce at a lower price.
This means that there is a windfall profit to be captured either by
the producing companies and/or the owners of the resource. As the
owners of the resource are states, the taxation and royalty systems
are the principal means by which economic rent is captured, although
licence and other fees may also contribute.
When prices depreciate unexpectedly, as occurred in 1986, the
economic rent is reduced or eliminated altogether. Once again,
development decisions have been taken much earlier on higher price
expectations and the system designed to capture economic rent must be
flexible enough to cope with this possibility. State revenues
depreciate against public expectations and company revenues decline,
disrupting exploration strategies.
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An axiom of rational choice theory is that politicians in
government will attempt to capture sufficient votes to enhance their
ability to remain in office. Instrumental goals which would assist
in the achievement of this objective include the maximising of
revenues from all sources to facilitate the provision of desirable
policies and services to citizens to win public support. Therefore,
the first assumption concerning governments' behaviour on the fiscal
front must be that they will at all times wish to maximise the
financial return to the state insofar as this is consistent with
retaining public support.
Rational choice theory assumes a degree of competition for
revenues between various government actors which could affect policy
output in both timing and in content. In a unitary state, the
central government remains solely responsible for the determination
of national policies, although it cannot be assumed to be a strictly
unified body given the conflicts which take place within any
administration. This competition may occur between political actors,
political and bureaucratic actors, or between various bureaucratic
actors, each claiming authority on a certain fiscal issue and/or a
greater requirement for revenues.
In the case of a federal state, such competition is complicated
by conflict between two levels of government if there is concurrent
jurisdiction. This conflict is often interpreted as a struggle
between forces of centralisation and decentralisation. Sproule-
Jones^ identifies three characteristics which increase the relative
bargaining power of either level of government in the federal
conflict: 1) the degree to which responsibility and authority is
constitutionally defined; 2) the greater the monopoly over policy
input and delivery; and 3) the degree to which the government
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approximates a team rather than a collection of various interests.
Federal conflict in Canada on the issue of petroleum fiscal
arrangements should therefore highlight the relative positions of
both the federal and provincial levels of government. The unitary
states of Britain and Norway should have similar policy outputs and
Canada should be the divergent case because of its federal division
of powers. Competition over fiscal arrangements within the unitary
states is likely at the bureaucratic level between departments, and
in federal states, conflict between federal and provincial
governments is added to this bureaucratic competition.
Short-term revenue acquisition is not the only objective of
government. There is a fine balance between securing maximum
revenues and continuing to encourage investment in resource
development through allowing companies to achieve sufficient rates of
return on their investments. Capital employed in petroleum
development could be employed elsewhere, and with the long lead times
mentioned above, producer companies must believe that the prospects
for profits are good in order to maintain levels of exploration and
production activity which the government deems adequate. After the
larger fields in any petroleum-bearing province are discovered and
exploited, the fiscal regime must also encourage the development of
more marginal prospects.
This is a scenario of a competitive, non-zero sum game played
between resource owners (states or governments) and producers (the
petroleum industry). If the government is to increase its share of
the economic rent from petroleum production, it does so at the
expense of the private industry's share, regardless of whether the
absolute value of economic rent is increasing or decreasing. Each
party is interested in securing the largest share possible while
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still satisfying the requirements of the other party. Modifications
to the fiscal regime will occur after major changes in international
prices or costs of production, whether due to technological advances
or the depletion of larger, less expensive fields. Companies might
exert influence over this policy area principally due to their
monopoly of information on what constitutes a sufficient rate of
return as well as the effectiveness of current technology and costs
of technological developments in the industry. National petroleum
companies may perform an essential information function on matters
such as these for the government once they are established.
As discussed in Chapter 1, petroleum fiscal regimes can be
designed along three broad lines: taxation on corporate profits alone
(the free market option), the inclusion of resource rent taxation,
and taxation combined with incentives to achieve other policy goals,
such as increased rates of exploration and the promotion of the
interests of domestic industries. Petroleum taxation solely on
corporate profits was employed in the early days of petroleum
exploitation in Canada, but is out of favour because the underlying
assumption — that petroleum activity is like any other industrial
activity — is no longer believed. Petroleum is a depleting
resource, strategically important because it is the primary energy
fuel in most industrialised economies. Furthermore, the development
of petroleum resources carries with it economic and fiscal
externalities. It affects employment, inflation, the state's current
account position, the value of the state's currency, and generally
has an impact on other economic and industrial activity. As the
owners of the resource, states are required to design fiscal regimes
which attempt to recompense the nation for the exploitation of this
natural resource and the problems that might be associated with it.
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In rhetorical tefrttS, the state attempts to capture the maximum economic
rent from petroleum production in order that the nation, the owner of
the resource, benefits from its exploitation and depletion.
Resource rent taxation, usually manifest in a royalty scheme, in
which the state attempts to capture maximum economic rent from the
production of a national resource, is employed in virtually every
petroleum producing province today. The justification of such a
policy derives both from the nation's ownership of the resource and
from the government's responsibility to mitigate negative
externalities and enhance benefits associated with petroleum
exploitation. The advantage of this type of fiscal regime is that it
is a simple and effective means of capturing economic rent, but it
may be inflexible in terms of encouraging marginal developments in
the hope of increased prices in the future. To offset this problem,
some states which wish to encourage longer-term petroleum investment
have added an incentive scheme. The incentives are designed to
diminish some of the risks inherent in investment in marginal fields
or new technologies. The difficulties with taxation-incentive fiscal
regimes are largely associated with their complexity and, sometimes,
their discriminatory application.
On rational choice assumptions, it would be expected that right-
wing political actors would favour the simple resource rent fiscal
regime, while left-wing politicians might more frequently prefer the
tax-incentive scheme. This hypothesis is based on the assumption
that right-wing political actors will favour more free-market policy
options and left-wing politicians will be more interested in state
intervention in the market to achieve other policy goals. However,
the prime objective of capturing votes is likely to outweigh these
ideological concerns. The petroleum industry would be expected to
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prefer the more simple scheme rather than complicated and
discriminatory incentives, unless the incentives were to apply
equally to all companies. However, the petroleum industry does not
constitute a uniform body of opinion on this matter. Smaller,
independent companies tend to have interests which differ from those
of the larger multinationals, especially on the fiscal front, as they
often have smaller cash flows and therefore less ability to make
marginal investments. In practice, various segments of the industry
would prefer incentive schemes which discriminate favourably toward
them. Finally, according to the precepts of rational choice,
bureaucrats would be expected to favour whichever fiscal regime would
give them more authority and discretionary power, and this usually
means a more complicated arrangement. The public can be assumed to
be relatively indifferent on the whole to the specifics of the fiscal
regime, as long as there is general satisfaction that the nation's
short and medium-term interests are being safeguarded (i.e., a
reasonable price and secure supply) and that the petroleum industry
is not escaping with windfall profits.
There is more public concern on the question of state
expenditure of petroleum revenues. The investment of state revenues
from petroleum exploitation takes two forms: management of immediate
financial difficulties or longer-term investment. In the first case,
governments will have been tempted to utilise petroleum revenues
immediately upon receipt to reduce deficits, support currency values,
and increase services to the public. All of these types of
activities can be viewed as vote-enhancing strategies. In a state
unconcerned with such financial problems, there is the opposite
difficulty of absorption of huge petroleum revenues into a relatively
small economy. The concern here would be the inflationary impact and
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social disruption that such huge revenues might produce. States with
financial problems will have a higher absorptive capacity than states
without, and if petroleum revenues cannot be profitably absorbed into
the economy, they must be invested elsewhere. Governments in such
situations might be expected to control stringently the flow of
petroleum revenues into their economies through investment of such
monies elsewhere and also through conservative depletion policies.
Initial hypotheses generated from rational choice theory lead to
the expectation that Canada, the United Kingdom, and Norway would
have resource rent taxation coupled with incentives to invest in
marginal prospects to secure maximum capture of revenue in the
shorter-term and continued development of the resource in the longer-
term. However, there should be a marked distinction between the
development of the fiscal regimes in the United Kingdom and Norway as
opposed to Canada, where federal conflict might contribute
substantially to the determination of fiscal policy. In addition,
the fiscal regime in each of the three states would be modified to
cope with both increases and decreases in economic rent arising from
petroleum production. As a sufficient rate of return to the industry
is a required part of each petroleum fiscal regime, then it would
also be expected that, notwithstanding different resource situations,
the percentage of economic rent acquired by governments should be
broadly similar in each of the three cases.
As part of this general discussion of petroleum fiscal regimes,
the expenditure of petroleum revenues will also be examined briefly.
On this subject, it would be expected that if the absorptive capacity
of the economy is high, petroleum revenues will be utilised to
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alleviate immediate financial problems. If the absorptive capacity
is limited, petroleum revenues will have to be invested to generate
future earnings, political and financial.
1. CANADA
Fiscal arrangements in Canada are greatly complicated by the
fact that, as a federal state, both the national and provincial
levels of government have taxation powers. The federal Parliament
under section 91(3) of the Canadian constitution has the powers to
pass legislation in order to raise revenue "by any mode or system of
taxation".^ In section 93 of the Canada Act, the provincial
governments are given the power to tax economic activity undertaken
within their respective jurisdictions, and in the case of natural
resources, they exercise the responsibilities of Crown ownership.
These include the responsibility of regulating and administering the
development of those resources, including pricing and taxation,
within their borders. While this apparent conflict of powers did not
have any major impact in the early petroleum fiscal regime in
Alberta, it was the source of continuing conflict throughout the
1970s and into the early 1980s in relation to petroleum revenue
sharing between the federal and provincial levels of government.
Much like the debate which centred on petroleum pricing throughout
that period, petroleum taxation and revenue distribution proved
another fertile source of intergovernmental conflict.
Petroleum was initially discovered in Alberta in commercial
quantities prior to 1920. However, in the early stages of the
petroleum industry's activity in the province, petroleum companies
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were taxed by the federal and provincial governments in the same
manner as other corporations. Until 1930, this was a result of the
federal government's reservation, as part of its National Policy of
development, of the powers of the provinces over natural resources^.
Had this power not been reserved to the federal government, royalties
would probably have been introduced by producing provinces at the
outset of petroleum production in Canada. Alberta, Saskatchewan, and
Manitoba were the three provinces affected by this policy. As a
result of the transfer of responsibility to the provinces concerned
in 1930, the government of Alberta introduced petroleum royalties for
the first time in 1931- The rate was set at 5% of gross production^.
In 19^8, the government introduced a maximum royalty rate of
l62/3# of gross production^. By this time, the province had become
an established petroleum producer and was receiving substantial
revenues from the development of its petroleum resources. It could
therefore afford to allow the industry a potentially larger but
certainly more secure share of the available economic rent from
petroleum production. The province as a whole would also benefit
from increased industrial activity resultant from increased petroleum
exploitation. The principal motivation behind the introduction of a
maximum royalty was to encourage continued development of those
resources by offering a stable fiscal arrangement to petroleum
companies.
In 1962, a sliding scale royalty schedule was introduced in
Alberta, with royalty rates to increase in proportion to increased
O
production up to a stipulated maximum rate0. The objective was to
stimulate investment in less productive fields. It was hoped that
fields which yielded lower levels of production might not be
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neglected by the petroleum industry. Once again, the government
demonstrated its interest in encouraging maximum development -- in
this instance, of more marginal prospects.
Petroleum companies also paid corporate income taxes imposed
both by the federal and provincial governments, but there was no
explicit resource rent taxation. The cost of production and
transportation of Canadian petroleum led, in 1961, to the
introduction of the National Oil Policy which divided the Canadian
petroleum market into the western half, supplied by more expensive
domestic crude, and the eastern half, supplied by cheaper imported
oil. The question of surplus economic rent from petroleum production
had not yet arisen as the market price for Canadian petroleum had to
be competitive with less expensive imported production.
The Conservative Party under the leadership of Peter Lougheed
displaced decades of Social Credit government in the provincial
election of 1971- In 1972, the new government's "Natural Resource
Revenue Plan"9 imposed a mineral tax on top of the maximum royalty
rate set by its predecessors, yielding the equivalent of an
additional gross royalty. New drilling incentives were also a part
of the package, but the basic intention of the program was to raise
incremental revenues to be used by the provincial government to
diversify the Albertan economy over the forthcoming decade. The new
mineral tax was intended to raise the average royalty rate to 21$,
providing the provincial government with an additional $70 million in
1973 if wellhead prices remained unchanged. This initiative
coincided with increased production as a result of increased U.S.
demand for Canadian oil, and by August 1973 the additional revenue to
accrue to Alberta was estimated at $103 million-'-'-'. Although the
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Alberta government could not have anticipated the first OPEC oil
crisis, it must have anticipated increased revenues from exports to
the U.S.
In early 1973. the United States dismantled its oil import quota
system, and Canadian petroleum exports rose dramatically. Canadian
production was pushed to full capacity, and wellhead prices became
more and more influenced by petroleum prices in the U.S. market, in
turn greatly influenced by the price of imported Middle Eastern
crudes. In consequence, the Canadian domestic price rose 95 cents
within a year, almost 50% of its previous price-'--'". In early
September, a price freeze had been requested of the industry while
1 P
the federal government revised its petroleum policy . As discussed
previously, the National Oil Policy was then abandoned in December'-3
as events in the Middle East rapidly overshadowed North American
pricing concerns, and the federal government introduced an export tax
on Canadian crude destined for the United States.
The federal export tax was to be the difference between the
lower Canadian price and the market price in the States. The export
tax was increased from its initial level of 40 cents in October to
$1.91 by December'-''. Canadian oil was then priced at less than $3-50
per barrel, while OPEC prices rose to $11 per barrel by January 1974.
The export tax was further increased to $2.22 per barrel in January
1974, and stood at $6.60 per barrel for the months of February and
March, after which it was complemented by the new federal pricing
initiatives, discussed in Chapter 4. These efforts not only
contributed to federal government revenues, they were also of great
assistance to hard-pressed petroleum consumers who were grateful for
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a depressed domestic price. It was a very popular program for
Canadian consumers, but was abhorred by the governments of the
producing provinces and the petroleum industry.
Alberta's response to the export tax was to announce the
abandonment of its revised royalty scheme in favour of royalty
appreciation related to the increasing international price. "The
province's primary objective was to force Ottawa to withdraw its
export levy by squeezing the industry...."^5 Later in the year, both
Alberta and Saskatchewan introduced legislative packages attempting
to increase their control over production, regulation, marketing, and
pricing of their resources"^. The Saskatchewan legislation was
declared ultra vires by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1977. but the
Alberta legislation was not challenged; its most important element,
as mentioned previously, was the creation of the Alberta Petroleum
Marketing Commission.
These fiscal initiatives were the trigger for the first federal-
provincial conflict over petroleum revenues. The export tax was
viewed by producing provinces as an unwarranted federal appropriation
of revenues which would otherwise have accrued to the provinces, and
should have done so. As royalties were deductible for the purposes
of federal income tax, the federal government viewed increased
royalty rates, especially a sliding scale designed to capture the
maximum economic rent from all types of oil fields, as a means of
eroding the federal tax base. The federal government retaliated by
passing the Petroleum Administration Act 7 which gave it powers to
set prices for petroleum. The new "made-in-Canada" price for
petroleum was to be an average between domestic and imported prices,
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with a subsidy provided to Canadian refiners purchasing the more
expensive imports. In May 197^. the new federal budget eliminated
1 ft
the deductibility of royalties for the calculation of federal tax
"The effect on corporate profits was dramatic and the result was
a significant decrease in exploration activity for the 197^~75
season."^9 Petroleum companies took their exploration funds and
drilling rigs south of the border where prices were higher and
financial prospects appeared much better. Realising that it had
contributed to taking the industry's rate of return lower than was
acceptable, the federal government reduced the level of corporate tax
?0
applicable to resource profits . The provinces of Alberta and
British Columbia followed suit by introducing incentives aimed at
alleviating the fiscal burden of the petroleum companies by reducing
royalties and introducing drilling incentives. This initial
confrontation between federal and provincial levels of government
over petroleum revenues had resulted in a game of chicken in which
the catastrophic movement of petroleum activity south of the border
marked the end of the game. Both parties backed away from the
confrontation and made serious attempts to reconcile their own
interests with those of the petroleum industry.
In the debate concerning the division of petroleum revenues in
Canada, there are three prime claimants: the federal government, the
provincial governments, and the producing industry. In the initial
conflict over the acquisition of rapidly increasing economic rent,
each of the three actors had a legitimate claim to an increased
revenue share. The federal government bore the responsibility for
the administration of the subsidy program to Canadian petroleum
refiners (the Oil Import Compensation Program) in addition to its
usual fiscal responsibility for equalisation payments to provinces
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whose revenue-generating capacity remained below the national
average . The provincial governments, as owners of the resource,
could legitimately increase royalty and taxation rates within their
borders so as to facilitate their capture of the increased economic
rent. Although their absorptive capacity for revenues was far less
than that of the federal government, their claim was in some senses
stronger as it was based directly on their constitutionally-based
ownership of the petroleum resource. Finally, the producing industry
had a claim to an increased share of economic rent as it took the
risks inherent in petroleum investment and was therefore entitled to
some of the new profits. Indeed, without the private petroleum
industry, these resources would not have been developed in the first
place and the question of capturing economic rent from inflated
prices would not have been an issue. The conflict remained in the
governmental sphere, with the federal and provincial initiatives
highlighting the tensions inherent in the constitutional provisions
for natural resources. Energy issues, primarily concerned with
petroleum prices and revenue distribution, were to remain one of the
key elements in the centralisation-decentralisation debate which
gripped Canada throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s.
Obviously, the federal-provincial conflict resulted in the
industry's financial interests being sacrificed to advance the
interests of both levels of government. When the petroleum industry
had reached its limit of tolerance, it voted with its feet and
effectively halted exploration activity in Canada. The outcome was a
retreat by both the federal and provincial governments and a revival
of industry activity. In part, these events contributed to political
pressure on the federal government to create a national petroleum
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company, and they affected pricing policy as well. They created
considerable uncertainty for petroleum investors, and they also
foreshadowed events which were to develop later in the decade.
In its Energy Policy document of 1973 . the federal government
stated that a reasonable rate of return to the petroleum industry was
20% of the capital itrWes-tedl- It implied that it would
endeavor to recover any rent above that level of return for the
benefit of the nation. Through the rest of the decade, estimates of
sufficient rates of return remained at around 20% after tax "...which
compares unfavourably with apparent available returns on new
investment of about l4#."^3 The reason the petroleum industry
considered 20# unfavourable compared with 14# elsewhere is, it
argues, that it is engaged in high risk investment, and uncertainty
requires high return, especially as front-end investment costs are
high.
Petroleum industry spokesmen frequently claim that
preferential tax treatment of the return to capital
in oil and gas production is necessary to offset the
extraordinarily high risk associated with that
activity, implying that resource allocation would
thereby be improved. The claim is based on three
assertions: first, that oil and gas production
involves very high risks; second, that given the high
risk there is a need to encourage more risk-taking;
and third, that the tax system contains an anti-risk
taking bias due to its incomplete loss offset.
Whether oil and gas exploration activity is more or less risky
than other industrial activity remains open to question. There is
less uncertainty in Western Canada where the exploration drilling
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success ratio remains constant at about 10%^. No one would doubt
the costs associated with drilling nine holes on the average in order
to find one commercial field, but many would argue that such costs
are not appropriately described as risks. The petroleum industry, it
is claimed, overplays the risk aspect in order to justify a larger
share of rent for itself. Risk, in the case of drilling costs, might
more properly be related to situations in which success ratios vary
dramatically from time to time and therefore a reliable estimate of
the cost of discovery cannot be made. However, the uncertainties of
price in the international petroleum market make the industry's
claims about risk appear more sensible.
After the exploration "strike" by the industry in 197^ t the
federal government amended its corporate income tax relating to
resource extraction industries to reduce the petroleum industry's tax
p/T
liability throughout the mid and late 1970s . Petroleum
corporations were allowed to treat capital expenditures as current
expenses for the purposes of federal corporate tax. This "expensing"
of costs associated with land acquisition, geological and geophysical
expenses, and drilling all contributed to delays in tax payments
which could be extended indefinitely if the company grew at a
sufficient rate. The immediate burden of corporate tax was reduced
and the expansion of petroleum activity was encouraged. The federal
government also introduced a depletion allowance of 33This
resulted in an automatic reduction of one-third in the profit liable
for federal corporate income tax.
These fiscal arrangements, while applauded by the petroleum
industry, were received with some criticism from the financial
sector. "It has been aptly observed that the Canadian tax system ...
is not designed to capture a very high percentage of the economic
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rent.... Although it has encouraged an accelerated rate of
exploration, development, and production.., the principal effect was
probably to enhance the rents paid to landowners, including
pO
provincial governments." In absolute terms, all three parties were
receiving substantially increased revenues as a result of increased
prices. The petroleum industry's net profits after tax rose from
$2.6 billion in 1968 to $6 billion by 1976 and to $12 billion in 1980
despite the fact that its percentage share of gross revenues declined
after 1972^9.
The other major fiscal issue in the late 1970s was the expense
associated with the Oil Import Compensation Program (OICP). As
mentioned previously, this federal program provided a subsidy to
Canadian petroleum refiners whose supplies came from the more
expensive imports. The subsidy was provided from funds gained by the
export tax on Canadian production. Canadian domestic prices had been
allowed to rise since 1973~74 and the eventual goal was to bring them
in line with international prices. This policy eased the fiscal
strain of the OICP in the mid-1970s, but once the second OPEC pricing
crisis developed in 1979-1980, the federal government was pressed to
sustain the program without additional revenues. "In July 1978, the
per barrel difference between world prices and domestic prices was
less than $3. By [the time the National Energy Program was tabled
in] late 1980, however, the differential was about $20 a barrel."3®
The OICP was projected to cost almost $3 billion in the years I98O-
198331.
In addition, the federal government was coming under increasing
pressure concerning rising public expenditures. "The Canadian
government's expenditures on the public debt had increased sharply,
from less than $3 billion in 1975 to almost $11 billion in 1981.
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With most of the federal government's revenues committed in advance
both to servicing the debt and to providing funds required for social
programs (whose cost has been escalating rapidly in recent years),
Ottawa feared that it would lack any significant revenues with which
to pursue new programs and to help develop the economy."3^ The
outcome was that the Liberal government, returned to power under
Pierre Trudeau in February 1980, committed itself to the tabling of a
new energy program designed to capture a larger share of increasing
petroleum rents.
Once again, petroleum revenues became the focus of federal-
provincial conflict. "With a federal budgetary deficit then
approaching some $14 billion a year, it seemed to Ottawa in late 1980
both justifiable and essential to attack the revenue base of the
Alberta government, which has over the past few years been massing
petrodollars in a 'Heritage Fund' that by 1983 contained more than
$12 billion."33 Alberta's aggregate petroleum revenues had increased
from $518 million in 1973 to $2.6 billion in 1977. creating
embarrassing budget surpluses. By 1980, they would "...be of the
same order of magnitude as the economy-wide federal corporate income
tax revenues from the entire country."3^
In May 1976, the Alberta government established the Alberta
Heritage Savings Trust Fund in an attempt to invest the accruing
surplus petroleum revenues in the interests of the provincial
economy35. The Heritage Trust Fund was to receive 30% of the
province's annual petroleum income which would be used in efforts to
mobilise capital to encourage economic diversification. At least 65%
of the Fund's assets had to be invested in provincial projects
yielding reasonable rates of return to the province, 20% had to be
invested in projects providing long-term social and economic benefits
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for the province, and the remaining 15# could be invested elsewhere
in Canada — mainly in loans to other provinces, further enhancing
the province's economic influence. At the time the bill was passed
by the Alberta legislature, 69 of the 75 provincial seats were held
by Premier Lougheed's Conservative party, ensuring that the bill was
enacted regardless of the controversy associated with it, one aspect
of which was that the Fund was kept under cabinet, not parliamentary,
control. This would ensure that the Premier and his closest
colleagues would retain control over the Heritage Trust Fund, which
was important in a legislature where the majority of the governing
party was so large that its own backbenchers could sometimes be a
force of opposition. On more than one occasion, the Heritage Trust
Fund has been referred to as the Heritage Slush Fund.
The Alberta government was able to consider investing a portion
of its economic rent from petroleum production because the absorptive
capacity of the provincial economy was limited. The province has a
very small population which was well-off in comparison with many
other Canadians, and it was widely believed that investing some of
the petroleum revenues (either for future generations or future
economic development) was a prudent use of an unusual opportunity. A
similar situation occurred in Norway and is discussed in greater
detail later in this chapter.
The fact that the province of Alberta was gaining in economic
power, and attendant political influence among the other provinces,
contributed to the federal government's urgent need to redesign
petroleum revenue distribution more strongly in its favour. The
federal government also had a desperate need for increased revenues,
but the critical issue was that Alberta's surplus revenues were
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eroding the dominant fiscal position of the national government
thought essential by the centralist Liberals under Prime Minister
Trudeau.
The minority Conservative government elected under Joe Clark in
May 1979 had, by December, reworked its energy policy. However, it
was defeated on budget proposals which included an increased tax on
gasoline. The voters in Ontario and Quebec were mainly responsible
for re-electing the Liberals whose energy platform was far more
sympathetic to the large consuming market in central and eastern
Canada. The second OPEC crisis caused energy prices to soar once
more, but the Liberals remained committed to the popular policy of
holding down the domestic price of oil. Before losing office in May
1979. they had begun a reform of energy policy to ensure increased
federal petroleum revenues. Once returned to power in February 1980,
the Liberal government resumed that effort in order to table the new
policy as part of the budget of October.
The National Energy Program^ was a major initiative and a
predictable outcome of the Liberal government's thinking on petroleum
policy. Firstly, the federal government was in need of substantially
increased revenues to maintain the OICP and payments on its
increasing deficit. Secondly, the financial strength of the
Conservative government of Alberta was alarming the federal Liberals.
Thirdly, the federal government had produced Energy Futures for
Canadians in 1978^, a policy document which outlined the principal
elements of a new energy policy which were finally implemented in the
NEP.
Contrary to popular opinion that the NEP was an opportunistic
attempt on the part of the federal government to increase its revenue
share after the OPEC price rises of 1979~80, it was in fact a well-
313
planned strategy, developed long before the OPEC actions, which had
been interrupted by the short-lived Conservative government's time in
office in 1979- The price increases of 1979~80 served to support the
federal initiative in the face of strong opposition to the program
from the producer governments, the industry, and the American
government. The vast majority of Canadian voters continued to stand
behind the federal policy in the belief that the exploitation of
Canadian petroleum resources should benefit Canadians, not Albertans
or oil tycoons or Americans. However, the National Energy Program
was part of a highly confidential budget document which contributed
to the surprise which greeted its introduction. It was drafted in
secret within the federal bureaucracy at very senior levels without
the consultation of the provincial governments concerned or the
petroleum industry. It proved to be a radical policy change with
far-reaching political, as well as economic, impact. "The NEP was,
beside being a set of policies, a bargaining ploy and a power play.
It was a political strategy by the Liberals to restructure political
power both between the federal government and the producing
provinces, and between the federal government and the foreign versus
Canadian-owned portions of the oil and gas industry."3^
The National Energy Program was tabled on October 28, 1980. Its
stated objectives included security of supply, opportunity for
Canadians, and fairness in pricing and revenue sharing. The
principal means by which the federal government was to achieve these
goals included price schedules below the international level
(discussed in Chapter 4), a new fiscal regime including the
introduction of several federal energy taxes, and an incentive scheme
aimed at alleviating the tax burden of frontier exploration for
Canadian companies. The objectives of supply, security, and fairness
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in pricing and revenue distribution were, however, conflicting.
Security of supply implies high prices and low taxes to encourage
investment but the policy actually implemented secured low prices and
a myriad of taxes on production, refining, and consumption, in effect
discouraging investors and provoking an industry reaction similar to
that of 1974.
The two principal objectives of the fiscal changes introduced in
the NEP were to rearrange the distribution of economic rent from
petroleum exploitation, and to bias incentives for exploration in
favour of Canadian firms and in favour of activity on the Canada
Lands. On the former, the federal government introduced taxes on the
principal aspects of petroleum activity: production, refining, and
consumption. The Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax (PGRT) was a 16%
federal tax on all petroleum production in Canada, despite the fact
that provincial ownership of the resource was not contested. There
was a 25% resource allowance which brought the effective PGRT rate
down to 12$, but, like a royalty, the new federal tax was not to be
deductible for the calculation of federal income tax. A Natural Gas
and Gas Liquids Tax (NGGLT) was a similar levy placed on natural gas
production. The Petroleum Compensation Charge (PCC) was levied at
the refinery and would fund the oil import subsidy to importing
refiners. The Canadian Ownership Special Charge (COSC) was a tax
paid by consumers at the petrol pump from which Petro-Canada's
acquisitions would be funded. As the federal initiatives were not in
any way coordinated with the provincial fiscal regimes, these new
taxes represented a net loss to the industry and ultimately an
increased financial burden on the Canadian petroleum consumer.
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The NEP outlined the historical petroleum revenue distribution
from 1972 through 1979. reproduced below^9. The dramatically
increasing revenues in the post 1973 era show a slightly increased
but stable federal revenue share, an increased provincial share, and
a decreased industry share.
Historical Sharing of Oil and Gas Production Income-Percentages
Canadians billions
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
With the NEP's new fiscal regime and international price expectations
of just under $80 per barrel by 1990, the federal government hoped to
increase its percentage share of petroleum revenues to 2^% over the
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years I98O-I983. The industry share would be 33# (which, in the
federal government's calculation included cash flow and fiscal
incentives), and the producing provinces would share 43# (Alberta —
35#. Saskatchewan and British Columbia -- 4# each). Revenue sharing
is a zero-sum game in percentage terms. If one party gains, other
parties lose, despite the fact that all may be realising larger
absolute revenues if the available economic rent is increasing. This
is partly why the competition for increased percentage revenue shares
is fierce while none of the parties tend to acknowledge absolute
increases in revenues. In the Canadian situation, three parties were
involved in this game: the federal and provincial levels of
government and the petroleum industry itself.
The 'Canadianisation' efforts of the NEP are evident in the
Petroleum Incentives Programme (PIP). All petroleum companies active
within Canadian territories were to be rated according to the extent
of Canadian ownership. Those with positive ratings were eligible for
up to 80% grants for exploration activities carried out on the Canada
Lands. The lower the Canadian Ownership Rate (COR), the lower the
grant percentage. PIP grants were to be funded through new PGRT and
NGGLT revenues, and companies had to apply to Ottawa directly,
enhancing the federal presence in petroleum activity. Since the
programme was intended to discriminate in favour of Canadian
companies at the expense of large, foreign-owned multinationals, the
American reaction was predictably hostile. The Canadianisation
program also vested more discretionary power in the federal
bureaucracy in both the COR and PIP programs.
The provincial reaction to the introduction of the NEP was
likewise hostile, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5» Premier Lougheed
saw the federal fiscal initiative as a bold grab for revenues not
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properly belonging to the federal government. In Alberta it provoked
something like a siege mentality, with the provincial government and
the petroleum industry lined up to fight the new energy program at
all costs. Every federal encroachment upon provincial jurisdictions
since the original withholding of natural resource rights to 1930 was
bitterly recalled. The province implemented production cuts in order
to force the federal government to negotiate as it seemed powerless
to fight the pricing or taxation legislation by any other means.
Once again, petroleum exploration declined dramatically in 1981 as
the industry moved rigs and capital to the States. According to the
Petroleum Monitoring Agency Canada, gross industry revenues had
increased 13.6% in 1981 over 1980 figures while industry net income
declined 33•5% over the previous year's figure as a result of the new
fiscal regime^. Clearly, the difference was accruing to the federal
government.
When the 1981 legislation was enacted, the oil fields of the
Canada Lands were not yet in production but the federal government
hoped, in the longer term, that they would provide an additional
source of revenue. A separate fiscal regime for these territories
was embodied in the Canada Oil and Gas Lands Act 1981^ which
provided for a greater federal revenue share than did the regime
introduced in the NEP. Its principal provision was the introduction
of a basic royalty rate of 10% that would be levied on all ensuing
production. There would also be a Progressive Incremental Royalty
(PIR), a tax levied at a rate of 40% on net profits. In addition,
production from the Canada Lands would be subject to the usual
federal petroleum taxes as well as corporate income tax.
318
The effect of the provincial production cutbacks coupled with
severe criticism of the NEP from the provinces concerned, the
industry, and the American government, brought the federal government
back into negotiation with Albertan representatives over the NEP. In
September 1981, after six months of negotiations, the Memorandum of
Agreement on Energy Pricing and Taxation was signed by Prime
Minister Trudeau and Premier Lougheed. Its main provisions included
revised price schedules for oil and gas through 1986, the
introduction of a further federal tax on petroleum production, the
Incremental Oil Revenue Tax (IORT), and the establishment of the
Alberta Petroleum Incentives Program. The Alberta government gained
little in these negotiations — slightly increased prices for some
categories of oil and a reduction of the NGGLT to a rate of zero on
gas exports. In turn, the Alberta government assumed the financial
and administrative reponsibility for the PIP program within the
province. The federal government appeared to have outmanoeuvred the
province, succeeding in levying a further federal production tax on
petroleum which was to act as a windfall profits tax. The IORT was
set at 50# of the increase in revenue above the previous NEP price
schedules, and was intended to capture the increased economic rent
resultant from the OPEC initiatives of 1979~80. The only deduction
allowed was royalty payments. However, revenue subject to the IORT
was not subject to corporate income tax. Within months, this
agreement too would be outdated„
In the spring of 1982 a number of factors
dovetailed to dampen the short-term outlook for the
industry. Continued high interest rates; the
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deepening of the world-wide recession; the softening
of demand for oil in Canada and world-wide, along
with the growing realisation that the emerging glut
of oil on world markets may be more than a short-term
temporal condition; the maturation of many of the
conservation and substitution programs put in place
since 1973 in the western consuming world; the
subsequent softening of world price and the growing
dissension within OPEC, all combined with the new,
higher royalty and taxation provisions of the
September 1981 Canada-Alberta Agreement, to squeeze
industry cash flow and profits^.
Several megaprojects concerning oilsand developments lost industry
partners early in 1982 as restricted cash flows curtailed
participation in high-risk ventures. In 1982, the industry's gross
revenues increased by 9# while net revenue declined a further 52#.
In response to the deterioration of the industry's financial
position, the Alberta government introduced the Alberta Oil and Gas
Activity Program (AOGAP)^ in April which comprised royalty
reductions, and other grants and credits totalling $4.5 billion in
assistance to the industry. The federal government followed suit
with the NEP Update^ announced in May. The IORT was suspended for
one year, the basic rate of PGRT was reduced from 16# to 14.67# and
smaller producers were eligible for exemption, and higher prices
introduced for some categories of oil. The federal government
expected these measures to reduce its revenue share by 7#, reduce the
provincial share by 3#. and increase the industry's share by 10# in
the years to 1986.
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By 1983, the improved condition of industry net revenue was
evident in its relatively slight decline of 11% from the previous
year^. Total revenues had once again increased, by 5#. which was
matched by a similar percentage for each of the next few years. Net
income increased l4l# in 1984, and 14# in 1985 before extraordinary
items. Revenue shares developed in this way:
PMA Estimated Percentage Revenue Shares 1979-1985^
Industry Provinces Federal
1979 41.2 45.7 13.1
1980 54.4 34.9 10.7
1981 50.4 30.4 19.2
1982 45.9 27.9 26.2
1983 50.3 29.2 20.5
1984 53-6 31.5 14.9
1985 54.0 29.8 16.2
The impact of the NEP on revenue distribution between the three
parties is quite clear. The federal government made substantial
gains in its revenue share at the expense of both the industry and
the provincial governments in both 1981 and 1982 with the
introduction of new taxes. After 1982, its share declined once more
as the IORT was suspended and international prices started to fall.
Nonetheless, the federal government share of petroleum revenues
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improved appreciably after the implementation of the National Energy
Program when compared with the pre-NEP figures of between 7% and 11%
in the years 1973 through 1979-
In a Departmental document produced by the Financial and Fiscal
Analysis Branch of Energy, Mines, and Resources in December 1982, Do
jiO
Governments Take Too Much? , the federal government's position on
revenue distribution was clearly stated.
One of the objectives of the federal government in
the development of the National Energy Program ...
was to secure a larger share of the revenues from oil
and gas production, and to have in place a system
which afforded the federal government a significant
share of the upside revenue potential. The federal
government emphasised, however, that it was not its
intention to improve its share solely, or even
substantially, at the expense of the industry. The
government believed, and still does, that there was
some room for higher taxes on industry revenues, but
made clear that the principal issue was the
disposition of revenues between the two levels of
government, [my emphasis]^
The purpose of the report was to argue against industry accusations
that the federal government achieved its fiscal objectives primarily
at the expense of the industry itself and not the provincial levels
of government. The industry associations had waged various
advertising and public information campaigns after the implementation
of the NEP in the effort to make the Canadian public aware of both
the taxation of petroleum and its products as well as the employment
and investment contributions of the petroleum industry to the
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Canadian economy. The federal government was increasingly sensitive
to charges of revenue-grabbing, and clearly wished to set the record
straight.
Quoting Canadian Petroleum Association figures, the report noted
that the average percentage revenue shares in the years 1975 through
1980 were: industry, 45-3%; provinces, 45-1#; federal, 9-6$. By
departmental calculations (no longer those of the CPA), percentages
from 1981 through 1986 would average at these levels: industry, 46%;
provinces, 32%; federal 22%. The report concluded that "...the tax
and incentive regime introduced in the NEP does not result in an
increased relative fiscal burden on the industry.... The industry's
criticism on this count is misplaced."^
This report was originally intended for Departmental revision
and use. It was, however, distributed within the petroleum industry
and created additional uproar. According to the federal government,
its gain was at the expense of the provinces, and cash flow
difficulties in the petroleum industry were largely a result of
increased interest rates. "Canadian companies which made major
acquisitions financed by debt have been particularly hard hit by high
interest rates, and it is important to distinguish them from other
Canadian firms which have been more financially cautious about taking
on major new debt burdens."51 The report did not mention that the
acquisition-debt problem was a direct result of the federal PIP
scheme in which grants were related to the assessed percentage of
Canadian ownership. As many foreign-owned and controlled firms
sought to increase their Canadian ownership rating, they fell prey to
unforeseen interest rate problems through acquisitions made possible
by substantial loans. In the report, the federal government was
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disregarding the impact of its new fiscal regime on the industry in
its effort to prove that its financial gain was at the expense of the
producing provinces, not the petroleum industry.
Early the next year, the Conservative Opposition began
consultations with key petroleum interest groups and provincial
governments in an effort to shape energy policy in the face of an
impending federal election^. Industry representatives were
surprised to be consulted by the Conservative Shadow Energy Minister,
Pat Carney, at the outset of policy planning. This had not occurred
in the development of either the NEP or the federal-provincial
agreement which followed. The industry had vigorously argued that
petroleum fiscal arrangements made without industry input were
unrealistic and doomed to fail. Sympathetic to industry
frustrations, the Conservatives committed themselves to eliminating
the NEP if elected in September 1984. Having gained office, the new
administration quickly opened negotiations with the producing
provinces and the petroleum industry in order to establish how best
to fulfil its campaign promise. However, until the last stage of
negotiations, the Conservatives attempted to retain a federal
resource rent tax by replacing the PGRT with another type of
petroleum tax^3. Their concern was that the federal government would
be left unable to fulfil its PIP obligations if the PGRT was
eliminated immediately. In addition, the new federal government had
serious financial difficulties in managing the $26 billion deficit on
the current account. The Canadian Petroleum Association and the
Independent Petroleum Association of Canada suggested a phasing-out
of the PGRT to secure some petroleum revenues for the government in
the near term, but eventually to return to the pre-NEP fiscal
regime^. This suggestion was accepted by the government.
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The Western Accord^^ between the federal, Albertan,
Saskatchewan, and British Columbian governments was announced on
March 28, 1985. Crude oil prices would be deregulated, natural gas
pricing would be redesigned along more market-oriented lines, and the
petroleum fiscal regime would be overhauled. The government removed
the NGGLT, IORT, COSC, PCC, and the oil export charge. The PGRT was
eliminated on new production and would be phased out on all
production by the end of 1988. The PIP scheme would end in 1986.
The Western Accord dismantled the entire NEP fiscal structure and did
not replace it with another federal resource rent taxation regime.
The petroleum industry would be taxed as it was in pre-NEP years,
paying royalties to the government of ownership and corporate taxes
to both levels of government. The system was greatly simplified and
the federal government believed that the reduction of the federal
fiscal burden on the industry would improve prospects for petroleum
activity in Canada. "The Western Accord has been welcomed as a major
step forward in rationalising and restoring equity to the fiscal and
regulatory regime applying to the oil and gas industry. The
substantial removal of government influence from pricing and
marketing of crude oil has been an objective of most industry
participants for over a decade.Unfortunately, this fiscal
initiative coincided with the dramatic decline in the international
price of oil (see Chapter 4) and the Canadian petroleum industry
remained as depressed as the industry elsewhere in the world.
The rapid decline in the international price of oil in 1986 was
estimated to cost the industry between $3*3 and $4.1 billion in
cashflow^?. Only 71 drilling rigs were active in June 1986 compared
with 320 a year earlier. On April 30, 1986, the federal government
announced a tax relief program worth $130 million to the industry to
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the end of 19885s. In April and June, the provinces of Alberta and
Saskatchewan offered packages of royalty relief. On September 8, the
federal Energy Minister Masse announced the elimination of PGRT
effective from October 1, 198659. Despite these fiscal
modifications, some industry representatives called for the
introduction of a floor price for Canadian petroleum to support their
financial position, a proposal which the federal government has
resisted strongly.
There are three principal conclusions to be drawn from this
discussion of the development of the Canadian petroleum fiscal
regime. Firstly, in both 1973 and 1980, governments took fiscal
initiatives to improve their revenue shares prior to the
international price crises, and both these initiatives provoked
conflict between the two levels of Canadian government. In 1973.
before the OPEC crisis, the Alberta royalty increases were followed
by the federal export tax. In 1980, the NEP was implemented prior to
the full impact of the second OPEC price increases, and it had been
in the planning stages prior to the short-lived Conservative
government of 1979- Canadian governments, contrary to popular
belief, did not redesign petroleum fiscal arrangements because of the
two OPEC crises. Rather, these crises simply coincided with
initiatives already underway, and encouraged further action on the
part of both levels of government by introducing the prospect of
additional economic rent. The OPEC price crises simply increased the
stakes; they did not start the zero-sum game between federal and
provincial levels of government for petroleum revenue shares.
The second conclusion to be drawn is that the petroleum industry
has learned to play the game as well. Since the events of 1973. it
has used increasing political savoire-faire in its effort to inform
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both governments and the Canadian public that the continuing
competition for increased revenue shares between the two levels of
government has resulted in the occasional reduction of the industry's
share to unacceptable levels. The reduction of industry cash flow
results in radically reduced exploration and investment activity.
The industry voted with its feet in both 197^ and 1981. moving
drilling rigs and exploration funds south of the border, but in the
second instance made serious efforts to enlist public support to
oppose the NEP. By 1981, it had learned the value of making
political points against its opponents. In the negotiations
preceding the Western Accord, the industry had a strong position
supported by the governments of the producing provinces, but yielded
on the question of PGRT elimination in recognition of the federal
government's continued financial difficulties and its responsibility
for PIP payments.
The third conclusion is that the development of the petroleum
fiscal regime in Canada has not been primarily a question of
balancing government and industry shares to secure the two main
objectives — maximum state capture of economic rent and sustained
industry activity. It has more to do with the political question of
federal and provincial competition for supremacy in decision-making
and revenue distribution, with backpeddalling occurring whenever the
"chicken game" resulted in disaster. Canadian federalism, with its
often conflicting areas of jurisdiction, provides ample opportunity
for muscle-flexing at both levels of government, often at the
ultimate expense of the Canadian public.
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2. THE UNITED KINGDOM
The United Kingdom claimed jurisdiction over its resources in the
North Sea in the Continental Shelf Act 1964^. It then began to
issue licences for exploration and the production of such petroleum
as might be found. As discussed in Chapter 5. the British government
was anxious to encourage investment in petroleum activity as it
wished to assess the magnitude of exploitable reserves and to
encourage rapid production from North Sea fields. Early licence
terms were therefore generous with regard to the financial cost to be
born by the industry. Likewise, the initial fiscal regime was
designed to encourage investment in petroleum resources. Royalties
were set at 12.5% of the wellhead value of production (landed market
value less costs of transportation to land) and corporate tax, at a
rate of 50%, was subject to substantial allowances in the case of
petroleum activities^. The fiscal regime was quickly criticised as
an inefficient method of capturing an appropriate state share of
economic rent. It was significantly altered after the first OPEC
pricing crisis.
As a result of the growing controversy over the value of the
discretionary method of licence allocation, the House of Commons
Public Accounts Committee (PAC) undertook a review of licensing and
taxation policy for petroleum activity in the North Sea in 1972,
published under the title North Sea Oil and Gas . Evidence
presented to the PAC by the Department of Trade and Industry, which
was responsible for the administration of the discretionary system of
licence awards, indicated that projections under the existing regimes
would yield substantial revenues to the government. However, the
Department of Inland Revenue challenged that position, arguing that
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the DTI figures underestimated the impact of the generous allowances
in calculating the corporate tax liability of the petroleum
companies. Hann suggests that this discrepancy in evidence
illustrates at the very least, a serious lack of communication
between government departments, and perhaps competition between
bureaucratic interests'^.
However, the Public Accounts Committee received enough evidence
from various sources to draw its own conclusions. In its review of
revenue generated from petroleum activities in Britain, the Report
was highly critical of the generous treatment in the field of
corporate taxation. In the early 1970s, petroleum corporations were
very favourably treated by British tax laws which allowed free
depreciation on capital expenditures and the offset of foreign taxes
against British tax liability. "This second provision extinguished
the UK tax obligation of Shell and BP before North Sea oil started
flowing, but the real concern was that 'losses' on overseas
operations that exceeded the United Kingdom tax obligations in any
one year could be accumulated and carried forward to offset UK tax
obligations in future years.This cumulative loss of taxes had
reached $3-75 billion for the nine major petroleum companies,
S
according to the Public Accounts Committee. It was
"...unsatisfactory that UK tax revenue from continental shelf
operations should be pre-empted by the tax demands of administrations
elsewhere in the world.The Report recommended a new taxation
policy for the petroleum industry, and suggested the possibility of a
system of quantity taxation. In this arrangement, tax revenues would
depend more heavily on the amount of production, which accorded well
with the government's aggressive production policy. A barrelage tax
would secure an increased portion of the economic rent available for
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the state, although it might be a disincentive to the producing
industry, assuming the competition for economic rent to be a zero-sum
game.
It should also be mentioned that the experimental auction of
several exploration blocks in the fourth round (1971) further
indicated to the government that the industry was prepared to pay
substantially greater sums for the privilege of exploration and
production in the British North Sea. Clearly, the licensing regime
was not securing a reasonable share of the economic rent available
for the state. The government wished to continue encouraging rapid
exploration and production of Britain's petroleum resources, so the
licensing regime was left unrevised while taxation arrangements were
examined. In spring 1973. the Conservative government announced in
its budget that the North Sea tax regime would be revised and it
opened discussions with petroleum companies^.
The PAC had been well aware of the potential difficulties
associated with overtaxing the industry when rapid exploration and
exploitation were the government's primary objectives. It assessed
the impact of various taxation regimes on the industry, and came to
the conclusion that the taxable capacity of the petroleum industry as
a whole was much greater than British authorities had believed, and
the upper limit was certainly not being reached by the existing
system. The oil crisis of 1973"7^ served to support further the PAC
Report by increasing the taxable capacity of the industry. The
Heath government's inability to secure increased supplies for Britain
also contributed to increased pressure on the government to modify
the licensing and taxation legislation. In 197^, the Conservative
government, in the midst of revising its policies, lost the election.
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The new Labour administration came into office with its own energy
ov\e-
priorities, the principal/of which was to increase state
participation in the industry.
In July 197^. the Labour government's White Paper on North Sea
/TO
petroleum policy indicated that increased state participation would
take two forms. Greater public control would be assumed through the
establishment of BNOC, and an increased share of the profits
generated from petroleum production would be achieved by tax changes.
It proposed to close the tax loopholes brought to light in the PAC
Report and to introduce an additional tax on North Sea production.
"This was intended as a specific tax ... designed to recapture
economic rent transferred to the oil companies via the discretionary
licensing system."^
The Oil Taxation Bill was introduced to Parliament in November
197^70_ Labour government did not intend to introduce a
barrelage tax, as had been suggested by the PAC, as such a tax was
thought too detrimental to marginal fields. Instead, it proposed the
levying of a Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT) which would be calculated
not on production but on some agreed concept of liable revenues.
Negotiations between government and industry officials occurred at
the report stage of the bill, and many changes in the proposed
legislation were made. Hann suggests that the success of industry
pressure was largely due to its monopoly of information about North
Sea activity and costs associated with it, coupled with uncertainty
on both sides about price, cost, and production expectations'^.
As originally conceived, the PRT was to be a single rate tax on
net positive undiscounted cash flow. It would be levied on a company
basis, rather than a field basis, and this was thought by the
industry to be discriminatory and potentially detrimental to smaller
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firms. In its final form, PRT was calculated on a field-by-field
basis at a rate of 45# of eligible revenues, but without any
offsetting of losses between various fields. In addition, a 25#
"uplift" allowance on capital expenses was introduced during the
course of the Bill's passage. Finally, safeguard provisions limited
the payment of PRT to 80# of annual net revenue less 30# cumulative
capital expenditure in any one calendar year. PRT payments would be
deductible from profits in the calculation of corporate income tax.
The Secretary of State was also to be granted additional powers to
waive or refund royalties in whole or in part as deemed necessary.
In 1976 it was further decided that royalties would be
calculated on a tax reference price from the fifth round in 1977^ •
A ring fence on the North Sea was introduced for the purposes of
corporate income tax calculation (then at a rate of 52#), which meant
that losses in one field could be used to offset gains in another
within the British North Sea^,
Under the Oil Taxation Act 1975^. the Exchequer expected to
receive revenues in the order of Sll billion to 1981 and $7-7 billion
per annum thereafter^5. The government expected the new fiscal
vvzfc
regime to capture 70# of the revenue generated by fields up to the
fourth round of licensing, and 85# for fifth round licences (which
included BNOC's automatic 51# stake). Although BNOC was responsible
for its share of development costs, the new fiscal regime, in the
latter half of the 1970s, only yielded 6O-7O# of net company revenues
to the government, given variations in company and field
performances^. Because tax liabilities built up slowly (as a result
of various allowances, falling production, and smaller field
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development), there would be a bell-shaped tax curve at a constant
price level. This too could contribute to a smaller revenue share
for the government than it had expected.
Economic studies of the impact of the new fiscal arrangements
conducted by Robinson and Morgan concluded that the PRT contributed a
fairly small percentage of total government revenues from petroleum
activity^?. For model fields examined at the 1977 price, the total
government share was in the range of 61-67# of net company revenues,
of which PRT contributed between 0# and 15#. The maximum PRT
liability of any of the model fields they studied was 22#. The
conclusion was the PRT was not a serious deterrent to field
development; there were sufficient allowances built into the regime
to reduce liability for the tax.
The Robinson and Morgan study also examined the impact of the
British fiscal regime for petroleum at various price levels,
concluding that the British system yielded lower company returns at
price levels below $14 per barrel than the Norwegian regime, which
was generally assumed to be much harsher^®. At the lower price
levels, royalties and corporate income tax were responsible for the
higher government share as PRT liability was eliminated. At higher
prices, petroleum companies under the British regime did very
marginally better than did those operating in Norway. Garnault and
Clunies Ross suggested that the government's objectives could have
been much more easily achieved through the introduction of an indexed
resource rent tax, "...the rules of which did not need to be amended
when oil prices changed."79 They also noted that a resource rent tax
would have been more profitable for the government than the current
PRT.
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The inflexibility of PRT adjustment to price variations meant
that its basic rate and allowances were modified several times over
the following decade. By 1978 the Labour government was sufficiently
confident in North Sea exploitation to propose an increase the rate
of PRT from 45# to 60% along with a reduction of the uplift allowance
Oq
on capital expenditure and the oil allowance . Although these
initiatives were announced before the Iranian Revolution and the
price developments which followed it, they indicate that the
government believed it was not obtaining maximum economic rent from
North Sea production. In 1975. the new fiscal regime had been based
on an assumption of falling oil prices in real terms after the
initial OPEC action. This did not occur, and in 1978 oil companies
were reaping large profits from the North Sea. With a general
election in the offing, the Labour government wanted to maximise the
state share from North Sea development. The Conservative Opposition
was in agreement with Labour's proposals; the Conservatives would
benefit from being on the popular side of this political issue, and
would have increased revenues at their disposal if they won office.
The Conservatives won the election and their first budget included
the increase of the PRT rate to 60%.
Although the OPEC marker price stood at over $33 per barrel by
the time the new administration enacted this change, it is important
to note that the new budget was not a reaction to increased
international prices. As in Canada, the government realised it was
not capturing its potential share and proposed changes before the
second price rises occurred. Because these fiscal arrangements were
designed prior to the second price increases, they had to be modified
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almost immediately to increase the government share in the face of
greatly increased economic rent produced by higher international
prices.
In March 1980 the Chancellor announced further changes in the
81
petroleum fiscal regime . The PRT rate was increased to 70#
effective from the end of 1979* In November, the Chancellor
announced his intention to introduce, in the following year, another
Op
tax on offshore oil production . The new tax, the Supplementary
Petroleum Duty (SPD), was intended to act as a windfall profits tax
in the wake of international price increases. The petroleum industry
was invited to make proposals for alternative tax systems which would
leave the government with a similar percentage share of net revenues
from petroleum exploitation. In the 1981 budget, the SPD was set at
20# of gross revenues, to be collected monthly, less an annual
allowance of one million tonnes per field. PRT allowances were
marginally reduced. Although the SPD was originally intended to
cover the periods 1981 through the first half of 1982, it was later
extended to the end of 1982.
The industry's reaction was strong and critical. In response to
the Chancellor's invitation for comment, both the United Kingdom
Offshore Operators' Association (UK00A) and the British independent
operators' group, BRINDEX, recommended that the SPD be abolished^.
The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) likewise concluded that the
new fiscal regime would overtax the industry and make marginal
investments unattractive. In The Taxation of North Sea 0il^\ the
IFS advocated a replacement of all oil and gas taxes by a simple
three-tiered resource rent tax, with thresholds indexed at 15#. 25#
and 35# and a top marginal rate of 85#. Other commentators agreed
with this basic proposition, but disagreed over threshold levels and
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assumptions used in the study. Hann suggests that these and similar
proposals were rejected by both the government and the industry
because "tax experts in government and in oil companies had
accumulated skill in manipulating the existing system and a new,
simple system could diminish their relative expertise and thus their
relative power and job security."®5 In a less formal reaction,
several new projects were shelved and rumour spread that UKOOA
members would not apply for exploration blocks in the next licensing
round.
Various analyses of the impact of SPD were undertaken which
brought to light some of the industry's complaints concerning the new
tax. The fiscal regime now "...incorporated a top marginal rate of
over 90# with two front-end production taxes in the royalty and
SPD.... Compared to the previous situation the structure of the
system was now less geared to profitability and the Government was
not sharing in the exploitation risks to the same extent."®® With
international prices no longer increasing, the industry's position
strengthened and in the March 1982 budget, relief was given®7. The
SPD was replaced with Advance PRT (APRT) which was similar to SPD in
that it was a 20% tax on gross revenues with an annual production
allowance. However, it was allowable against PRT and did not affect
total PRT liability but it increased immediate payments to the
government. To compensate for the reduction in the government share,
the PRT rate was increased to 75%• Industry criticism was immediate,
and further modifications were made to the budget proposals so that
APRT would not be incurred within the first five years of a project's
life and companies would be repaid APRT after five years rather than
in a lump sum at the end of field life®®. With all these fiscal
changes, marginal tax rates had increased from 76.9# in 1975~78 to
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87.4# after the 1979 and 1980 changes, to a high of 90.3# after the
introduction of the SPD. After the 1982 relief, this was reduced to
89.5#89•
In 1983. the decline in both new developments and the
international price of oil spurred the government into further
petroleum fiscal modifications in its budget99. Royalties were
abolished and the production allowance for PRT was doubled for new
fields (fields granted development approval after April 1, 1982).
The distinction between old and new oil fields allowed the government
to develop two fiscal regimes: one which was more flexible, intended
to encourage new projects; and the other more rigid, intended to
sustain a large government share from less expensive production. The
newly established APRT was to be phased out and eliminated
by the end of 1986. Further relief was offered in the Oil Cessation
Bill, which allowed companies to claim capital expenditure on shared
projects against PRT. These reliefs reduced the marginal tax rate to
88# instead of the previous 89.5#9^. In the 1984 budget, further
relief was offered in the form of a reduction of corporate tax over a
period of time from 52# to 35#. and relief on secondary recovery
projects was expected in the following year9^. Kemp and Rose
concluded that under these fiscal arrangements, and assuming a 10#
minimum rate of return with prices constant at $28 to $30, "...a
considerable number of the fields available for development from the
mid-1990s would not be commercially viable on a pre-tax basis. The
addition of taxation ensured that several more fields could not be
developed."93 With the collapse in international oil prices, the
future looked considerably more bleak. Although representations were
made to the government, major fiscal changes have not been
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introduced. In any event, patchwork modifications to the fiscal
regime would contribute little to enhance security of long-term
investment.
Taxation arrangements affect two outcomes: industry activity, as
demonstrated in the discussion above, and state revenues which in
turn allow the government to pursue various financial courses of
action. In 1982, petroleum output contributed approximately 4.75% to
the GNP; gross revenues were in the order of $24.5 billion for oil
and $1.7 billion for gas production*^. In 1982-83, government
revenues from petroleum exploitation equalled 9-8% of total central
government revenues excluding national insurance contributions (7*9%
including such contributions)95. Xo make another comparison,
government petroleum revenues amounted to over half of the total sum
collected in VAT and just under one-quarter of total income tax
revenues in 1982-83^. These sums are not insubstantial.
The issue of spending petroleum revenues was largely obscured in
the mid-1970s by the government's increasing burden of public debt as
a result of loans borrowed on the strength of future petroleum
revenues, and inflationary difficulties in the aftermath of the
increased price of oil. The government had initially several options
for spending petroleum revenues. Immediate financial difficulties,
such as the increased public debt and rising unemployment, could be
addressed directly. Petroleum revenue could have been invested in
energy or industrial projects rather than being applied in whole or
in part to pressing financial problems. This was the type of option
favoured by the Scottish Nationalists, who advocated an investment
fund for the community most affected by oil exploitation and
therefore, according to the SNP, with the most legitimate claim —
Scotland. A more general option was to treat petroleum revenues as
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any other form of state revenue and not to earmark them. There was a
strong case against the employment of petroleum revenues for specific
purposes, such as industrial development. Uncertainty about the
future shape of the British economy, its industrial potential, and
its requirements in the 1990s could make a strategy formulated in the
1970s completely inappropriate in the future. Commentators of the
right were opposed to such strategies precisely because of
uncertainty and the high risk of wasting resources. "There is no
more reason to believe that the assembled multitudes of Ministers and
civil servants (even when joined by the Confederation of British
Industry, the Trades Union Congress and miscellaneous academics) can
work out the 'correct' strategy for Britain ... than there is to
think that the Energy Department can determine an 'optimum' depletion
rate."97
The Labour government of 197^~79. the period in which
substantial revenues began to accrue, did not establish a specific
investment fund for petroleum revenues. Like the Conservative
administration which followed, the Labour government had greater
interest in employing the revenue for current account expenditure.
In the 1980s, petroleum revenue of around $14 billion per annum
contributed to general revenues and still only covered under half of
the estimated fiscal loss due to unemployment*^. With declining
production in the British North Sea and a depressed international
price for oil, many commentators believed that the opportunities
created by an influx of petroleum revenues have been missed
altogether.
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Oil revenues provide resources which would permit tax
reductions, lower interest rates, and raise
investment incentives, but the main (though not the
only) effect of these policies would be to move us
along a given marginal efficiency of investment
schedule. More direct reforms, for example in the
labour market, are required to shift that schedule.
North Sea oil cannot be separated from the general
problems of the UK economy. ...[0]il revenues
provide a substantial increase in the level of
resources available to the country, but it is the
performance of the non-oil economy which will
determine whether those resources can provide a
contribution to expansion or a rentier's cushion
against decline.99
Unfortunately, it appears that the latter has proved to be the
British experience.
3. NORWAY
Norwegian petroleum policy has developed contemporaneously with
the British but it has been shaped by three factors -- Norway has
similar petroleum reserves to Britain, a population less than one-
tenth that of the UK, and a substantially lower demand for petroleum.
Consequently, influences on policy development in the Norwegian case
have been fundamentally different than those affecting the British
government. The principal issue was to formulate petroleum policies
which allowed the Norwegian parliament sufficient control over
exploitation to mitigate externalities. On the fiscal front, these
3^0
externalities were primarily related to the lack of absorptive
capacity for the tremendous influx of petroleum revenues in the
Norwegian economy.
In the Royal Decree of May 31. 1963^®♦ Norway declared its
sovereignty over the offshore areas of the Norwegian coastline. In
1965, the first petroleum taxation act was passed-'-'-'-'-, in which the
Norwegian government claimed the right to tax foreign petroleum
companies operating in the Norwegian offshore. Like the British
government, the Norwegian government was anxious to attract
investment in the exploration of its offshore resources. Until the
first OPEC pricing crisis, the Norwegian government exercised this
right by levying corporate taxes on the petroleum companies according
to the regulations of the General Tax Act 1911. The companies also
paid licence fees and royalties determined by the Norwegian
government for the right to explore for and to produce petroleum.
In the late 1960s, the royalty rate was 10%, but once
exploration was under way and prospects were encouraging, the
Norwegian government modified the licence fees and royalty rates-*-^.
It did this in 1972, well before the first OPEC price increases.
Licence fees were increased and a progressive royalty rate was
introduced which, like the sliding scale royalty scheme operating in
Alberta, related increased royalty rates to increased production.
The objectives were clearly to encourage the exploration of large and
small petroleum fields, to protect small producers, and to increase
the fiscal burden on more profitable oil wells (large producers).
The progressive royalty ranged from 8% for fields with production
under 40,000 barrels per day to 16% for fields with production of
3^1
350,000 barrels per day and above-*-1^. Some older fields retained a
fixed rate of 10$, and a separate royalty of 12,5% was established
for natural gas production.
Norwegian corporate tax comprised three taxes. The rates
applicable in the initial period of petroleum activity in Norway
were: federal tax at 26.5%, municipal tax at 15%, and a withholding
tax on distributed dividends at 10%. This municipal rate for the
petroleum industry compared very favourably with the 16% to 19%
liability of other industries-*-*-^. However, the municipal group of
taxes was increased to 24.3% at the same time as the new royalty
scheme was introduced^^ # jn 1975, corporate tax was modified again
to total 50.8%: the federal tax was increased to 27.8% and municipal
taxes came down to 23%^"^. This corporate tax is not subject to an
explicit ring fence, as it is in the U.K., but deductions of
expenditures outside the country are prohibited and only 50% of the
losses incurred in petroleum and related activities onshore can be
deducted from profits. For the purposes of calculating the tax,
deductible losses may be carried forward for no more than fifteen
years, and only one-third of the previous year's loss may be claimed
in any given year. In addition, expenditures may be deducted over a
period of not less than six years from the year in which the asset
comes into ordinary use-*-*-^.
As in other petroleum-producing countries, the OPEC price
increases of 1973~74 had a great impact on Norwegian petroleum fiscal
policy in that rent-capturing initiatives already under way were
encouraged. The Norwegian government was well aware of the increased
opportunity for both companies and the state treasury. The fiscal
terms governing petroleum activity were changed while the
participation and licensing regulations remained constant. In 1975.
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a new Petroleum Tax Act (PTA)^® was implemented in which a Special
Tax (ST) on petroleum production was introduced at a rate of 25% on a
revenue base equal to that subject to corporate tax. The Norwegian
ST is similar to a windfall profits tax. An uplift allowance was set
at 10% of the cost of purchasing permanent installations offshore for
fifteen years, totalling 150% of the investment. Fixed assets were
to be depreciated at 16^/^%. and losses could be carried over for
fifteen years.
With the introduction of these new fiscal arrangements, the
companies' marginal tax rates increased from 50.8% to 75-8%, although
with various allowances and deductions, the real tax rate for the
period 1975~1980 was approximately 68-70%-^9. Although this fiscal
initiative was greatly criticised by the petroleum industry, "...only
one pending application for a licence was withdrawn and was promptly
replaced by another applicant. This acceptance of the special tax
recalls a statement by a Norwegian Minister of Finance in the 1940s,
that 'it is incredible how much taxes [sic] people are prepared to
110
pay, once they get used to them...'" u
The principal criticism which was levelled against the new
fiscal regime, and continues to be made today, was that it did not
discriminate between profitable and marginal fields and bordered on
discouraging the development of the latter. Hans Ramm, Advisor to
the Ministry of Finance on oil taxation, acknowledged this point in a
speech made to the Norwegian Petroleum Society in 1983-
It is a matter of fact that our petroleum taxation
system is not a particularly progressive one.... Now
— there will always be some fields that are marginal
under any tax system. Correspondingly, a majority of
fields are either profitable or nonprofitable. Since
3^3
a significant number of fields up till now have been
ready for development, our concern about less
profitable fields and reserves has obviously been
limited,m
By acknowledging the Norwegian government's lack of interest in the
development of marginal fields, Ramm's comments highlight the
principal difference between the British and the Norwegian approach
to petroleum taxation. Because of relatively limited reserves,
strong demand for petroleum, and a high absorptive capacity for
revenues within the British economy, the government of the UK has
attempted to continue encouraging the development of more marginal
prospects as well as the obviously profitable. In Norway, with its
relatively abundant petroleum reserves, limited demand for petroleum,
and restricted absorptive capacity for revenue influx, the
encouragement of marginal field development was unnecessary and
potentially harmful. This distinction between the objectives of the
two governments remains constant and is the source of the common
belief that the Norwegian regime is much harsher on the industry than
the British, a charge which appears largely unsubstantiated in many
economic studies comparing the two regimes.
The new fiscal regime in Norway remained stable until the second
OPEC pricing crisis, after which taxation measures were once again
re-evaluated. The Norwegian government estimated that profits would
increase from $8.3 billion at a price of $18.50 per barrel, to $20.6
billion at $33 per barrel, and the Petroleum Tax Act was modified
1 1 ?
accordingly-1"1- . The rate of Special Tax was increased from 25# to
35# and the uplift allowance was reduced from 10# per annum to
making the total deduction over fifteen years 100# rather than the
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previous 150$. Tax credits were also reduced and new regulations
concerning the timing of tax payments were put into effect. The
average tax rate was expected to increase from 73>2% to 81.5%, and
the industry's income would be limited to $13-8 billion of the
anticipated $20.6 billion potentially available as a result of the
price increases. Total government revenues were expected to increase
over the period I98O-85 from $46 billion to $57 billion, with the
assumption that the nominal price of oil would increase at a rate of
10% per annum during that time-*--^. gy 1982, petroleum revenues
amounted to 32.4% of the total Norwegian tax revenue^^.
After the decline of the international oil price, the Norwegian
government announced, in July 1986, tax changes intended to provide
substantial relief for new production and some easing of the fiscal
burden on production^^5. Statoil's exploration share would no longer
have to be carried by the private licensees; royalty rates would be
reduced to zero on future developments; the ST rate would be reduced
to 30% from 35%; and depreciation allowances would be granted from
the start of spending rather than the start of production. The
government acknowledged that these initiatives were designed with an
international oil price range of $13 to $18 per barrel in mind, and
that if prices average Tess than $13 there will be no incentive to
develop even the large fields. With its support of recent OPEC
attempts to increase and stabilise the price, the Norwegian
government is clearly committed to a higher price for oil.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, there have been similar
developments in the British and Norwegian petroleum fiscal
regimes. Both states opened North Sea activity with attractive
fiscal arrangements, and tightened them up after the initial
exploration period and after the first OPEC pricing crisis. Both
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states introduced resource rent taxes which operated differently, but
which contributed to similar percentage revenue shares according to
independent economic studies. Both states increased the rates of
their resource rent taxes and reduced allowances after the second
OPEC price increases in attempts to capture an increased share of
economic rent. Both have made modifications to their fiscal regimes
in the environment of depressed international prices. Although there
are broad similarities on taxation, there are great differences
between these two case states on the disposal of such revenues.
Three main themes stand out in Norwegian expenditure of
petroleum revenues. The difficulty of absorption justified the
government's investment of petroleum revenues outside the Norwegian
economy. The tradition of social democracy in Norway encouraged the
government's pursuit of a policy of full employment in the wake of
the international recession brought on by the first OPEC crisis. The
increase in the public debt throughout the 1970s was financed on the
strength of petroleum revenues.
Norwegian state revenue from oil and gas production became
substantial in the mid-1970s. In 1975. petroleum revenues amounted
to approximately 3% of the Norwegian GDP, and by 1983 this figure had
increased to nearly 20%^^. However, by the end of 1978 the public
debt had reached 45.6% of GDP, amounting to almost S20 billion. This
situation gave the government the option of employing petroleum
revenues exclusively within the country. However, those revenues
were not entirely devoted to reducing the public debt. Norway's
Prime Minister, Odvar Nordli, in an interview in 1977 noted that 40-
50% of Norway's oil revenues were being invested outside the
Norwegian state as its economy could not absorb them
appropriately"*""*^. Despite this foreign investment, it was still
3^6
expected that, by the early 1980s, the revenues would be sufficient
to offer the government the choice of continuing to service the debt
or to abolish the budget deficit within a matter of three to five
years. The latter strategy was chosen and by 1984, Norway was the
only OECD country with a surplus on its state budget.
Cappelen, Offerdal, and Strom suggest that it was precisely the
petroleum revenues which allowed the Norwegian government to pursue
1 1 ftthe popular policy of full employment . Lind and Mackay suggest a
domestic absorption of 60% of the petroleum revenues as the threshold
level before significant inflation and other industry- and
geographically-specific problems arose-*--*"9_ appears that the
Norwegian government came to a similar conclusion. In the 1974
parliamentary report of the Ministry of Finance, Petroleum Industry
1 PDin Norwegian Society , the impact of increased petroleum revenues
in the economy was assessed, indicating the government's resolve,
even before substantial revenues accrued to it, to employ petroleum
revenues cautiously both within and external to the Norwegian
economy.
The Norwegian government was not solely concerned with the
problem of economic absorption of large amounts of petroleum revenue,
despite its rhetoric. At the same time as it publicly advocated slow
development to control revenue inflow, it took every opportunity to
increase the government percentage of economic rent, and was not
using the revenues exhaustively within the Norwegian economy before
seeking investment opportunities elsewhere. The Norwegian government
was clearly maximising its revenue share and applying it selectively
between political investment on the domestic front and profitable
foreign investment.
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In Britain, necessity almost foreclosed discussion on the use of
revenues altogether, whereas Norway was in the fortunate position of
being able to employ strategically its petroleum revenues both
domestically and abroad to maximise both political and financial
returns. In addition, the extent of Norwegian petroleum reserves
implies that the availability of petroleum revenues is not of limited
duration, as it is in the British case. "The challenge facing the
Norwegian economy is to adjust to quite considerable oil and gas
1 ?1
revenues over a long period of time." The challenge which faced
the British government was how best to employ a relatively short-term
revenue gain. The Norwegian investment policy has proved more
successful, but that was to be expected given the absorption problem
of the Norwegian economy which did not exist in the British case.
The British sector of the North Sea is not expected to yield any more
large petroleum discoveries, while the Norwegian province remains
more promising. This, coupled with the British population of almost
sixty million, a balance of payments problem, and industrial decline,
makes the Norwegian situation all the more attractive. "Finally, a
little digest of the likely causes of the differences between the two
regimes. The Norwegians are the blue-eyed Arabs. The British are
just blue."^^
CONCLUSION
Rational choice theory hypothesises that governments, like all
economic agents, will maximise their revenue gains when possible. It
has been demonstrated that each of the three governments has, on
every occasion, seized the opportunity to reform fiscal arrangements
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to capture a larger share of the available economic rent. Such
initiatives were not solely, as is commonly thought, the result of
the two OPEC pricing crises. In every case, governments have
encouraged exploration and development within their territories, and
once the extraction industry was well established, have sought to
increase their relative revenue share. Fiscal regimes were
continually modified as opportunities increased for the capture of
increased economic rent. There have been further fiscal
modifications after decreases in the international price, which
indicate a sensitivity on the part of fiscal planners to the fine
balance between sufficient returns to industry and maximising state
revenue.
Federalism is an independent variable. The development of the
Canadian petroleum fiscal regime demonstrates that competition in
this zero-sum game for revenue shares between the two levels of
government can be at the expense of the industry's interest. In this
respect, the Canadian regime is significantly different than those of
either Britain or Norway. The latter two share many similarities in
the timing, mechanisms employed, and impact on government revenues of
their respective petroleum fiscal policies.
The significant difference between the British and Norwegian
cases can be explained by the issue of revenue absorption in the
economy. Because the British economy is more constrained than the
Norwegian, it has a greater need for petroleum revenues. British
petroleum policy therefore encouraged rapid development and the
immediate acquisition of maximum government revenues. In the
Norwegian case, petroleum revenues cannot be fully absorbed in the
economy and the taxation regime, in consequence, does not encourage
the development of marginal prospects. Nonetheless, the Norwegian
3^9
government is and was as fully committed to maximising its revenue as
are both the Canadian and British governments. In all three cases,
government/industry revenue shares are similar, despite differences
in political arrangements and resource situations. It is unlikely
that such a result would have been expected if the basic principles
of rational choice had not been assumed to determine governmental
behaviour in the formulation of petroleum policies.
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of this dissertation is twofold: firstly, to
demonstrate the applicability of rational choice theory to the
comparative analysis of policy output; and secondly, to elucidate the
similarities and differences between petroleum policies in Canada,
Britain, and Norway. The first two chapters provided broad
theoretical and historical overviews which provided the foundation
for the analysis to be undertaken in the last four chapters, each
devoted to a specific policy area. This thesis starts from the
assumption that the formulators of public policy behave in a rational
way, which is to say that they order preferences, are self-interested
actors, and are frequently engaged in competitive games with other
interested parties.
At the political level, this means that governments will be
primarily interested in the attainment and maintenance of office, and
secondarily interested in instrumental objectives, such as maximising
government revenues to assist in achieving that primary objective.
However, governments are not unified actors; they are composed of
differing interests, often in competition with each other, and their
policies frequently represent the compromises made between these
interests. Similarly, "the public" comprises various interests and
individual members of the public may demonstrate different and
sometimes contradicting preferences as voters, as producers, and as
consumers of goods and services. The petroleum industry is also made
up of various groups sometimes with differing objectives; the most
obvious examples being the major multinationals and the smaller
independent firms. The relative bargaining strength of these various
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interests and the timing (both in terms of elections on the political
front and market movements on the economic front) will influence the
actual policy implemented in any given area.
It is unlikely that other theoretical approaches would have had
the same predictive value of rational choice in relation to petroleum
policy outputs. Collectivist theories of the state assume that
governments are dominated by one group which, although motivated as
individuals by self-interest, acts in concert for the achievement of
collective benefits. Pluralist theories of the state are
individualistic and emphasise the process of political activity which
is assumed to take place between individuals, in voluntary
organisations, and governments. Although based on the premiss of
economic self-interest, these theories do not adequately account for
the problem of free-riders on group activity.
Rational choice theory is based on the assumption that
individuals are self-interested, but it differs from other theories
of the state in its conclusions regarding this premiss. Rather than
assuming that individual self-interest will naturally be subordinated
to collective interests when groups are formed, rational choice
theorists contend that individual self-interest often inhibits the
achievement of collective goals. Therefore, collective activity is
subjected to a natural tension between the interests of individuals
and collective benefits. In this sense, rational choice theory has
more predictive value than other theoretical approaches in that it
offers a more complete explanation of competition between various
interests.
The examination of petroleum policy outputs on rational choice
assumptions is justified on several counts. Public policy concerning
a financially and strategically important resource has been
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demonstrated to be amenable to rational choice analysis. The
petroleum industry yields two types of goods — the private good of
petroleum and the public good of the opportunity for increased
government revenue. The policy areas examined concern these two
types of goods: state participation, pricing, depletion, and fiscal
policies are all related to the development of both private and
public resources.
In Chapter 1, theoretical models of petroleum policy options
were generated from rational choice assumptions. The purpose of
these models was to see if rational choice assumptions correctly
predicted behaviour. In each of the three states under examination,
governments implemented policies which corresponded with the
assumptions, and when there are policy variations, the rationale
behind the policy option was explicable in rational choice terms.
With regard to state participation, the application of rational
choice theory predicts that state participation in the petroleum
sector would be increased in response to strategic concerns regarding
supply, to public demand for an increased role in the development of
a national resource, and to a perceived need by governments for more
information to formulate petroleum policies. In two of the three
cases under study, Canada and the United Kingdom, public petroleum
corporations were created immediately after the first OPEC pricing
crisis of 1973~7^. Norway was the exception, having previously
established Statoil in 1972; however, the public demand for its
creation coupled with the government's desire for information
provides the rationale of the policy decision, even though it
anticipated events in the international petroleum market. All three
state petroleum corporations came under severe criticism in the late
1970s and early 1980s, and BNOC and Petro-Canada were the targets of
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privatisation proposals. Reduced public concern over petroleum
supplies and the resurgence in conservative politics contributed to a
re-evaluation of participation policy in all three states. There was
growing public concern about the cost of government operations which
appeared excessive as the initial shock of OPEC's impact waned.
Statoil has retained its position as the state petroleum company,
helped by the emphasis on the requirement placed upon it to make a
profit like any other corporation in Norway. The most interesting
finding was the lack of relationship between party principles and
government policy on state participation in the petroleum industry.
This indicates the common interests of all governments in this policy
area, regardless of their positions on the right/left spectrum.
On pricing policies, Canada is the only state in which petroleum
prices were determined by the government -- in this case, below the
international level. This was the result of the federal nature of
the Canadian state -- the conflict between the two levels of
government was influenced by the location of petroleum extraction in
the western provinces and concentration of voters in the eastern
provinces, who were consumers, not producers of petroleum. The
Canadian government sacrificed maximum financial gain to its
political interest by transferring economic rent arising from price
increases to the voting consumers. It could afford to exercise this
policy option because Canada has a history of federal intervention in
the development of natural resources under the jurisdiction of the
provinces; the majority of the public was advantaged by the federal
pricing policy. However, in both Britain and Norway, where the
development of the resource was dependent on heavy capital
investment, both states allowed their petroleum to be priced at the
international level. This pricing policy was in part a necessity,
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but it was an option available because of the unitary nature of the
government of these two countries. The increasing economic rent
arising from petroleum development was captured by the fiscal regime
which, in the case of the North Sea states, was not contested by
another level of government nor by the public. The governments of
the United Kingdom and Norway were, in this sense, less constrained
in their policy options than was the Canadian government on this
issue. Again, party politics and manifestos were not influential in
the formulation of the pricing policies implemented.
According to rational choice assumptions, depletion policies
should be largely determined by the pcViVvcoi rate of return of the
respective economies. Where governments can productively employ the
additional revenues generated from petroleum production, depletion
rates will be liberal or non-existent, despite any political rhetoric
to the contrary. Where the economy has a low potential for revenue
absorption, and other investment opportunities do not exist, more
conservative depletion rates would be expected. In Canada and the
U.K., powers over depletion policy have been assumed by the
governments but iitfcle used. There was political value in rhetoric
favouring control over production, while there was financial
advantage in rapid exploitation in the 1970s and early 1980s. While
Norway is, to some extent, an exception; the rhetoric of the "go
slow" depletion policy is reflected in a more conservative
licensing regime than the regime in Britain. Both North Sea states
were interested in securing activity in their respective petroleum
jurisdictions, but the former has a smaller population and economy
than the British, and therefore the Norwegian state was more
conservative in the development of its petroleum resources. However,
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the rhetoric of Norwegian depletion policy appears to be more
forceful than the policy itself if production levels relative to
national demand are considered.
The fiscal regimes in all three states indicate the governments'
interests in securing for the states the maximum revenues possible
while leaving the petroleum industry sufficient incentive to continue
investing. Each government seized every opportunity to increase its
relative share of petroleum revenues, and petroleum fiscal
arrangements were not modified solely after OPEC price increases, as
is commonly thought. The competition for revenues is a zero-sum game
in which increased shares for one player mean decreased shares for
other competitors. In Canada, federalism determined the nature of
the main issue — the growth of significant financial power of the
governments in the producing provinces was the stimulus for federal
fiscal intervention. The conflict between the federal and provincial
levels of government over revenue shares twice escalated into a game
of chicken, in which the industry's share was so restricted that
exploration ground to a halt. This situation was disadvantageous to
all three parties (the federal government, the provincial
governments, and the petroleum industry), and resulted, in both
instances, in the liberalisation of the petroleum fiscal regime. In
the North Sea states, competition for petroleum revenues occurs
between the governments and the petroleum industry. As most of the
petroleum development in the North Sea took place during a period of
increasing petroleum prices, both governments could afford to
increase their revenue shares relative to the industry's share as
economic rent increased. The use of petroleum revenues in the two
states was different as a result of the different absorptive
capacities of the two economies. Norway's social rate of return is
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much lower than Britain's, and this allowed for a more conservative
exploration policy and the investment of petroleum revenues abroad.
However, in all three states, policy objectives did not appear to
vary significantly along ideological lines — all governments,
regardless of their political persuasion, were interested in maximum
revenues.
This application of rational choice theory to petroleum policies
in Canada, Britain, and Norway has proved fruitful on all the main
issues. It has demonstrated that, in the area of petroleum policy,
the three states under examination have had governments which have
acted rationally in the pursuit of both political and economic goals.
The study has also elucidated the different policies in the three
countries and provided some explanation for the similarities and
differences. The similarities in the petroleum policies implemented
in the three states has been striking, with principal differences
being the results of the differing constitutional structures
(Canada's federal state in contrast with the unitary states of the
United Kingdom and Norway) and different rates of return
(Norway's low absorptive capacity against the higher social rates of
return in Canada and especially Britain). In addition, ideas for
further research have been generated in the political and economic
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OPEC - Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
NOP - National Oil Policy (Canada)
GC - Gas Council (UK)
BGC - British Gas Corporation (UK)
PRT - Petroleum Revenue Tax (UK)
PTA - Petroleum Tax Act (Norway)
ST - Special Tax (Norway)
BNOC - British National Oil Corporation (UK)
NOA - National Oil Account (UK)
NEP - National Energy Program (Canada)
SDA - Scottish Development Agency (UK)
PGRT - Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax (Canada)
NGGLT - Natural Gas and Gas Liquids Tax (Canada)
PIP - Petroleum Incentives Program (Canada)
COR - Canadian Ownership Rating (Canada)
FIRA - Foreign Investment Review Agency (Canada)
EPTA - Energy Pricing and Taxation Agreement (Canada)
IORT - Incremental Oil Revenue Tax (Canada)
SPD - Supplementary Petroleum Duty (UK)
AOGAP - Alberta Oil and Gas Activity Program (Canada)
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APPENDIX TWO
TIMETABLE OF POLICY EVENTS : OPEC, CANADA, UNITED KINGDOM, NORWAY
1960 - formation of Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC)




Valley Line - eastern
market to consume
imported oil; western









YEAR CANADA UNITED KINGDOM NORWAY
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- Gas Act 1965:
creation of Gas
Council monopsony
- first North Sea
discovery: BP's West
Sole gas field
- April 9: Royal
Decree re: licensing
procedure
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be granted in 1969
and 1971•
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- 4th Licensing Round
(bids for 15 of 286
blocks raised £37
million)
- first oil prod¬
uction from Ekofisk





- Frigg gas field
discovery (production
onstream in 1988




- Gas Council became
British Gas Cor¬
poration (BGC)






- June: Statoil set
up by unanimous vote
in Storting







October 16: OPEC unilaterally increased the price of oil of its
marker crude by 70# to $5•12/bbl; the next day it imposed an embargo
on countries sympathetic to Israel in the Arab-Israeli War. The price









- North Sea Oil and
Gas, First Report
from the Committee of
Public Session 1972-
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- July 30: Petro-
Canada incorporated
by Parliament
- July: White Paper





- first oil prod¬
uction from British
North Sea (Forties)





- Dec.: Varley guide¬
lines re: depletion
policy
- Feb.: Oil Taxation
Act (PRT at 45#)









Paper: The Role of
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No. 25 - production
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June 13 (ST at 25#
and corporate tax at
51.9#)
- world (norm) pric¬
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- 6th Licensing Round
(51# interest to
BNOC/BGC)
- White Paper The
Challenge of North






The Iranian Revolution prompted a perceived oil supply shortage; spot
market prices increased to $40.00/bbl by June and OPEC increased its
marker crude price to $26.00/bbl on January 1, I98O.
- May: minority
Conservative govern¬




uction of budget with
gasoline tax








- July: Finance Act,








- June: 5th licensing
round arrounced
1980
OPEC market crude price increased to $26.00/bbl on January 1, and
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osals modified
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- Alberta government taxation with same - 5th Licensing Round
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- Finance Act 1981:
SPD to mid-1982 at
20%
in January.












- April 13: Alberta
Oil and Gas Activity
Program (AOGAP)
introduced
- May 31: NEP Update
quotas imposed totalling




- Finance Act: PRT to
75%; SPD replaced at
year end by advance
PRT (same as SPD but
allowable against
PRT)
- Nov.: 51% Britoil
(expltn/prodtn arm)
sold on market yeild-
ing £625 million to
government, govern¬
ment retained 49%;
BNOC kept as govern¬
ment trading company
17.5 million barrels




- 7th Licensing Round
- evaluation of pet¬





March 14: OPEC reduced the price of its marker crude to $29-00/bbl
and reasserted production quotas totalling 17-5 million bbls/day.






















- May: 8th Licensing
Round awarded: part
auction (33 million


















- Budget: CT to be
reduced to 35% (from
52$) over time with
reduced allowance (to
25# from 100% by
1986)




- average tax rate
over field life = 80%
OPEC market crude price reduced to $28 per barrel.











onment of NEP, dereg¬
ulation of prices,
new fiscal regime to
be introduced)
- June: oil prices
deregulated
- June: Alta. royalty
reduction of 10%






- Oct. 31: Agreement





- 9th Licensing Round
(13 of 15 blocks
auctioned raising
£121 million)
- March: BNOC abol¬
ished
- Autumn: BGC to be
privatised
- 9th Licensing Round




- March 22: Petroleum
Act replaces Contin¬
ental Shelf Act 1963.
Decrees of 1965. 1972





- Oct.: First half of
10th Licensing Round
January: international oil price falls below $20 per barrel
April: international price falls below $10 per barrel, but rallies
July: international price again below $10 per barrel, before rising
to below $20 at year end.
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- Sept.: PGRT abol¬
ished from 1st Oct¬
ober
- March: 2nd half of
10th Licensing Round
- October: bids due
for 39 blocks in 11th
Licensing Round
1987
The international price of petroleum generally remained in the mid-
teens levels, with the exception of an increase above $20 per barrel
in June after OPEC agreed a production ceiling of 16.6 million







- May: 10th Licensing





- April: 1st half of
11th Licensing Round
- 11 blocks
- 2nd half of 11th
Licensing Round - 10
blocks
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APPENDIX THREE : PETROLEUM PRICES
TABLE ONE
OIL PRICES: OPEC, CANADA. BRITAIN. AND NORWAY ($US)











(07) 8.00 (07) 11.70
(09) 11.46 (10) 12.45
1976 avg. 12.80 (01) 12.70
(04) 12.79
(07) 9.05 (07) 12.89
(10) 13.15
1977 (01) 9.75 avg. 14.00 (01) 14.33
(04) 14.39
(07) 12.70 (07) 10.75 (07) 14.26
(10) 14.04
1978 (01) 11.75 avg. 13.80 (01) 13.S
(04) 13.9
(07) 12.75 (07) 14.1
(10) 14.2
1979 (01) 13.34 avg. 20.67 (01) 16.05
(03) 14.54 (04) 20.05
(06) 18.00 (07) 13.75 (07) 24.00
(10) 27.50
(12) 24.00
1980 (01) 26.00 (01) 14.75 avg. 34.99 (01) 33-75
(05) 28.00 (04) 36.00
(08) 30.00 (08) 16.75 (07) 37.05
(11) 32.00 (10) 37.10
397
YEAR (Month) OPEC (Month) CANADA BRITAIN (Month) NORWAY
( /
1981 (01) 17.75 (01) 40.00
(04) 39.30
(07) 18.75 (07) 35-75
(10) 34.00 (10) 21.25 (10) 36.75
1982 (01) 23.50 (01) 35.05
(04) 32.50
(07) 25.75 (07) 34.15
(10) 34.00
1983 (01) 29.75 (01) 31.45















AVERAGE WORLD CRUDE OIL PRICES ($US)
DATE OPEC N0N-0PEC WORLD
31/12/78 13.03 13.44 13.08
01/01/81 34.82 38.54 35.49
01/01/85 28.43 28.16 28.33
01/01/86 27.81 26.14 27.10
28/02/86 26.88 18.73 23.73
07/03/86 15.65 15.56 15.61
11/04/86 13.03 13.44 13.08
09/05/86 13-48 12.72 13.21
01/01/87 16.10 16.44 16.34
01/01/88 16.77 16.21 15.56
Source:
US Department of Energy in Petroleum Economist, April, May, June 1986
(pp. 153. 193, 237). December 1987 (p. 461), March 1988 (p.107).
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APPENDIX FOUR : PETROLEUM SUPPLY AND DEMAND
TABLE ONE
SELECTED INDICATORS OF ENERGY USE AND PRODUCTION 1982
COUNTRY POP GDP PRIMARY DEMAND PRODUCTION PRIMARY DEMAND
(millions) (US$bn) (petajoules) (fossil fuel
equivalent)
PER CAPITA PER GDP
CANADA 24.7 363 9,086 9,968 368 25
U.K. 56.3 582 8,236 9,404 146 14
NORWAY 4.1 69 797 2,618 242 15
U.S. 232.1 3.708 73,291 66,959 316 20
Source:
Adapted from National Energy Board 1984, p. 102 (OECD statistics)
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TABLE TWO; WORLD CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION (MILLION BARRELS)
YEAR WORLD OPEC SAUDI ARABIA CANADA U.K. NORWAY
1973 21,209 11,314 2,773 772 3 12
1974 21,245 11,216 3,095 728 3 13
1975 20,162 9,923 2,583 633 11 69
1976 21,851 11,252 3,139 582 91 102
1977 22,607 11,413 3,358 587 287 102
1978 23,134 10,879 3,030 582 404 130
1979 24,011 11,289 3,479 667 583 149
1980 23,059 9,838 3,624 645 603 193
1981 21,645 8,201 3,580 591 670 185
1982 20,645 6,937 2,366 579 773 191
1983 20,579 6,340 1,825 608 861 237
1984 21,106 6,345 1,675 650 942 273
1985 20,781 5,878 1,236 662 953 297
1986 21,837 6,693 1,840 656 949 331
1987 *10,521 6,521 1,535 *334 *456 374
* (1st half only)
Source:
Petroleum Economist: September 1986, p. 360, December 1987, p. 464,
March 1988, p.108.
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Public choice theory and petroleum policies in Canada, Britain
and Norway
Miriam EDWARDS
University of Edinburgh, UK
Abstract. It is assumed that the development of an economically promising resource such as
petroleum would be amenable to analysis from an economic viewpoint, and that government
initiatives in this area might reveal the essential economic interests of the state. If governments are
assumed to have similar economic and political objectives (i.e., to attain the greatest revenues
possible from the exploitation of a depleting natural resource and to maintain public office), then it
is to be expected that the petroleum policy outputs in various states would likewise be similar.
Such differences as do exist should be amenable to explanation by examining the differences in the
political constraints and economic situations of the states in question. The study models petroleum
policy in four areas: state participation, pricing, depletion (including exploration and production
policies), and fiscal arrangements, based on assumptions central to public choice theory. A
comparison of policy outputs in the three case states illustrates the usefulness of the public choice
approach to comparative policy analysis.
Petroleum policies in Canada, Britain and Norway can usefully be compared
within a theoretical framework derived from public choice theory. Petroleum
exploitation necessarily yields two types of product: the private good of
petroleum and the public good of increased state revenue opportunities result¬
ing from exploitation of a national resource. If public choice assumptions
about political and economic rationality are correct, petroleum policies in
these three countries should possess more similarities than might otherwise be
expected. This is because governments in all three states would be similarly
interested in maintaining office: increasing revenues would further enhance
the possibility of securing that principal objective. A comparison of petroleum
policies with regard to state participation, pricing, depletion, and fiscal ar¬
rangements demonstrates the usefulness of the public choice approach to
comparative policy output analysis.
The treatment of the exploitation of petroleum as the provision of a public
good and the management of market failures is justified on several counts.
Firstly, in the very broadest sense of the term 'public good' (which is that it has
the characteristics of public supply and administration), public policy in gen¬
eral may usefully be analyzed from this theoretical perspective. Secondly,
petroleum exploitation yields two types of goods in the sense of joint produc-
An earlier version of this article was presented to the European Consortium for Political Research
Workshop on The 'Energy Question' and Policy Analysis, April 1-6,1986; Gothenburg, Sweden.
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tion: the private product of petroleum and the collective good of the oppor¬
tunity of increased government revenues which would necessarily accrue from
such production. In addition, there are the positive and negative external
effects of petroleum exploitation upon the economic and fiscal conditions of
the state as a whole.
Government interest in both these goods and the externalities associated
with their joint production is demonstrable in policies which concern govern¬
ment ownership and control of the industry itself (state participation), regu¬
lation or non-regulation of petroleum pricing, depletion policy, and the fiscal
regime. This article suggests what types of policies in these four areas might be
expected if it is assumed that governments are indeed economic utility max-
imizers, constrained in their activity principally by the contingencies of public
opinion and regular elections. The policies implemented in each of these areas
by the three case states will be briefly outlined and (dis)similarities will be
analyzed from the public choice theoretical framework. In this way, the utility
of public choice theory for comparative policy study should become clear.
The function of our models of policy options is to suggest likely state
objectives and mechanisms which can be employed to realize those objectives
with regard to a rapidly-depletable, financially rewarding natural resource.
They will be used to assess the similarities and dissimilarities in policy mea¬
sures taken by the three case states in the subsequent analysis of the actual
policies implemented. If public choice assumptions about economic rationality
are correct, it is to be expected that the petroleum policies in the three case
countries will be broadly similar, with differences accounted for by principles
of public choice theory.
1. State participation in the industry
A. The model ofpolicy options
'Because of the shortages that have occurred in petroleum products and the
sharply rising energy price levels since 1972, consumers are unhappy with
various segments of the energy industry. Given this general dissatisfaction,
political appeals for increased regulation and even public ownership are more
frequently voiced and welcomed by an irate public.' (Watkins and Walker
1977, 165) Prior to the OPEC price crisis of 1973, the public perception of the
oil industry was that of its dominance by the major multinational petroleum
companies, the seven sisters. With its assertion of power as a cartel-like
organization of the world's largest petroleum producing governments,
OPEC's control of the international market became the focus of public con¬
cern until very recently. In both cases, there seemed to be a consistent body of
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public support for government intervention in the petroleum industry in order
to prevent or ameliorate negative externalities associated with oligopolistic
control of a major energy market, at first by the major multinationals and later
by the OPEC governments.
There appear to be three major policy options for participation in the
petroleum industry which could be pursued by producer governments, all of
which could secure a degree of stability and control in an oligopolistic pe¬
troleum market. In the first case, state ownership may be limited to the
resource itself, and control will thus be exercised only through the regulation
of production and the imposition of taxes. In other words, the private industry
could be left alone to produce the resource within the confines of government
regulation set up with only stability of price and security of supply as the
principal objectives of collective ownership and control. On the other hand, if
the free market option is rejected as being insufficiently secure, nationaliza¬
tion efforts may be undertaken in which governments either participate in
equity ownership or create national petroleum companies.
'Economic nationalism is not a costless indulgence.' (Garnault and Clunies
Ross, 1983, p. 292) There are compelling reasons for governments to partici¬
pate directly in the petroleum industry, some of which pertain to market
failure in the forms of decreasing costs, externalities, and uncertainty. Other
advantages offered by direct government participation in the industry are
related to the information gained which is useful to the formulation of pe¬
troleum policy in other areas of concern. Equity ownership would appear to be
a less public form of participation which may also afford less direct control
than the creation of a state petroleum company. Public petroleum corpora¬
tions offer the advantages of high public profiles and a direct industrial
participation which can yield invaluable policy input. In addition, depending
upon the scope of their mandate, if they are granted participation of buying
rights in much of the state's petroleum resource, they can also directly influ¬
ence production and pricing levels in ways less obvious to the public than
promulgated policies.
From the public choice perspective, it can be expected that government
ownership in the petroleum industry will be augmented in response to strategic
concerns, public pressures for increased state presence in the industry itself, or
when the government wishes to secure more information regarding the actual
state of the industry in order to sharpen its policies and capture the greatest
benefits possible from exploitation of the resource. If none of these conditions
pertain, the utility-maximizing government would likely choose the free mar¬
ket option, limiting its participation to regulation in other areas of petroleum
policy or in equity ownership. However, if the issue of collective ownership
and control of the petroleum industry has become a strategic and/or public
concern, it is more likely that participation will take some form of nationalist
366
policy, from the establishment of a state petroleum company through to
outright nationalization of the industry. Complete nationalization, however,
seems an unacceptable option in terms of political interests in the western
liberal democracies.
B. The policies
Once the effects of the OPEC initiatives of October 1973 were felt, the
Canadian government announced a series of energy policy steps. These in¬
cluded plans to create a publicly owned petroleum company to expedite the
exploration and production of Canada's petroleum resources. Petro-Canada
was incorporated by the Canadian Parliament on July 30, 1975, and com¬
menced operations six months later.
Throughout the late 1970's, Petro-Canada's roles as policy advisor and
Canadian public presence in the petroleum industry were not prominent, yet it
nonetheless met ideological opposition from both the federal Conservative
Party and the Conservative government in oil-rich Alberta. In May 1979 the
federal Conservatives formed a minority government after an electoral cam¬
paign which included a promise to privatize Petro-Canada. In the following
December, however, this government was defeated on a budget which pro¬
posed an 18 cent tax on transportation fuels. The Liberals returned to power
with a strong majority in February 1980, and introduced the National Energy
Program (NEP) in October, a policy which greatly enhanced Petro-Canada's
role. On Canada Lands and in frontier regions (federal territories and waters),
Petro-Canada was to have an automatic 25% back-in (without compensation
at market value) on all ongoing exploration. Furthermore, the company's
expanded operations were to be assisted by cash injections from the federal
government. This created some not inconsiderable ill feeling within an indus¬
try subjected to a much more rigorous fiscal regime under the NEP. The
company also became a prime acquisitor of foreign-owned firms under the
Canadianization legislation which accompanied the NEP, to the extent that it
is now the largest petroleum retail concern throughout Canada. In short,
Petro-Canada's role was greatly expanded after the second OPEC oil crisis.
In 1984 the federal government announced that cash injections for Petro-
Canada were to be halted. The company's president responded by stating that
its role in petroleum policy development would not continue if it had to
operate within the confines of a private industrial concern (Interview with P.
Manders, Calgary, 8.1.86). However, Petro-Canada quickly ceased to be an
issue of political concern, and discussions towards the end of 1985 on possible
privatization proved to be of little interest to Petro-Canada's employees, the
petroleum industry as a whole, and the public at large. Formal privatization
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appears to many to be a redundant initiative.
In 1965, the British government began actively to pursue energy policy
objectives through the creation of the Gas Council, later known as the British
Gas Corporation (BGC). The Gas Council was the means by which economic
rent would be collected from British natural gas production. By denying
producing companies the right to sell British gas to any agencies other than the
Gas Council, the government made of the national gas corporation a state
monopoly. With the Department of Energy as the sole arbiter of a reasonable
price for sales to the Gas Council, BGC set a price below market levels for the
gas it purchased, and consequently transferred some of the economic rent
from gas prouction to consumers, so creating distortions in the gas market on
the demand side. Additionally, exploration activity from the southern North
Sea gas fields to the oil prospects in the northern North Sea can, to a certain
extent, be explained by private industry's dissatisfaction with the marginal
returns received on gas production.
The new Labour administration of 1974 extended the debate to a public oil
company. In April 1975 the Conservatives countered by proposing the estab¬
lishment of a UK Oil Conservation authority with regulatory powers over
depletion. Early the following year, the government passed the Petroleum and
Submarine Pipelines Act of 1975, creating both BNOC and the National Oil
Account (NOA) from which it was to be funded (Johnson, 1979, 5). BNOC
commenced operations in January, 1976, and was to provide policy advice and
to exercise depletion control through the development of its own reserves and
the disposal of its production in the national interest. Under all licensing
rounds, BNOC had the right to purchase 51% of oil production at market
prices, and from the fifth round, it had an automatic 51% stake in all North Sea
exploration, carry risks as well as gaining reserves (Kemp, 1984, 73). It was
also exempt from Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT) payments.
The Conservative government elected in 1979 announced a policy of reduc¬
ing the privileged position and quasi-governmental role of BNOC by denying
it access to government funds, ceasing to use it in a policy-advising capacity,
and eliminating its mandatory participation in all exploration licences. In 1982
the government announced the creation of Britoil out of the exploration and
production arms of BNOC, and sold 51% of the new company into private
hands: 'BNOC remain[ed] only as an oil trader purchasing 51% of oil from
licensees' (Kemp, 1984, 73). However, in an international petroleum market
with declining prices, BNOC had frequently purchased North Sea oil on long-
term contracts at prices well above those at which it could sell on the Rotter¬
dam spot market. As the attendant public controversy developed early in 1985,
the government changed its policy once again, and the Conservatives an¬
nounced plans to abolish BNOC while retaining powers to demand 51% of
North Sea production in emergency supply situations (Scotsman, 14.3.85).
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Later in the year, the government introduced legislation to sell the British Gas
Corporation into private hands as well (Guardian, 7.11.85). In Britain, priva¬
tization has become the fate of the national petroleum companies.
Not so in Norway: 'Norway.. .has seen almost unbroken social democratic
rule since World War II. The hegemony of social democratic ideas, including
the legitimacy of a strong and active state, was undoubtedly a necessary
precondition for the establishment of Statoil' (Vishner and Remoe, 1984,337).
Additionally, Norway has a strong tradition of nationalism, and consistent
public mistrust of foreign capital made the creation of a state oil company a
desired policy initiative as soon as North Sea petroleum potential became
obvious.
In 1971 the Norwegian Ministry of Industry proposed that state participation
rights should be vested in a 100% state-controlled joint stock company, a
proposal which was passed unanimously by the Storting in June 1972. Statoil
was created to operate under normal Norwegian corporate law, with its
objective being profit. Its functions included the management of government
oil and gas participation agreements, the expansion of state activities down¬
stream, a major operating role north of 62°, conservation of petroleum re¬
sources (by influencing a slower depletion rate than might be indicated by
commercial considerations alone), and cooperation with Norwegian industry
to build up an integrated petroleum sector (Johnson, 1979, 24).
In the late 1970s tensions appeared both between Statoil and the private
petroleum companies operating in Norwegian territories, and between Statoil
and the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) which had been created in
1973 to perform regulatory functions with regard to petroleum exploitation.
'The growing criticism was channelled into the conservative-liberal goal of
"clipping the wings of Statoil"...' (Vishner and Remoe, 1984, 333). In 1981,
the Labour government was replaced by a Conservative coalition pledged to
reevaluating the role of Statoil. However, a recent editorial in the Petroleum
Economist (Vol. LIII, No. 2, Feb. 1986, 38) suggests that Statoil remains the
dominant presence in the Norwegian petroleum industry.
In both Canada and the United Kingdom national petroleum companies
were created shortly after the impact of the first OPEC pricing crisis, and came
under increasing criticism in the late 1970s. Both BGC and BNOC were
privatized in Britain at roughly the same time as Petro-Canada lost its policy
role. In Norway, Statoil has had a longer policy life; however, it suffered the
same critical evaluation as did the other companies in the late 1970s and early
1980s. The similarities in the timing of the creation, critical evaluation, and
privatization (both formal and informal) in the cases of the Canadian and
British companies is quite striking, although their actual policy functions were
different in many respects. It can be suggested that these similarities are
related to the initial shock of the first OPEC pricing initiatives. Once other
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policy mechanisms were satisfactorily operating in the petroleum sectors, and
once public concern had been calmed, the continued usefulness of public
petroleum companies was called into question. The return of Conservative
governments in all three states within a few years of each other also contrib¬
uted to the criticism levied against public petroleum corporations along with
the abolition of their policy functions in Canada and the U.K. The Norwegian
situation appears to be the exception, but perhaps the strong tradition of social
democracy in that state helped preserve Statoil against a similar abandonment
of its policy role. In all three cases, the governments appeared to have similar
political interests in creating national petroleum companies, with less concern
for the economic efficiency of such corporations than for the public presence of
the state in the petroleum industry.
2. Pricing policy
A. The model ofpolicy options
Since the OPEC-induced price crises of the 1970s, pricing policies of the
private product have come to be of great concern to governments with such
resources. There appear to be two main pricing policy options: determination
by the international market or by the government (either via established price
schedules or by public corporation activity).
The decision of states to allow the price of petroleum produced by private
and public firms within their territories to fluctuate along with the interna¬
tional market indicates a willingness, at the most basic level, to allow OPEC
initiatives (primarily) to continue to determine the price of the resource.
Government regulation of prices, on the other hand, demands evaluation and
decision regarding the relative utility of a price set below the international
market value (a benefit to consumers) or above the international market value
(a benefit to producers). Lower prices automatically lower reserve standings,
as the economic cost of developing any geological prospect determines the
viability of its production, and vice versa for higher prices. Various price levels
also affect the world petroleum market itself, the value of the producing
country's currency, and production costs elsewhere in the economy. Price
levels can be established by government determination of schedules or more
implicitly by the activities of a public petroleum corporation if it is given the
responsibility for purchasing and distributing a large proportion of petroleum
production within state territories. Public choice theory would suggest that in
an environment of rising international prices, all things being equal, govern¬
ments would be less likely explicitly to determine price levels for production
within their territories. However, given the primacy of the political objective
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of maintaining office over economic interests, governments may determine
petroleum prices not only when it is to their economic advantage, but also
when political circumstances make such a policy advantageous.
B. The policies
An explicit petroleum pricing policy was not implemented in Canada until the
first OPEC pricing crisis forced the federal government to reevaluate its
petroleum policy as a whole. In late 1973, as the impact of the OPEC initiatives
became manifest, the government requested the petroleum industry to accept
a price freeze while it determined a new petroleum policy. With the inflation of
international oil prices, domestic production was to be subject to an export tax
to be collected by the federal government, the tax representing the margin
between the frozen domestic and rapidly-escalating international prices. Early
in 1974, a single-price formula was adopted by the government in which the
export tax on domestic production would subsidize more expensive import
requirements. A conflict arose between the Albertan and federal governments
over the export tax and price levels (held below international prices), but it
was resolved through intergovernmental) negotiations. Throughout the re¬
mainder of the decade, prices were established through negotiation between
the federal and Albertan governments at the bureaucratic level.
A similar federal-provincial conflict emerged after the second OPEC price
increases in 1979-80. International oil prices doubled while Canadian prices
were held well below international levels, resulting in a domestic price of less
than half the international price in 1980. Negotiations were undertaken be¬
tween the two levels of government throughout the first half of 1980, but
agreement could not be reached, as the Albertan government argued for price
deregulation, while the federal government wished to maintain domestic price
levels well below international prices. The unilateral introduction by the
federal government of the National Energy Program (NEP) in October imple¬
mented gradually escalating price schedules which maintained the domestic
price below international levels in addition to a new fiscal regime designed to
capture a large share of the rapidly increasing economic rent on petroleum
production for the federal government. The Albertan government responded
by reducing domestic production (with the cooperation of the industry) by a
total of 180,000 barrels per day in order to force negotiations to resume, and in
September 1981 an agreement was reached between the governments. Price
schedules remained the essential feature, but they had been designed with
provincial input and with a gradual approach toward expected international
levels.
With the decline in the international price which began in 1983, the price
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schedules were revised and the case for deregulation made stronger as the
domestic price approached international levels more rapidly than expected.
The Conservative federal government reached an accord with the producing
provinces in March 1985 which dismantled the NEP and deregulated pe¬
troleum prices altogether.
Both the British and Norwegian governments have instituted policies that
allow prices for North Sea production to be determined by the international
market. In Britain, as was noted, the BGC was used as a mechanism for
keeping the price of natural gas at a low level for domestic consumption,
whereas BNOC's role as an oil trading company had no such price-fixing
element; it was more concerned with secure supplies of a strategically impor¬
tant resource. The decline in international prices, especially the recent rapid
fall, has meant that North Sea production, which was selling for over thirty
dollars per barrel in December 1985, was selling for less than $ 10 per barrel in
some contracts six months later. Clearly this has very serious implications for
the British Treasury and for North Sea development and investment as a
whole. The same concerns must confront the Norwegian government which,
until early 1985, set prices via a norm price. The norm price, however, was
merely a tax reference price based on average prices of various Norwegian
crudes as obtained in contracts and on the spot market; therefore, the Nor¬
wegian government, like the British government, allowed its petroleum to be
priced in the international market-place. It abandoned the norm price when
downward adjustments in the international petroleum market made the
scheme much more difficult to administer. The North Sea producers have thus
been price takers, implying that the economic viability of such an remotely-
situated resource is best determined by international price levels.
Both the situations of the petroleum resource and the federal nature of the
Canadian state contribute to the difference in its pricing policy with regard to
British and Norwegian policies. Conventional crude oil has been produced in
the province of Alberta since 1914, and has been a far less expensive resource
to exploit than North Sea oil. The conflict between the federal and provincial
governments over petroleum pricing in the 1970s and 1980s is largely a result of
the federal government's concern to appease the highly-populated, large
consumption market in eastern Canada being confronted by a defensive
provincial posture based on the presumption that domestic production should
be priced as highly as possible. In the United Kingdom and Norway, pricing
policy was not such an issue simply because the situation of the resource
necessitated certain price levels to secure investment, and in a climate of rising
international prices the international market was the best determinant of such
a price level. In addition, the unitary nature of both states allowed a certain
freedom in policy design and implementation from which Canada is con¬
strained by the federal nature of the state. In consequence, the free market
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pricing option was chosen by the British and Norwegian governments as the
best mechanism by which to encourage investment in their resources and to
gain economic rent. In Canada, economic interests were outweighed by
political concerns in the price question, and the free market option was
rejected in favour of maintaining prices below the international level, pri¬
marily to appease the large body of consumer voters in eastern Canada.
3. Depletion policy
A. The model ofpolicy options
Depletion policies are an extremely important indicator of the way in which a
government views the value of petroleum and the length of time it expects to
have the resource at its disposal. Slower rates of depletion indicate a concern
for conservation, while policies which encourage rapid exploration and maxi¬
mal production imply urgent need on the part of the government for immedi¬
ate benefits to be realized from such exploitation, or perhaps indicate an
optimism with regard to the geological, technological, or pricing prospects
which may arise in the near future. Depletion policy is consequently a valuable
indicator of government assumptions and interests in the development of
petroleum resources.
Government control of depletion of the resource is related both to price, as
illustrated in the discussion of pricing policy, and to the assumption that the
private industry's discount rate may be higher than the social discount rate
(Kemp, 1984, 69). The assumption is that petroleum companies will produce
the resource at maximal levels without due regard for social interests in
conservation, the socio-economic impact of rapid development, increasing
scarcity, and the like. If governments are indeed the omniscient and altruistic
organizations assumed by welfare economists, operating to maximize social
welfare, depletion rates lower than those desired by industry would be typical
of all governments. If, on the other hand, governments are economic and
political utility maximizers, a rapid depletion of the natural resource wherever
politically possible is to be expected. It is possible that to satisfy both political
and economic interests, governments may publicly support slower rates of
depletion, whereas actual policies may belie this public posture.
In terms of major policy options, governments could choose to disregard
depletion policy altogether, leaving production levels to private industry and
assuming efficient investment in future energy sources as a result. On the other
hand, depletion policies, as mentioned earlier, can be effectively implemented
either through licensing mechanisms which allow for varying rates of explora¬
tion, or through production controls on petroleum development. Further-
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more, licensing for exploration leases can be undertaken in two principal
ways: either through the discretionary allocation of licences by the bu¬
reaucracy, or by competitive auction for leases in which private companies
make bids for desired exploration territory. Discretionary awards demon¬
strate interest in government control; competitive auctions demonstrate inter¬
est in economic rent.
B. The policies
An explicit depletion policy has never been implemented by either the Cana¬
dian or the Albertan government, although security of supply has been a stated
policy objective of the federal government since the mid-1970s. The export tax
levied on domestic production in 1974 cannot be considered an effort in
depletion control; it was very obviously designed to capture increasing eco¬
nomic rent. In addition, conservation of petroleum within Canada was hardly
to be encouraged by prices held below the international market price. Like¬
wise the Albertan production cutback in response to the introduction of the
NEP was not an exercise in depletion control. It was clearly the provincial
government's most effective means of forcing the federal government back to
negotiations by increasing the amount of more expensive imported oil which
would be required in eastern Canada.
In terms of exploration licensing, the auction system of Crown lands has
been the means by which exploration licences are allocated in Canada. Com¬
panies submit sealed bids for desired leases in auctions which are held reg¬
ularly, and the highest bidder is awarded the lease. There is little room for
bureaucratic or political discretion in this system, and many would argue that it
is a better means than the discretionary award system of capturing economic
rent.
In the United Kingdom, the policy of rapid exploitation was instituted in the
mid-1960s with the encouragement of gas exploration and production by a
relatively generous fiscal regime and simple licensing procedure (Robinson
and Morgan, 1978, 19-20). It has been suggested that '.. .the Government
desired a rapid build-up of [petroleum] production in the 1970s in order to
bring relief to the weak balance-of-payments' (Kemp, 1984, 79). A discretion¬
ary system of licence awards was instituted in order to speed exploration, allow
for substantial British participation, and because of'. .. the fact that both the
Treasury and the then Ministry of Power relied on the cooperation of Shell and
BP, which favoured discretionary allocation over auction' (Garnault and
Clunies Ross, 1983, 280). The reasons for this preference are clear both in
terms of government and industry interests. On the government side, the
discretionary system is best suited to the nationalistic purposes associated by
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the British government with resource development (principally the encour¬
agement of British participation), and it vests enormous power in the bu¬
reaucratic department responsible for making awards. From the company
point of view, licences awarded by the flat fee, discretionary system are far less
expensively obtained than if awarded via competitive, sealed bids. The choice
of this system of licence award can thus be seen as having little to do with
depletion control and far more with the satisfaction of both government and
industry interests. It should be noted that despite much criticism of the
discretionary system as a far inferior means of capturing economic rent than
auction awards, the British government retains the discretionary system,
although it has experimented with auction sections in licensing rounds 4 (1971),
8 (1983), and 9 (1985), with increasing financial success.
In the Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act 1975 the government set out
specific ministerial powers to control depletion which were subject to virtually
no constraints. The Minister of Energy can set maximum and minimum
production rates, vary production plans and the like in accordance with his
determination of the national interest (Robinson and Morgan, 1978, 30-31).
However, these depletion powers have not been exercised.
Norway is well-known for its 'go-slow' depletion policy. In contrast to the
British policy of rapid development, the Norwegian government undertook to
moderate the depletion of its resource from the outset, not via production
controls but through the limited and discretionary award of exploration li¬
cences. It could afford to do so for several reasons, which include the differing
sizes of the two economies and populations, differing energy consumption,
and the fact that North Sea reserves are approximately the same for both states
(Robinson and Morgan, 1978, 27). With its small population and comfortable
balance of payments, there was little incentive for the government to advocate
rapid exploitation on economic grounds, much less for political reasons. As
Per Kleppe, the Finance Minister, expressed it in 1975:
As long as some of Norway's petroleum reserves remained below the North
Sea, our assets are probably fairly well placed. A gradual rise in the relative
price of petroleum would represent interest earned on these untouched
assets. Reasoning along these lines, this kind of investment compares
favorably with financial investment abroad (Lind and MacKay, 1979, 35).
The Norwegian Ministry of Energy carefully vets all licence applicants in a
process very similar to that employed by the British (Robinson and Morgan,
1978, 28). However, it held licensing rounds rather infrequently in the 1960s
and 1970s, and awarded fewer licences per round (4 rounds comprising 123
blocks, as opposed to 6 rounds awarding 296 blocks in UK territories (Bergen
Bank, 1985, 38; Noreng, 1980, 59), although the Norwegian blocks have
typically been of greater size than the British). Nonetheless, it has been
suggested that the Norwegian 'go slow' is not all it appears to be at first glance:
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In relation to domestic gas and oil requirements the U.K. target (produc¬
tion) level of 150 million tonnes ... is about 50 percent greater than domestic
demand. In Norway the target level of 90 million tonnes ... is about 800
percent greater. Looked at in that way, it could be argued that the Nor¬
wegian rate is about forty times faster than the U.K. Does that constitute a
'go slow' policy? (Lind and Mackay, 1979, 48).
None of the three states has implemented an explicit production policy regard¬
ing depletion of the resource, although all the governments have the powers to
do so; licensing procedures have largely determined the rate of resource
development. Canada and Britain use different methods to achieve similar
outcomes, while Britain and Norway use similar methods to achieve different
outcomes. In Canada, an auction system is the means by which the govern¬
ment attempts to maximize its capture of economic rent through the award of
licences, with little regard for the depletion rate of the resource. The British
government appears equally unconcerned with depletion, less concerned with
maximal economic rent in the award system, but more concerned with bu¬
reaucratic control and satisfaction of the national interest via that control.
Norway's famous 'go-slow' depletion policy is implemented via a mechanism
of awarding exploration licenses similar to that of Britain, although licensing
rounds have been less frequent and extensive. However, target rates of
production in relation to domestic requirements are far greater in Norway
than in Britain and it may be possible to argue that the Norwegian 'go-slow'
policy is not as restrictive as it is thought to be. The difference in the Nor¬
wegian approach from the British policy is largely accounted for by its les
constrained economic position, its abundance of other fuel sources, and the
public concern over the development of Norway's petroleum resources for the
benefit of the Norwegian people.
4. The fiscal regime
A. The model ofpolicy options
Fiscal arrangements concerning the exploitation of petroleum necessarily
indicate the economic interests of the state. If governments are assumed to be
economically rational, then royalty levels and taxation policies will be de¬
signed so as to capture the maximum economic rent from the exploitation of
the resource while leaving to private industry sufficient incentive in terms of
profit to continue developing the resource. The fiscal regime will also be
designed to encourage the production of marginal developments, while reap¬
ing a larger proportion of economic rent from more profitable fields. Modifica¬
tions to the royalty and taxation system will be expected to follow every major
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increase and/or decrease in the price of petroleum, whether the price is
government-regulated or follows the international market.
The fiscal regime can be designed along three broad lines: taxation on
corporate profits only (the free market option), resource rent taxation, and
taxation combined with incentives. Taxation on corporate profits alone would
imply that the development of petroleum resources is similar to any other
industrial activity and has no strategic importance and minimal external
economic and fiscal effects. This system was employed only in the very earliest
days of petroleum exploration and production in Canada, and never in the
United Kingdom or Norway. Resource rent taxation comprises taxation on
corporate profits in addition to a single resource rent tax (a royalty) designed
to capture maximal economic rent for the owners of the resource from those
who are developing it. The advantages of this scheme are associated with its
simplicity and efficacy in capturing economic rent, while the disadvantages
might be thought to lie in its inflexibility in terms of encouraging marginal
developments. Taxation combined with incentives overcomes the difficulty
with resource rent taxation in that it allows for the development of an often
complicated scheme of various taxes and incentives, the objectives of which
are to capture maximal economic rent, leave sufficient incentive to investors,
and encourage the development of marginal prospects.
B. The policies
The petroleum fiscal regime in Canada was relatively straightforward until the
first OPEC price increases of f973-74. Petroleum production was subject to
Alberta royalties, initially introduced in 1931, and normal corporate income
tax at both the federal and provincial levels. Royalty rates were increased very
occasionally as prices increased, but beyond that the petroleum industry was
taxed as any other industry in Canada.
The export tax introduced by the federal government in 1974 incited the
Alberta government to increase its royalty rates substantially, but over the late
1970s the export tax decreased in relation to negotiated increases in the well¬
head price of crude oil. It was not until the introduction of the National Energy
Program in 1980 that the petroleum fiscal regime in Canada became a compli¬
cated arrangement of various taxes and incentive schemes. In the NEP a new
federal well-head tax, the Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax (PGRT) was
introduced along with the Petroleum Compensation Charge (PCC) - levied at
the refinery gate, and the Canadian Ownership Special Charge (COSC) -
levied on gasoline at the pumps. The PGRT was, in effect, a federal royalty on
petroleum production, and part of these revenues funded the Petroleum
Incentives Program (PIP) which was a grant system directed at Canadian-
ill
owned companies to encourage exploration on the Canada Lands. The PCC
was to provide a fund from which more expensive imported oil was to be
subsidized for refiners in eastern Canada who had to purchase it. The COSC
was to provide monies to be used by Petro-Canada to acquire foreign pe¬
troleum companies in the Canadianization effort undertaken by the federal
government. This complicated taxation-incentive regime was strongly ob¬
jected to by the Albertan government, which saw it as an encroachment on
provincial jurisdiction over natural resources. The Memorandum of Agree¬
ment on Taxation and Pricing made between the two governments in Septem¬
ber 1981 modified the NEP price schedules, and introduced a further federal
windfall profits tax, the Incremental Oil Revenue Tax (IORT), which, how¬
ever, was very shortly thereafter suspended. The fiscal regime of the NEP
remained basically intact until the Conservative government negotiated the
Western Accord with the producing provinces in March 1985. Under this
agreement, the fiscal arrangements of the NEP were dismantled, and the
federal government pledged itself to foregoing a resource rent tax and simply
taxing corporate profits on the petroleum industry as had been the case before
1973.
In the April 1973 budget the British Conservative government decided that
North Sea production should be treated differently for tax purposes than other
corporate activity. Up to this point, royalties had been a part of the licensing
agreements, and corporate tax had been levied on companies as in any other
British industry. The Oil Taxation Act, passed in February 1975, introduced
the Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT), which was increased in subsequent bud¬
gets. In November 1980 the Chancellor announced his intention to implement
a new petroleum tax, which duty appeared in the March budget of 1981. The
Supplementary Petroleum Duty (SPD) was designed to capture an increasing
share of the increasing price of oil, but like the IORT in Canada, it was shortly
thereafter suspended. The 1983 budget introduced some incremental tax relief
in terms of royalty exclusions and, tax allowances, and corporate tax rates
were reduced in the 1984 budget. As in the Canadian case, the level of
government taxation clearly increased with the increasing potential for eco¬
nomic gain from petroleum production, but once the international price
started to fall, the government reduced and eliminated some taxes in order to
sustain sufficient incentive for the industry to continue investing in North Sea
petroleum activities.
Norwegian production is subject to corporate tax, royalties and a special tax
(ST) on petroleum which was introduced in 1975. Royalties are levied on a
sliding scale with rates, ranging from 8% to 16%, fixed according to the level of
production - the same system as that employed in the province of Alberta
(Robinson and Morgan, 1978, 94). The ST approximates the British PRT.
Robinson and Morgan estimated that at 1977 prices and taxes, the Norwegian
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and British petroleum tax systems probably yielded similar percentage
government tax shares (Robinson and Morgan, 1978, 105). The average tax
rate increased from 69.2% to 81.8% in 1980, with the ST increasing from 25%
to 35% thus absorbing much of the windfall profit which would have otherwise
accrued to the industry. With the dramatic decrease in international petroleum
prices, the rate of the ST has not been changed, though ameliorations to
various allowances have been made.
This brief outline of the petroleum fiscal regimes of Canada, Britain, and
Norway illustrates some broad similarities in the policies of the three coun¬
tries. Roughly speaking, the Canadian fiscal arrangements appear slightly
more complicated than those of the UK and Norway, largely due to the
federal-provincial conflicts surrounding energy issues. Britain and Norway
have approximately similar taxes levied on petroleum production which
yielded, in the latter half of the 1970s at least, approximately similar govern¬
ment shares. In the environment of declining world prices, all three govern¬
ments have reevaluated their petroleum fiscal regimes with varying results.
Conclusion
An application of public choice principles to a comparative analysis of pe¬
troleum policy outputs in Canada, Britain, and Norway has proved a useful
exercise. As expected, the policies within four issue areas possess more
similarities than might have been expected at the outset, at least in terms of
general objectives and methods. Where differences are evident, they seem to
have political origins, as with price in the Canadian federal state or with
Statoil's longevity in Norway, or to have been the result of differing economic
constraints on the state, as in the case of a more conservative depletion policy
in Norway. In short, it would appear that the fundamental determinants of
petroleum policies in the three states have been the international price and
public concern over both cost and control of petroleum development.
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